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A B S T R A C T
Historically, international relations texts were concerned with determining systematic 
approaches. Initially, it was assumed the entire system was homogeneous. Rarely were spatial 
differences and non-European studies considered. Over time this has changed as international 
relations evolved to include more actors. The rise and fall of powers has meant the epicentre of 
focus and literature continues to shift. Prior to the industrial revolution and European 
colonisation, the ancient empires of China, Mongolia and Italy took their turns in dominating 
the international political economy. The US replaced the European colonists. Since the end of 
WWH Japan has emerged as an economic superpower. Similarly, the rise of the East Asian 
Tigers and communism’s collapse attracted substantial attention. Indeed, trends and issues also 
generate attention and literature. During the Cold War, ideology, free markets, East versus 
West, North versus South, non-alignment, bipolarism, hegemony, the arms race and game 
theory were dominant. Since the 1990s, communism’s collapse, transition, democratisation, 
decentralisation, globalisation and multipolarity have all been in vogue. Moreover, the rise in 
global communications has meant international relations have become more transparent. With 
so much information (perhaps too much) trends are more visible. However, the end of 
bipolarity has meant international relations are no longer as predictable as they once were. 
Many theories of international relations, based around historical events, have been thrown out 
of the window. Similarly, theories about the state, statehood and sovereignty have changed. 
The domestic transition process of the former Eastern bloc has been accompanied by an 
international systematic metamorphosis that has made the domestic as unpredictable as the 
international, against a backdrop of increasing numbers of actors.
The collapse of central authority has exacerbated the rise of regions and global relations. 
Classical theories that revolved around the state, such as statehood and sovereignty, are now in 
disarray. Within the state and international political economy there has been an exponential 
growth in actors that are responsible for changes in the nature and structure of relations. One 
such actor is the subnational region. This volume focuses on one such region -  the Russian Far 
East [(henceforth the Far East) (see Figure A 1.2)] -  and its role in Russian-Japanese relations 
(see Figure A l.l). Moreover, it looks at how roles might change. It provides the basis for
building a model, concept, theory or notion that could be used as the basis for determining 
and/or investigating the roles regions can play in the changing international political economy.
This volume is the culmination of ten plus years of work. Its intention is to examine the role 
that subnational regions, henceforth regions, can and do play in a changing international 
political economy. Changes in the international political economy mean regions now have the 
ability to play a role in international relations. In some cases they have entirely redefined the 
nature of relations. This raises the question as to whether regions have become actors in their 
own right -  both within the state and the international political economy. This thesis 
investigates this and related issues, by using the Far East, as a case study vis-a-vis its relations 
with Japan (see Figure A1.3). Whether the Far East can truly be considered to play a role, in 
this case in shaping relations with Japan, is central to this piece of work. Indeed, although 
issues within Russia (local, regional, subnational, centre-periphery, national) and in North-East 
Asia complicate this study they do make for a more than interesting case study and one that is 
relevant to many themes and issues in international relations (see Figures A1.9 and A. 10).
The Far East continues to be of interest to academics from all disciplines and policymakers 
alike. Russian-Japanese relations are a critical framework for understanding the development 
and the role of this region. Geographical proximity, historical interaction, complementary 
economics, the balance of power and the need for the resolution of a territorial dispute confirm 
this. Traditionally, studies about the Far East focused on the region’s resources within the 
context of North-East Asian geopolitics. There has been a continuous debate as to whether the 
region is Russia’s outpost or gateway vis-a-vis North-East Asia. Since Gorbachev’s 1986 
Vladivostok and 1988 Krasnoiarsk speeches the Far East seemed destined to be a gateway. 
However, post-communist transition, centre-periphery conflicts and the reality of the anti­
resource thesis have thrown the region into disarray. The Far East’s resources are well 
documented; they form the basis for the renaissance of contemporary interest with the view to 
potential exploitation and local decision-making. Meanwhile, contemporary studies of 
Russian-Japanese relations have been dominated by the Kuril Islands/Northern Territories, but 
perhaps needlessly so (see Figures A1.4, A1.5, A1.6, A1.7, A1.8 and Appendix 2).
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ABBREVIATIONS
Amur Amurskaia Oblast’ (Amur Oblast or Amur)
APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum
ASEAN Association of South-East Asian Nations
ASN News Attorney Search Network News
BBC-SWB British Broadcasting Corporation-Summary of World Broadcasts
Chukotka Chukotskii Avtonomnyi Okrug (Chukotka Autonomous Okrug or
Chukotka)
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CNN Cable News Network
COMECON Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (or CMEA)
CSCE Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EIU-BR Economist Intelligence Unit-Business Russia
EL-RFE Economic Life of the Russian Far East
EU European Union
Evreiska Evreiskaia Avtonomnaia Oblast’ (Jewish Autonomous Oblast’ or
Evreiska)
FESCO Far Eastern Shipping Company
G7 Group of Seven
G8 Group of Eight
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades
GNP Gross National Product
IMF International Monetary Fund
IWGIA International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs
Kamchatka Kamchatskaia Oblast’ (Kamchatka Oblast or Kamchatka)
Khabarovsk Khabarovskii Krai (Khabarovsk Krai or Khabarovsk)
Koriak Koriaskii Avtonomnyi Okrug (Koriak Autonomus Okrug or Koriak)
Magadan Magadanskaia Oblast’ (Magadan Oblast or Magadan)
MNCs Multi-National Corporations
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGOs Non-Governmental Organisations
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
Primorie Primorskii Krai (Maritime Region or Primor’e)
RFE Russian Far East
RFE/RL Russian Far East/Radio Liberty
RIA-Novosti Russian Information Agency-Novosti
ROTOBO Japan Association for Trade with Russia and Central-Eastern Europe
(formerly SOTOBO -  Japan Association for Trade with the Soviet Union 
and the socialist nations of Europe)
Sakha Respublika Sakha (Yakutia) {[Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)] or Sakha}
Sakhalin Sakhalinskaia Oblast (Sakhalin Oblast or Sakhalin)
UN United Nations
WEU Western European Union
WTO World Trade Organisation
WWI World War One
WWII World War Two
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
It is the intention of this volume to examine the role that regions can and do play in a 
changing international political economy. The author will illustrate this by using the Russian 
Far East as the case study of a region and Russian-Japanese relations as the framework 
representing the changing international political economy. This research will culminate in 
the dissemination of findings that will make conclusions about three key issues:
>  The relationship between Russia and Japan;
>  The role of regions in shaping the external relations of the Russian Federation; and
>  The significance of regions for international relations in the conditions of globalisation 
as an indication of the changing international political economy.
Interest and Specialisation
The author’s initial interest in Russia, Japan and the Far East was bom out of the pull of the 
enigma of tsarist Russia. In the beginning, research revolved around understanding the 
communist system and the chronology of Russian and Soviet history. It was clear at an early 
stage, however, this study would include more than history. Russian and Soviet history had 
very much been determined by geography. Geography played a role in the Russian and 
Soviet systems. The addition of the Far East and Japan to the equation came as a result of 
initial postgraduate studies in development. Could half-a-century of development policies be 
applied to a vast land such as Russia to facilitate the exploitation of her resources and her 
integration into the international political economy? While development studies focused on 
the economic progress of former colonies, transition conversely focused on the economic 
progress of a collapsed empire and its satellites. When the Soviet Union collapsed, 
expectation was that the former communist bloc would be a vast new market for consumer 
goods, supplier of natural resources and a new partner in international relations. Very 
quickly this enthusiasm waned. What alternative options could be considered?
At the time of the Soviet Union’s collapse there were also numerous studies highlighting 
Japan’s desire for new sources of natural resources. This was driven by the hope to reduce 
dependency upon the Middle East and to cope with increasing demands for natural resources
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and energy. What were Japan’s options? Her distance from and the turbulent political 
situation in the Middle East was part of the decision to diversify lines; indeed, proximity was 
key. Furthermore, of all of her neighbours, it was Russia who had the resources to meet these 
demands. This laid the foundations for the construction of the macro framework within 
which relations between two states could be analysed. However, this was an incomplete 
framework. If Russia was going to be a source of natural resources the location of these 
resources also had to be considered. After all proximity was part of the decision to look for 
alternative sources and in a vast country such as a Russia this was going to be a key issue. In 
Russia these resources were located in the Far East.
Further investigation uncovered both theoretical and historical analyses that could be used as 
the basis for Russian-Japanese cooperation in the form of the natural-fit thesis. The idea 
assumed that the complementary nature of economies was the underlying reason for building 
relations between states and, subsequently, this would result in cooperation in other fields: 
Russia’s vast resources and capital, with a technology and know-how deficiency; 
Conversely, Japan’s capital, technology and know-how with a resource deficiency. Initial 
research questioned why there had not been greater Russian-Japanese cooperation. 
Moreover, Gorbachev’s attempts to establish relations with North-East Asia, with special 
attention to Japan, had not fully exploited this potential. What were the key issues 
determining Russian-Japanese relations? The literature was peppered with one theme -  the 
territorial dispute (see Figures A 1.4, A 1.5, A 1.6, A 1.7, A 1.8 and Appendix 2). What was 
this territorial dispute? Why were these tiny islands so important? Given that the domestic 
and international frameworks had changed for both states, surely the territorial issue would 
have been marginalised? Well in some circles yes and in others no. In the traditional 
framework of bilateral relations -  i.e. those between Moscow and Tokyo -  the territorial 
issue continued to dominate. However, globalisation and decentralisation of the state meant 
local and regional forces had pushed an immense number of new actors onto the 
international stage. These new actors included subnational actors, and it was relations 
between subnational actors (for example, Primorie and Hokkaido), or between one 
subnational actor and centres of political power (for example, Sakha and Tokyo), that had 
started to shift attention away from the territorial issue.
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Amongst these new subnational actors was the Far East -  a region of immense resources that 
were key to the natural fit thesis’s success in Russian-Japanese relations. The Far East was 
an example of a region rich in resources that had gained domestic and international attention. 
This resource-rich region -  trying to gain greater autonomy over its wealth, politicise its 
position vis-a-vis the centre and forge an international role -  made for an interesting case 
study as it raised issues of centre-periphery relations, sovereignty and the role regions can 
play in the domestic and international political frameworks. Where these regions were 
located and whether or not they had resources could also affect their success in striving for 
greater autonomy and a heightened international role.
The framework for the study had been established -  the role of a resource-rich region at the 
edge of a state in an economically complementary bilateral relationship: Russian-Japanese 
Relations -  What Role fo r  the Far East? The case study of the thesis would be an example of 
the role of a region in the changing international political economy.
The Far East
The Far East (Dalni Vostok) refers to the Russian (formerly Soviet) Far East. Once called 
Pacific Siberia, it is that region of the Russian Federation (and FSU) between Eastern Siberia 
and the Pacific Ocean. The Far East comprises ten territories (all subjects of the Russian 
Federation) -  Amur, Chukotka, Evreiska, Kamchatka, Koriak, Khabarovsk, Magadan, 
Primorie, Sakha and Sakhalin (see Figure A1.2).
Under the 1993 constitution there are four different jurisdictional designations -  krai, oblast, 
autonomous okrug and republic. The word krai literally means margin. Historically, it referred 
to border territories but is now applied to all types of territories. Administratively, the 
difference between an oblast and a krai is that the latter of the two tends to be larger in terms of 
area. An autonomous okrug is a territory with indigenous minorities that have certain 
privileges distinct from an oblast’ or a krai. There are two autonomous okrugs in the Far East -  
Koriak (home to the Koriaki) and Chukotka (home to the Chukchi) -  both created in 1930. In 
1928 a homeland for Russian Jews was created in the Far East. The area was designated an 
autonomous oblast in 1934 (originally called Birobidzhan). There is one republic in the Far
16
East -  Sakha. A republic enjoys the most privileges due to its special constitutional status. In 
the case of Sakha this is due to a combination of factors, including its ethnic population, its 
size (about five times the size of France) and its phenomenal resources (especially diamonds 
and gold). An elected president heads a republic. The native Yakuti are now only a small part 
of Sakha's population. Russia-Sakha relations are governed by the 1993 constitution and a 
special bilateral treaty signed in July 1994.
The Far East is Asia’s oldest region. Prior to its incorporation into the Russian state it was a 
melting pot of North-East Asian peoples while being home to the dozens of native groups 
resident in the Eurasian North. However, it is the wealth of resources that have always been the 
region’s fait accompli. It is these resources that lured Russia to extend her empire and claim 
these lands. But is the combination of resources and geographical location that has been key to 
the Far East’s historical role. It has been a frontier between the Russian/Soviet empires and 
North-East Asia. It has been a power base for the projection of military strength. It has been a 
buffer zone between Moscow and North-East Asia’s centres of political power. It was the 
engine that fuelled the Soviet economic machine; the region benefited from the best the Soviet 
development model had to offer. Throughout its history the Far East has played numerous roles 
that have been determined by the dynamics of the Russian state and the international political 
economy.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, the debate as to what role the Far East should play 
resurfaced. With the end of central planning and the decline of military-industrial complexes, 
the Far East has had to re-consider its role within the state and within North-East Asia. Socio­
politico-economic liberalisation, combined with globalisation, has resulted in the Far East 
becoming an actor in its own right. Indeed, the Far East exemplifies the debates over centre- 
periphery relations, regions and regionalism, localisation, decentralisation, federalism, 
sovereignty, globalisation, transition, resource-rich regions and non-state actors. Moreover, the 
individual territories that make up this area also have their own agendas and have also sought 
to establish with Moscow and internationally, independently from each other. This, in turn, 
raises questions over the unitary nature of the Far East as a region.
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The Far East As A Unitary Region
The geographically informed are aware and understand that regions are created to interpret 
complexity. But regions are also socio-economic, political, strategic, cultural and 
administrative. In the case of the Far East she is an administrative region defining a unique 
socio-economic, geographical and historical area. Others use the Far East to distinguish the 
direction of policy and strategy. The Far East can be considered a region -  in terms of 
geography and in terms of administration. Under the Soviet Union the Far East was the subject 
of large-scale planning. Some form of regionalisation usually accompanied planning. At its 
simplest, a region was a specified area set apart for particular attention either because of 
potentialities, human content, strategic importance or relative backwardness. Conceptually, 
planning, at its most complex, sees the entire national area subdivided into regions. But this 
can be confusing in that there are two types of regions -  those in terms of individual territories, 
such as Primor’e, and those in terms of sub-national areas such as the Far East. Indeed, Russia 
is made up of eighty-nine regions while being subdivided into large planning regions. But this 
can be confusing in that there are two types of regions -  those in terms of individual territories, 
such as Primor’e, and those in terms of sub-national areas such as the Far East. Indeed, Russia 
is made up of eighty-nine regions while being subdivided into larger planning regions.
There have been three attempts to classify Russia’s eighty-nine regions -  Hanson (1996), 
Lysenko and Matveev (1999), Bradshaw and Treyvish (2000). Each study identified a number 
of prospective roles for each region. However, each region potentially has more than one role 
with which it can identify. Indeed, at the subnational level, the whole Far Eastern region too 
had many roles with which it could also identify. The three classification studies were a 
starting point for developing and interpreting the Far East -  its role, image and position. 
Though these models were broad, vague and simplistic, what they did do was highlight the fact 
that the individual territories of the Far East, though geographically representing an area of the 
Russian Federation, were difficult to classify or label. As with the individual territories, the 
region, as a whole, too had many roles. Moreover, it showed that it was difficult to regard the 
Far East as a unitary region.
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Each of the Far Eastern territories has different political statuses, non-uniform relations with 
Moscow, varying resource endowments and distinguishing climatic features. Some of the Far 
East’s territories can be regarded as gateways based on their geographical location. Others are 
resource-rich regions based on their abundance of resources, as well as their capacity and 
ability to exploit those resources. In terms of the concept of centre-periphery relations, each of 
the Far Eastern territories can be broken down into at least four dimensions -  cultural, 
economic, political and geographical. The cultural focuses on elite-minority ethnic relations. 
The economic focuses on exploitation and uneven wealth distribution. The political is 
concerned with participation and power. The geographical is related to distance, territorial 
status and regional conflict. Each of these four criteria further highlighting and emphasising 
differences between the Far Eastern territories.
While the Far East has an extraction economy, politically it is an arena of ten regional players 
forming no single political entity. Despite the creation of the Association of Far Eastern and 
Trans-Baikal Territories, an interregional association, little progress has been made in pushing 
for unified autonomy and policy, in spite of common interests, shared geography and similar 
post-Soviet/transitional problems. Infighting and competition between the various territories 
have been the key negative forces. Consequently, Moscow has been able to continue to hold 
onto power through a policy of divide and rule. Though separatists would argue the Far East 
needs an association to centralise regional problems and coordinate efforts to lobby Moscow, 
attract foreign investment, deal with political corruption and have various regional bodies 
answerable to a superior authority, realistically and unfortunately, it is likely that such a body 
will add to existing bureaucracy and centralise political corruption. In the case of the 
Association of Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal Territories it has added no value whatsoever and 
remains very much a non-influential, non-unifying institution.
The Far Eastern political situation has been turbulent. It is anti-Moscow in character. To a 
considerable extent Far Eastern politics is attributable to the region’s geography -  both within 
the Russian Federation and vis-a-vis the Pacific Basin. Understanding Far Eastern politics is 
best done through sub-divisions of the region -  the south (Khabarovsk, Primor’e and Amur) is 
anti-Moscow and pro-nationalist. The north (Magadan and Kamchatka) is less anti-Moscow.
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While Sakhalin and Sakha are special cases given their pro-Moscow and pro-reform natures, 
and their immense resource endowments as well as their success at attracting foreign 
investment. This is a simplification and on many occasions Magadan has been conservative, 
while Khabarovsk has been moderate. Far Eastern politics is a battleground -  federally and 
locally. Despite common problems, little unitary success has materialised and secession is 
unlikely.
Russian-Japanese Relations
Since the end of WWQ, Russian (and Soviet) relations with Japan have been characterised by 
reticence and suspicion, mainly attributable to the overarching territorial dispute over the 
Northern Territories/Kurils Islands (see Figures A1.4, A1.5, A1.6, A1.7, A1.8 and Appendix 
2). However, during the Soviet era there were three waves of positive engagement: 1955-1956, 
during the re-establishment of diplomatic relations; 1972-1974, when Siberian and Far Eastern 
resources were elevated as the energy crisis forced Japan to search for alternative sources; and 
since 1988, as Gorbachev’s approach seemed to augur well for improved relations. It is only 
now, more than half a century on, there seems some possibility that foundations for a 
resolution of the territorial dispute could be established which would significantly improve 
Russian-Japanese relations. The Cold War’s conclusion, the Soviet Union’s collapse and 
Russia’s transition brought expectations of a speedy resolution to this dispute which has, thus 
far, failed to materialise. Resolution of the territorial issue -  the main reason preventing the 
signing of a post-WWH peace treaty between Russia and Japan -  would bring untold political 
and economic opportunities, fully incorporating Russia (not just the Far East) as an actor and a 
power in North-East Asia. Trade is the most beneficial aspect of Russian-Japanese relations but 
remains to be fully exploited.
However, crises, conflicts of interest and war are not just a post-WWII phenomenon in 
Russian-Japanese relations. The two, along with China, have been contestants for North-East 
Asia, particularly the Korean Peninsula (see Figure A1.10) and Manchuria (see Figure A1.9), 
for much of the last two millennia. Indeed, crises, conflicts of interest and war have always 
been central to Russian-Japanese relations.
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Contribution to the Field of Study
This study strives to make a contribution to the field of international relations by attempting to 
fill in some of the gaps in the literature as well as by building on existing literature in four key 
ways:
> Firstly, the incorporation of theory into his study -  something innovative in studies about 
Russian-Japanese relations and the Far East;
> Secondly, by attempting to determine the socio-politico-economic role of (resource-rich) 
regions in international relations by using the Far East as an example. This is complicated 
by the fact the region’s historical role has shifted many times and today it has many 
prospective and existing roles. Thus, the role of a region, such as the Far East, needs to 
include an investigation into gateway, frontier and peripheral regions -  all of which raise 
issues about sovereignty, centre-periphery relations, decentralisation, federalism, 
regionalism, nationalism and cooperation;
>  Next, this study attempts to understand post-Soviet Russian-Japanese relations and the Far 
East both independently and in the frameworks of Russian-Japanese relations and North- 
East Asia; and
> Finally, by using all of this research and its findings the key objective is to provide a 
contribution to the literature of international relations by investigating the role of regions in 
the changing international political economy.
Indeed, this research will make a contribution from the fact that the primary research conducted 
is different in terms of time, location and interviewees than that previously undertaken in this 
field of study (see Appendix 3).
Literature Review
The classic texts in Russian-Japanese relations focus on the territorial issue. Little 
consideration has been given to other aspects of the bilateral relationship. Hasegawa’s The 
Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations (1998) exemplifies this. Though 
one of the most recent texts on Russian-Japanese relations, it fails to journey beyond the 
territorial issue. Older texts such as Lensen’s The Russian Push Toward Japan (1959) make 
more interesting reading but still focus upon territorial issues. Stephan’s The Kurile Islands
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(1974), Malozemoff s Russian Far Eastern Policy (1958), Connaughton’s The War o f the 
Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear (1989), White’s The Diplomacy o f the Russo-Japanese War 
(1964), Westwood’s Russia Against Japan (1986) and Jain’s The USSR and Japan (1981) are 
somewhat more successful in examining the aspects of Russian-Japanese relations but the 
territorial issue very much remains central to the discussions. Moreover, the literature 
highlights the nature of the relationship that has existed between Russia and Japan, one where 
Moscow and Tokyo have determined and executed policy.
There are, however, a number of more recent edited collections that have been successful in 
going beyond the territorial dispute. These include Akaha’s Politics and Economics in the 
Russian Far East (1997), The UN’s Trade and Investment Complementarities in North-East 
Asia (1996), and ERINA’s Japan and Russia in North-East Asia (1997). These later texts, 
along with numerous articles, have examined the prospects of Russian-Japanese relations that 
are based around other aspects of cooperation and, moreover, they discuss relations that go 
beyond the traditional Moscow-Tokyo dynamic. By analysing relationships that include 
subnational regions, such as the Far East, as well as security, trade, resource cooperation and 
cultural exchange issues, the outlook for Russian-Japanese relations seems optimistic. 
Developments in the field provide evidence of this and the rise in numerous regional 
newspapers and lines of communication mean this progress is now being reported. 
Nonetheless, official reports, such as those from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
politically biased newspapers and texts written by natives on each side continue to focus on the 
territorial issue and are merely interested in attaining political support for their position on the 
dispute, though other issues may be referenced, rather than investigating the wider framework.
Literature about the Far East has long centred on the region’s resources. The most authoritative 
text about the region is Stephan’s The Russian Far East -  A History (1994). The book is very 
successful in detailing all aspects of the Far East’s history and goes far beyond what most 
studies do -  listing resources. Other key studies, such as Armstrong’s Russian Settlement in the 
North (1965), Forsyth’s History o f the People in Siberia (1992), Wood’s Siberia and 
Khisamutdinov’s The Russian Far East (1996) also make wonderful reading by providing an 
analysis of the region in historical, geopolitical and socio-economic contexts. Collectively they
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demonstrate the multi-disciplinary approach necessary for understanding this region. Yet little 
literature has emerged on the region’s politics. Many articles give a general overview of what is 
going on but none is successful in providing significant detail, building general notions of Far 
Eastern politics or applying political and/or international relations theory. One explanation is 
that there is too happening on and by the time the printer hits the press everything is dated.
Russian texts on the Far East have focused on history and economics. Professor Pavel Minakir 
(based at Khabarovsk Institute of Economic Research) has been key in supplying data about 
the economic situation in the Far East. Numerous articles in edited collections and his Da ’Inii 
Vostok Rossii -  Ekonomicheskoe Obozrenie (1993), Ekonomika D al’nego Vostoka -  
Reforma i Krizis (1994), DaVnii Vostok Rossii -  Ekonomicheskoe Obozrenie (1995), The 
Russian Far East -  An Economic Handbook (with Freeze) (1994), The Russian Far East -  
An Economic Survey (with Freeze) (1996), Ekonomika DaVnego Vostoka -  Perekhodnyi 
Period (with Mikheeva) (1995) and Ekonomika DaVnego Vostoka v Usloviiak Reformy -  
Materialy Mezhdunarodnoi Konferentsii (with Mikheeva) (1995) all confirm this. However, 
it should be remembered the region’s economy and its location have politicised its position 
vis-a-vis Moscow and North-East Asia. Indeed, the region’s resources and geography are key 
to determining its politics and future.
Methodology
The Oxford English Dictionary defines methodology as the science o f method; a body o f 
methods used in a particular branch o f activity. In determining the methodology for this thesis, 
it was critical to consider all aspects of the study, so as to take account of the body of methods 
used in international relations. Indeed, it was critical to consider both primary and secondary 
sources. It was not sufficient to regurgitate all existing materials, or to reiterate an argument 
with some additional sources thrown in to produce a biased picture. It was about reaching 
conclusions through investigation of a subject and the appropriate theoretical and 
contemporary issues, ideas and themes. Since the seventeenth century, in Western culture the 
word thinking has become synonymous with the acts of observing, questioning, investigating, 
analysing and synthesising. The scientific method has moved beyond the natural sciences into 
the study of human beings and society (thus the birth of political science, sociology,
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economics, psychology and communications). In the humanities the emphasis is also on 
observing, questioning, investigating, analysing and synthesising. This is what critical thinking 
means. Indeed, critical thinking ties at the heart of any research. Thus, when determining the 
research methodologies for this volume, the process involved:
> Asking questions;
>  Gathering as much information as possible on the subject in an effort to find answers to key 
questions; and
>  Carefully and systematically judging the meaning of the information gathered.
As a contractor is unable to build a house without lumber, nails, pipes and electrical wiring -  
the physical materials of a building -  it is impossible to develop an idea, a conception of the 
world, without concrete facts about that world. Depending upon the type of research being 
undertaken, the evidence that can be gathered may be primary or secondary. In this case it 
involved both.
Primary research involves gathering facts or evidence by going directly to the source itself -  in 
the case of this thesis this involved fieldwork in Russia, Japan and the US. It involved learning 
Russian in order to facilitate communication with appropriate individuals in the field, as well 
as to have the ability to read relevant local materials and understand local culture to get into the 
psyche and the reasoning behind decision-making. Primary research for this thesis was 
conducted during the period June 1995-June 1998 in Russia, Japan and the US with sixty 
officials, academics and business personnel at national and subnational locations (see table 
below for a summary and Appendix 3 for a detailed fieldwork diary).
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State City Date Institutional Affiliation Activities
Russia Moscow Jun-Aug 1995 Moscow International University- 
Moscow Institute of Social and 
Political Studies
Russian language; 
Interviews
Russia Moscow Mar-Apr 1996 Moscow State University Russian language; 
Interviews; Research
US Boston Jun-Aug 1996 Harvard University Russian language; 
Interviews; Research
Russia Moscow Nov 1996 None Interviews; Research
Russia Vladivostok Dec 1996 Far Eastern State University Interviews; Research
Russia Khabarovsk Dec 1996 Khabarovsk Economic Research 
Institute
Interviews; Research
Japan Tokyo Jan-Feb 1997 None Interviews; Research
US Hawai’i Mar 1997 University of Hawai’i; 
East-West Centre
Interviews; Research
US Seattle Mar 1997 University of Washington Interviews; Research
US New York Mar 1997 Institute of East-West Studies Interviews; Research
US U rbana-Champaign Jun 1997 University of Illinois at Urbana- 
Champaign
Research
Japan Tokyo Oct 1997 None Interviews; Research
Japan Kyoto Oct 1997 Kyoto Institute of Economic 
Research
Interviews; Research
Japan Niigata Oct 1997 Economic Research Institute for 
North-East Asia
Interviews; Research
Japan Sapporo Oct 1997 Hokkaido University Interviews; Research
Russia Vladivostok Jun 1998 Far Eastern State University Interviews; Research
Primary research, as groundbreaking, inspiring and unique as it may be, is irrelevant and 
incomplete without secondary research. Indeed, secondary research is necessary prior to the 
conduct of the primary research. Secondary research looks at existing materials -  be they prior 
fieldwork, newspapers, theoretical studies, articles, books, conferences or other items. It is 
secondary research that essentially involves using theories and hypotheses completed, 
conclusions reached, completed, investigations done, facts and/or evidence discovered and 
used. Secondary research for this volume was conducted with the help of English, Russian and 
Japanese publications in the form of books, articles and newspapers.
The classification of research for this volume was then split into three categories:
>  Facts -  pieces of information that could be objectively observed and measured;
>  Inferences -  statements made about the unknown made on the basis of the known; not 
necessary statements of truth but hypotheses that may or may not be valid; and
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> Judgements -  expressions of the author’s approval or disapproval of occurrences, persons 
or objects being described; making inferences and judgements is natural. But facts in 
themselves are meaningless.
The classification of research in the process of this volume’s culmination involved gathering 
facts to test, to reassess inferences about the themes, issues and ideas of this thesis. Indeed, it 
also involved the careful examination of the inferences and judgements of others to determine 
if those inferences or hypotheses are reasonable and, indeed, applicable.
Following on from research classification, the next stage of methodology involved evaluating 
the research. Though there are numerous methods to collate facts to reach conclusions, it is key 
to avoid, as far as possible, any biases and prejudices. Thus, it is necessary to determine some 
systematic, objective way to assess and examine facts. Some disciplines rely on mathematical 
models, like statistical analyses. Other disciplines rely on logic, or what can be termed 
reasonable arguments. In developing this thesis it was necessary to select some systematic 
methods of analysing the evidence gathered otherwise it was possible to end up simply 
rationalising or justifying one opinion or school of thought. Justification and rationalisation are 
the anti-thesis of the whole purpose of research, the main purpose of which is actually to open 
inferences or judgements to objective testing.
Whether undertaking primary or secondary research methodology is usually typical of that 
undertaken by those carrying out similar research -  be it other academic work or other research 
conducted in similar fields of studies. It was the author’s obligation to initially gather as much 
evidence as possible about the area of study, and to oblige testing methods and/or evidence 
testing considered appropriate to the field of study. In short, undertaking research for this 
volume, involved questioning, searching, weighting, assessing, as well as drawing personal 
inferences while critically examining the inferences of others.
Research methodology is not the solution for a problem nor is it the search for the final truth. It 
is a quest for a solution, an answer that evidence points to. It is a conclusion.
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Structure
This volume is divided into five distinct sections -  theory, history, application, conclusions and 
appendices. The first section is a summary of all appropriate theories relevant to the thesis. It 
reviews international relations theories, as well as appropriate political themes and ideas such 
as those about regions, transition and globalisation. History is the focus of section two where 
there is a review of the Far East and its role in Russian-Japanese relations. This journey begins 
with the Russian Empire’s Eastward expansion and concludes with the region’s post-Soviet 
transition, emphasising interactions with Japan along the way. The third section uses the ideas 
from the theoretical section and the knowledge from the historical section and applies it to the 
case study in hand with conclusions reached from the primary research done in the field. This 
section essentially tests the theories of section one, reviews the impact of the history of section 
two, while reaching a new set of conclusions based on the author’s work in the field. The 
fourth section of the thesis attempts to reach some appropriate conclusions on the case study in 
focus and, more generally, about the role of regions in the international political economy. 
Finally, section five is a summary of appendices containing information about the Far East and 
Russian-Japanese relations from both primary and secondary sources. These appendices detail 
interesting facts relevant to the study but not key to the structure of the thesis.
Technical Notes
This thesis covers the period to 1998 (the pre-Putin period). Any conclusions reached and any 
analysis done refer to that period.
Where possible the author has refrained from using the terms Northern Territories and Kuril 
Islands. Instead terms such as disputed territories have been used to prevent any bias.
Russian statistics are notable for their unreliability. The two main problems are that they are 
either driven by political motivation or do not include unofficial trade (which usually takes the 
form of bartering or illegal transactions). However, what is important is a trend not statistical 
accuracy.
For consistency all currency references, unless stated, are in United States Dollars (US$).
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Sources referred to more than once in a chapter will be stated in full when initially quoted and 
then, subsequently, using op. cit. If the same source is used in subsequent chapters it will, 
initially, again be stated in full and then op. cit. will be used for further references in that 
chapter. This is to make reading and reference to sources easier for the reader.
The British Library’s System of Transliteration has been used for Russian to English 
transliteration. Where translations have already been undertaken (such as in the case of an 
author’s name for materials used or for the name of a journal) these have not been amended to 
be consistent with the British Library’s System of Transliteration.
Japanese sources are based on interviews carried out in English and Russian as well as from 
sources translated into English or Russian from Japanese.
The bibliography has been organised into regions -  Western, Russian and Japanese. The 
written sources are listed first -  texts, journals and then newspapers -  followed by human, 
institutional and financial resources. This has been done for the purpose of simplification. 
Western sources include all non-Russian and non-Japanese sources.
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Chapter One:
Frameworks for Regions in the Changing 
International Political Economy
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1.0 Frameworks for Regions in the Changing International Political Economy
Due both to domestic and international processes and phenomenon, regions are now able to 
play a significant role in the changing international political economy. Regions have become 
international actors in their own right. This thesis illustrates this phenomenon by examining 
the role of the Far East in the relations between Russia and Japan. Using a case study such as 
this generates points of contention -  theoretically and analytically. Indeed, analysing the role 
of a region in the changing international political economy highlights issues at the 
international, regional, national, subnational and local levels, but it also questions 
approaches and methods used in international relations.
There is a diversity of theoretical and contemporary approaches and methods used in 
international relations -  from intricate descriptions of single events to the broad and 
theoretical -  that seek to explain trends. All approaches add value but ideally a study 
combines detail with broader generalisations for the purpose of explanation. For example, if 
the topic of focus is Russian-Japanese relations, commentary about the underlying 
framework and the basis of analysis of that bilateral relationship should be made. This would 
include theory, actors and space, the post-Soviet environment and globalisation. However, it 
is critical to go beyond theoretical approaches and include empirical detail such as 
fieldwork.
Fieldwork, however, is not undertaken solely for constructing a predictive theory (assuming 
that can be done). It is done to build ordering devices or approaches that assist in making 
sense of the diversity of data and events in the international political economy. Whatever the 
device (theory, model, conceptual framework or analytical framework) its purpose is to 
promote understanding by ordering facts and concepts into meaningful and appropriate 
patterns. The gathering of facts or descriptions of events creates an understanding but, quite 
often, has little broader application. Only when these facts and events are placed in some 
conceptual framework can they illustrate recurring processes in the international political 
economy. Nevertheless, an organising device does more than relate facts to propositions. It 
provides a basis for discovering gaps or deficiencies in previous studies that cannot explain 
contemporary and, in some cases, historical situations. Most importantly it establishes
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frameworks for analysis. This is the focus of and basis for chapter one -  establishing 
frameworks for analysing regions in international relations and for illustrating the case study 
central to this volume -  the role of the Far East in Russian-Japanese relations. It is not 
exhaustive but an introduction and a summary of relevant theories, concepts, notions and 
ideas.
1.1 Contending Theories of International Relations
In 1935 Zimmem suggested ‘...the study of international relations extends from the natural 
sciences at one end to moral philosophy at the other’. He defined the field as a ‘...bundle of 
subjects... vie wed from a common angle’.1 Spykman, among the first to propose a rigorous 
definition, used the phrase interstate relations. However, he later replaced interstate with 
international. International relations encompass varying activities. Scholars have never 
fully agreed on where the boundaries of the discipline he. Dunn suggested the ‘...subject- 
matter of international relations consists of whatever knowledge from any sources may be of 
assistance in meeting new international problems or understanding old ones...’ He added 
international relations may ‘...be looked upon as the actual relations that take place across 
national boundaries or as the body of knowledge which we have of those relations at any 
given time’.3 This is a fairly standard approach but is it adequate? Does it limit relations to 
states and governments? Or is this delineation too broad? Is it better to include relations on 
the basis of their political significance, for example, by focusing upon influences they exert 
on other political units? Political scientists are concerned with relationships amongst all 
actors (state and non-state, international and transnational) to the extent they contribute to 
the understanding of political phenomena.4 Conflict and cooperation both attend 
international relations. Scholars argue over which predominates, which constitutes the norm
'Zimmem, Alfred, “Introductory Report to the Discussions in 1935” in Zimmem, Alfred (Ed.), University 
Teaching of International Relations. Report of the Eleventh Session of the International Relations Conference, 
International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, League of Nations, Paris, France, 1939, pp.7-9.
2Spykman, Nicholas J., “Methods of Approach to the Study of International Relations” in Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, Proceedings of the Fifth Conference of Teachers of International Law and Related 
Subjects. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, US, 1933, p.60.
3Dunn, Frederick S., “The Scope of International Relations” in World Politics. V ol.l, October 1948, pp.142 
and 144.
4Taylor, Philip, Non-state Actors in International Politics -  From Trans-regional to Sub-state Organisations. 
Westview, London, UK, 1984, pp.l 13-142.
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and from which deviations must be explained. Some see conflict as the hallmark of 
international relations and hold cooperation to be rare, insignificant and temporary.5 Others 
believe international relations resemble other political systems in the development of norms, 
rules and a generally cooperative ambience. To them, conflict appears unusual.6 Scholars of 
both persuasions concentrate on developing presumptions and relating these to patterns of 
cooperation or conflict. Ironically, neither school focuses on explaining departures from 
expected patterns. Both schools emphasise what they perceive to be the norm. Most 
basically, states choose between cooperation and conflict, and such decisions underlie the 
entire spectrum of international relations from alliances to war. When, how and why they 
choose between them, and with what consequences, constitute the primary foci of the study 
of international relations. It is not surprising international relations scholars concentrate on 
the extremes of conflict and cooperation. These extremes have the greatest impact upon 
international relations. Both are the final stages of a process. Here international relations will 
be viewed in a framework that shall be called the international political economy; 
international because it is between different states; political economy because it involves 
both politics and economics.
As the study of international political economy has developed, different and discernible 
approaches have emerged to guide scholars in tackling some central and abiding 
preoccupations. Viotti and Kauppi identified three alternative images -  realism, pluralism 
and globalism.8 But discussions on the changing international political economy also need to 
consider the contemporary. The contemporary is most prevalent in trends and there are two 
trends that will be considered -  the post-soviet and globalisation. These two trends, while 
being the most relevant to this case study, also collectively encompass the major
5Such as Nicholas J. Spykman. See Spykman, Nicholas J., “Geography and Foreign Policy, I” in American 
Political Science Review. Vol.32, February 1938, pp.391-410.
6Deutsch, Karl W., and Singer, J. David, “Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability” in World 
Politics, Vol.16, April 1964, pp.388-397.
7They identified pluralism but the focus here will be on liberalism, which is an aspect of pluralism, to be 
consistent.
8Viotti, P.R., and Kauppi, M.V., International Relations Theory -  Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, Second 
Edition, MacMillan, London, UK, 1993.
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phenomenon in the international political economy since the end of the Cold War and 
highlight how things have changed.
No theory monopolises either the international political economy or Russian-Japanese 
relations. Theories of conflict and cooperation, of bipolarity and multipolarity, of the causes 
of war, of imperialism and independence, and indeed more, are applicable to both but not 
resolute. Realism, liberalism and globalism assist in understanding and explaining specific 
aspects of the changing international political economy and Russian-Japanese relations, but 
so do contemporary trends. In order to marry the theoretical and the contemporary, each of 
the schools of thought will be discussed vis-a-vis the changing international political 
economy and then vis-a-vis Russian-Japanese relations. The intention of this line of 
discussion is to highlight how both the key ideas of each school of thought and 
contemporary trends relate to changes, themes and actors in the international political 
economy. Indeed, each of these also relates to Russia and Japan and their bilateral relations. 
How has theory tracked the changing international political economy? Have changes shifted 
emphasis between types and roles of actors and how they interact? As part of the themes of 
this thesis, the most important points to be made from this section are how domestic and 
international changes have affected Russia and Japan, as well as their foreign policies and 
interactions with each another. Both Russia and Japan, like many other powers, have faced 
domestic upheavals that have changed how they view and interact in the international 
political economy emphasising how the domestic affects the international. In a sense each 
state has its own international political economy -  how it views the world, its role in the 
system, its enemies, its allies, its prospects for cooperation and development, and so on. 
Indeed, it shows how the domestic situations in those states has changed and affected their 
perceptions of the world.
1.2 Realism
Realism has, since WWII, been the dominant Western approach in the study of international 
political economy. It sees the inevitable tendency of the international political economy 
towards recurrent balances of power, as alliances and war are a consequence of anarchy. 
Realists argue a bipolar international political economy is more stable than multipolarity
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because there are fewer conflict possibilities; deterrence is easier ‘...because imbalances of 
power are fewer’; and ‘.. .prospects for deterrence are greater because miscalculations o f... 
power and... opponents are less likely’.9 Realism’s view of change is important. Change that 
occurs is strictly within-system, the most significant being shifts in the balance of power -  
from bipolarity to multipolarity, or vice versa, triggered by alterations in capability 
distribution (population, territory, economy, military and so on). Waltz doubted such change 
is common. Multipolarity lasted three centuries until bipolarity.10 Realists explain the long 
peace of the post-WWII era by bipolarity.11
Unlike utopianism and idealism, realism connotes a hard-boiled willingness to see the world 
as it is. Realists begin with assumptions and emerge with a coherent perspective on 
international relations, using anarchy as their primary metaphor for the international political 
economy and stressing there exists no central authorities capable of creating and imposing 
order on the interactions of states. They view states as competitors and argue order emerges
1 9from competition under anarchy. For realists, states are the primary actors and the 
international political economy where states’ policies clash. A state defines its foreign policy 
as a rational response to a hostile and threatening international environment where it can 
only ensure its survival. For both Russia and Japan, such an environment has certainly 
influenced their foreign policies.
Though historically dominated by conflict Russian-Japanese relations have also seen periods 
of cooperation. Russian-Japanese relations are a representation of classic realism -  two 
states whose foreign policy is/was based on rational decision-making calculated in response
^earsheimer, J .J., “Back to the Future -  Instability in Europe After the Cold War” in International Security. 
Vol.15, N o.l, 1990, pp.102-108 and 163-170. (Contrast this with classical realists.)
10Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Politics. Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, US, 1979, pp.97, 
100, 131, 162, 176-183.
1'Mearsheimer, J.J., op. cit.. p.l 1.
12For discussions of realism, see Thompson, Kenneth W., Masters of International Thought -  Major Twentieth- 
Century Theorists and the World Crisis. Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, US, 1980; 
Dougherty, James E., and Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Robert L., Contending Theories of International Relations -  A 
Comprehensive Survey. Second Edition, Harper and Row, New York, US, 1981, chapter 3; and Smith, Michael 
Joseph, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, US, 
1986.
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to a hostile and threatening international political economy. Prior to the Soviet Union’s 
collapse, irrespective of their political systems, socio-cultural traits or personalities of 
leaders, Russian-Japanese relations interacted in an international political economy where 
states were key actors; an international political economy where concerns over anarchy 
created bipolarity around security and alliance. Indeed, domestically, anarchy has historically 
led both Russia and Japan to self-help in the form of the Bolshevik and Meiji revolutions. 
However, it was clear, early on in the post-Soviet era, that in spite of changes in the 
international political economy as well as domestic transitions in Russia and Japan, political 
stalemate continued in relations between Moscow and Tokyo. This has led to liberalism 
defeating realism and the dynamics, actors and themes in the relationship changing.
1.3 Liberalism
With their roots in economics, liberals argue comparative advantage can lead to economic 
interdependence, exemplified in ideas, theories and notions such as the natural-fit thesis. It, 
like other ideas of international political economy, has traditionally focused on state 
interaction, not non-state actors. Non-state actors derive their significance on whether they 
are able to influence on state policies and behaviour. Moreover, location of non-state actors 
is critical to their impact on the international political economy. However, the liberal shift 
away from state emphasis offers one attempt to overcome growing anomalies in realism -  
for example, the growing role of non-state actors and international organisations in the post- 
WWII international political economy. Similarly, realism was found wanting in the face of 
growing evidence of international cooperation. For realists cooperation is a function of the
balance of power and something that is only an expedient for states. Liberals challenge
11this. They believe cooperation is promoted by international organisations and regimes. 
Regimes exist to deal with numerous issues. For liberals, international organisations and 
regimes mitigate uncertain effects of anarchy. They create mutual restraint, promote trust
13Axelrod, R., and Keohane, R.O., Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy -  Strategies and Institutions” in 
World Politics. Vol.38, N o.l, 1985, pp.226-254; and Milner, H., “ International Theories of Cooperation 
Among Nations -  Strengths and Weaknesses” in World Politics. Vol.44, No.3, 1992, pp.466-496.
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and alter expectations about how other states will act -  . .more willing to cooperate because 
they assume others will do the same... \ 14
Originally linked to enterprise, liberalism evolved to include international trade theory. 
Liberal economists treat states as the primary units and conclude cooperative arrangements 
emerge naturally from exchange. More generally, liberals hold that states, wanting to 
maximise economic welfare, allow unfettered exchanges, i.e. free trade, between themselves 
and other states. Since this exchange is based primarily on comparative advantage, it leads to 
specialisation and the growth of economic interdependence between states. Liberals also see 
international relations akin to social situations characterised by rules, norms and cooperative 
arrangements. Given that the roots of liberalism lie in late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century economics, this view of the world is very much a laissez-faire one -  order emerges 
as self-interested actors coexisting in an anarchic environment reach autonomous and 
independent decisions leading to mutually desirable cooperation. Unlike realists, who stress 
crises attend constant preparations for war, liberals point to peace. They see conflict as a 
periodic aberration that breaks tranquillity in which exchange makes it possible for states to 
prosper. Liberals see conflicts arising out of misunderstanding.
Despite the different conclusions drawn about cooperation and conflict in international 
relations, realism and liberalism share core assumptions.15 Although liberals avoid using 
anarchy to describe it, they share the realists’ vision of the international system. This, in fact, 
justifies specific disciplinary concentration on international relations distinct from domestic 
politics. The distinction between anarchy and authority differentiates foreign policy from
14Krasner, S., “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences -  Regimes as Intervening Variables” in 
International Organisation. Vol.36, No.2, 1982, p. 185. (Regimes have also been employed in neorealist 
analysis, but here ‘...regimes creation and maintenance are a function of the distribution of power and interests 
among states...’. It is the liberals who remain more convinced of their utility in promoting cooperation. See 
Krasner, S., Sovereignty, Regimes and Human Rights” in Rittberger, V. (Ed.), Regime Theory and 
International Relations. Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK, 1993, pp. 139-140.); and Kupchan, C.A., “Concerts, 
Collective Security and the Future of Europe” in International Security. Vol. 16, N o.l, 1991, p.131.
15Some, like Stein, disagree with those who suggest that realism and liberalism make different core 
assumptions. See, for example, Greico, Joseph M., “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation -  A Realist 
Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism” in International Organisation. Vol.42, Summer 1988, pp.485- 
507.
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other policies. Although realists make the most of this point, liberals accept there is no 
centrally mandated order in the international arena; no hierarchical government can impose 
authoritative decisions on states. Realists and liberals both recognise there exist no accepted 
enforceable legitimate and binding universal laws. Yet despite their common focus on self- 
interested states interacting in an anarchic environment, realists and liberals come to 
different conclusions about international relations. International relations involve 
cooperation and conflict -  more cooperation than realists admit and more conflict than 
liberals recognise. Yet both fail to agree on who the dominant actors in international 
relations are and where the basis for relations lies.
In spite of recognising danger, liberals argue realist pessimism is overstated and based on 
false assumptions; threats to peace can be contained and ameliorated through international 
institutionalisation. In the post-Cold War world, liberals have accorded institutions a central 
role. For Keohane and Nye, post-1945 Western European stability is the result of the 
development of a densely institutionalised network of relations between states. The 
durability of this network ensures the gloomy premonitions of realism remain unrealised. 
What about elsewhere? The task in this connection is to extend the model to Eastern Europe 
and the FSU in order to set in motion ‘...a continuous pattern of institutionalised 
cooperation’.16 For advocates of this approach, it is seen as a process of co-opting successor 
states into existing arrangements. This serves to stabilise potentially disruptive international 
consequences of the Soviet Union’s collapse and the Cold War’s end. Organisational 
involvement in the FSU (NATO, the EU, the IMF, the World Bank, G7), preservation and 
extension of arms control and disarmament regimes, the UN and CSCE in conflict 
resolution, are all seen as germane in this regard.17 In contrast to realists, who see
16Keohane, R.O., and Nye, J.S., “Introduction -  The End of the Cold War in Europe” in Keohane, R.O. (Ed.), 
After the Cold War -  International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe. 1989-1991. Harvard University 
Press, London, UK, 1993, pp.5-6.
17Archer, C., Organising Europe -  The Institutions of Integration. Second Edition, Edward Arnold, London, 
UK, 1994, pp.281-282; Cox, R.W., “Multilateralism and World Order” in Review of International Studies, 
Vol.18, No.2, 1992, pp. 164-165; Ruggie, J.G., “Multilateralism -  the Autonomy of an Institution” in 
International Organisation. Vol.46, No.3, 1992, p.561; and Kegley, C.W., Jr., “The Neoidealist Moment in 
International Studies? Realist Myths and the New International Realities” in International Studies Quarterly, 
Vol.37, 1993, p. 136.
37
international organisations weakened by the end of the Cold War, liberals argue that 
although the rationale of these bodies has altered, their fundamental organisational strengths 
remain. Indeed, in the case of the UN and CSCE they have been freed from the paralysis that 
gripped them previously. Liberals are keen to identify conditions where common interests 
arise. And, indeed, there are many common interests between Russia and Japan.
In more than a decade since the Soviet Union’s collapse, significant progress has been made 
in improving Russian-Japanese relations, much of which is due to the impact of liberalism. 
During the El’tsin era (1992-1998) Russian-Japanese diplomacy manifested itself in high 
profile meetings, declarations and statements as efforts to resolve the territorial dispute 
multiplied. The framework of Russian-Japanese relations changed (domestically and 
internationally) materialising in increased interaction. In pursuit of a liberal legacy, this 
cooperation involved state and non-state actors, and institutional and regime frameworks 
(see Appendix 4). The Soviet Union’s collapse provided great impetus to increasing the 
frequency, nature and levels of Russian-Japanese interaction. The behaviour of Russia and 
Japan, nationally and subnationally, can be explained by reference to both the international 
political economy and the domestic conditions affecting policymaking. The centres of 
political power were redefining their international roles while managing national malaise.
In the post-Soviet era, the context and parameters of the Russian-Japanese relationship 
changed. Ideology ceased being the main factor determining international relations, as 
identity has come to the fore. Geopolitical factors begun to play a more important role and 
economics became far more salient. However, both Russia and Japan found it difficult to 
find a common language; at best they have found the islands fo r economic aid formula. 
There were two peaks in Russian-Japanese relations between 1992 and 1998 -  in the period 
1992-1993, with the Tokyo Declaration of October 1993; and 1997-1998, with a new wave 
of change, although the window of opportunity narrowed in regard to the peace treaty. In 
both cases, Japan was the initiator, in contrast to the Soviet period. Russia was divided on 
how to react to the Japanese offensive. Russian domestic factors were passive but 
determinant, although matters were more complex than that. After the Soviet Union’s 
demise, ideology abruptly shifted from Sovietism to liberalism. New Russian elites,
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including President El’tsin, proclaimed themselves advocates of democratisation and 
marketisation. Reform economist Gaidar and Foreign Minister Kozirev claimed they were 
motivated by this new pro-Western ideology. Amongst others, Kozirev’s committed himself 
to Atlanticism vis-a-vis Japan. First Deputy Japanese Foreign Minister Kunadze was 
instrumental in formulating a new policy based on the principles of law and justice. Japan 
tried to use the new situation for old causes -  namely, resolving the territorial dispute (see 
Figures A1.4, A1.5, A1.6, A1.7, A1.8 and Appendix 2). However, politics is not moved by 
ideology alone. Instead of ideology, identity conflict came to the fore in Russian politics. 
Russians had to cope with the establishment of the new state system and national ideology in 
a situation where the old system was dissolving. Statists and nationalists united in opposing 
El’tsin and his entourage’s foreign policy, including their policy towards Japan. His visit to 
Japan was postponed twice during the period 1992-1993. On the Japanese side, post-Soviet 
thinking in the new context was still lacking. Policymakers only tactically radicalised the old 
territory first approach. Thus, both viewpoints met indirectly. Japan was able to obtain a 
new and amorphous response from El’tsin in October 1993 but her economic leverage was 
also limited. By December 1993, El’tsin had to cope with growing resistance from 
communists and nationalists -  the winners of the first parliamentary election. In spite of this, 
liberalism had been bom in Russian-Japanese relations.
Liberalism materialised in the realisation of the natural fit thesis (see Section 1.5). By 1996 
Russian-Japanese relations were mutually exploiting comparative advantages -  technology 
and know-how deficient, resource-rich Russia trading (without hindrance) with resource- 
deficient, technology and know-how rich Japan (see Figure 1.1). This was a separation of 
politics and economics. During the Cold War ideology integrated politics and economics -  
what was economic was viewed through political lenses. Both Russia and Japan failed to 
fully exploit their economic complementarity. Recognising anomalies in realism by the 
growing role of non-state actors (see Figure 1.2) and international organisations (see 
Appendix 4) in the international political economy, liberalism manifested itself in Russian- 
Japanese relations in attributing these actors and frameworks responsibility for interaction, 
cooperation and the development of mutual interests. Indeed, as can be seen from Figure 1.2 
and Appendix 4 both derived their significance from their influence on policy. Evident from
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Appendix 4 and Russia’s accession to the IMF, World Bank, WTO, G8 observer in APEC 
and ASEAN, Russian-Japanese relations were also being conducted through an increasingly 
densely institutionalised network of relations. The Cold War split in the UN Security 
Council disappeared. Russia and Japan were cooperating bilaterally but also as part of larger 
multipolar frameworks.
Figure 1.1: The Structure of Russian-Japanese Trade, 1996 
Japan ’s Exports to Russia, 1996
Ca r s  
1 4 %
L i g h t  
I n  d u s t r y
M e t a 1 
P r o d u c t s
M a c h i n e r y
O t h e r
Russia's Exports to Japan, 1996
O t h e r
T i m  h e r
1 7 %
Fi s h
3 0 %
M a c h i n e r y
3 2 %
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs -  Secretariat of the Cooperation Committee, Japan's Assistance 
Programmes for Russia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs -  Secretariat of the Cooperation Committee, Tokyo, Japan, 
May 1997, p. 1.
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Figure 1.2: Liberalism and Russian-Japanese Relations
Russian Link Japanese Link Form of Cross-Border Relations
- Hokkaido/Tokyo Hokkaido Ambassador to Tokyo appointed to highlight 
the island’s Far East interests to Tokyo
Siberia/Far East Hokkaido 6th Russian-Japanese Meeting of Far East, Siberia and 
Hokkaido representatives (Sapporo, September 1994) 
concluded stable Far East-Japan relations established. No 
mention was made of Moscow
Siberia/Far East Niigata Siberia and Far East Fair held in 1994
Moscow Niigata Russian consulate opens in Niigata in 1994
Sakhalin Hokkaido Japanese Industry-94 Fair in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk 
sponsored by Sakhalin Entrepreneur Union and 
Hokkaido’s Japan-Russia Trade Association
Khabarovsk/Vladivostok Toyoma/Aomori Direct air services established in 1994
Moscow and Far East Tokyo Japan-Russia New Era ’95 Programme places emphasis 
on Far Eastern peoples in cultural exchanges
Far East Tokyo Japan provides special assistance to the Far East, 
promoting administrative reforms
Far East Iide Farmers from Iide involved in teaching Far Eastern 
minorities vegetable processing techniques
Nakhodka/Zarubino Tokyo Japanese foreign investment initiated Nakhodka’s Free 
Economic Zone and Zarubino Port
Khabarovsk/Vladivostok/ 
Y uzhno-Sakhalinsk
Tokyo Japan Centres and Consulates established in Khabarovsk, 
Vladivostok and Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk
Far East Tokyo Japan established a Regional Venture Fund prioritising 
the Far East in her assistance to Russia18
Magadan Tokyo Nisso-Boeki Company opened office in Magadan
Petropavlovsk-
Kamchatski
Tokyo Progress Corporation opened office in Petropavlovsk- 
Kamchatski
Sakhalin Tokyo C. Itoh and Company becomes member of Sakhalin 
Entrepreneur’s Union
Far East Tokyo Export-Import Bank of Japan guaranteed loans and credit 
insurance to the Far East ahead of all regions
Far East Tokyo By 1996, 67% of Far Eastern joint ventures involved 12 
Japanese companies (Mitsui, Sumitomo, Nissyo-Iwai, 
Itochu, Marubeni, Nichimen, Mitsubishi, Toyota Tsusyo, 
Tomen, Konematsu, Tokyo Boeki and Tyori)
Far East Japan Vladivostok develops sister city relations with Niigata, 
Akita and Hakodate
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk Aomori In November 1996 Michinoku Bank opens offices in 
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk
Sources: Author’s interviews with Magosaki, Ukeru, Hokkaido’s Ambassador to Tokyo, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Kumabe, Kensaku, Assistant Director General, Loan Department 2 (Europe, Middle East and 
Africa), Export-Import Bank of Japan both in Tokyo, Japan on January 23, 1997; The Japan Times, 
September 24-26, 1994; RFE Update, April 1994, p.9 and March 1995, pp.7-10; The Moscow Times, May 
30, 1995; and UN, Trade and Investment Complementarities in North-East Asia, Papers and Proceedings of 
the Roundtable on Economic Cooperation through Exploitation of Trade and Investment Complementarities 
in the North-East Asian subregion, July 10-12, 1995, Seoul, South Korea, Economic and Social Commission 
for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP): Studies in Trade and Investment No.18, 1996, p.213.
1 initiated through the EBRD in 1996, the Daiwa Far East and Eastern Siberia Fund is assisted by the Japanese 
government and the Nippon Company. The fund aims to acquire shares in small and medium-sized firms.
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The end of the Cold War in North-East Asia also fuelled expectations of a new, regional role 
for Russia and regional cooperation -  multipolarity. But, these hopes have been slow to 
materialise. Despite considerable disparities, the macroeconomic potential of North-East 
Asia is significant.19 The basis of this potential lies in the perceived complementary nature 
of regional economies.20 The UN Survey of Trade and Investment Complementarities in 
North-East Asia highlighted the economic complementarity between North-East China, the 
Far East, North Korea, South Korea, Japan and Mongolia by employing the natural-fit thesis 
in a multipolar framework. It focuses on labour, resources, capital, technology and 
management (see Figure 1.3).
Figure 1.3: Production Complementarities in North-East Asia
Labour; Resources; Technology; Management:Area:
China
North Korea
Mongolia
South Korea
Source: UN, Trade and Investment Complementarities in North-East Asia, Papers and Proceedings of the 
Roundtable on Economic Cooperation Possibilities through Exploitation of Trade and Investment 
Complementarities in the North-East Asian Subregion, July 10-12, 1995, Seoul, South Korea, Economic and 
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP): Studies in Trade and Investment No. 18, 1996, p.99. 
Notes: China = Three North-Eastern Provinces of China: Far East = Russian Far East; |  = sufficient; |  = 
moderate; |  in su ffic ien t.
However, actors restraining regional cooperation are numerous. Previously, stagnation in 
Russian-Japanese relations; and now, development differences and resource endowments; 
trade balances; as well as obvious political scenarios. China has large trade deficits with 
Japan, South Korea and the Far East, but surpluses with North Korea and Mongolia. There 
are technological, capital and infrastructural disparities. There are also trade barriers -  South 
Korea and Japan still maintain relatively high levels of protection. Politically, there are 
worries over growing Chinese economic and political power. As the US role in the region 
declines will China’s gain momentum? Prospects of Korean unification and worries over 
North Korea highlight shifting balances of power. Against this complex and changing
19This was originally apparent in the plans for the Tumen River projects.
2(>The Japan Times, October 20, 1997.
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backdrop Russia is attempting to gain influence and actively pursue a North-East Asian role. 
Japan, meanwhile, is increasingly active internationally, wishing to hold onto the label of 
regional leader. In so much as things have changed and will continue to change, post-Cold 
War North-East Asia continues to undergo balance of power shifts as globalising forces rain 
down.
1.4 Globalism
Globalism embraces Marxist and non-Marxist approaches. It shares common 
preoccupations, particularly of the international political economy and underdevelopment of 
the developing world, with other schools. Viotti and Kauppi in their summary on globalism 
identified four key assumptions.21 Firstly, understanding the contexts within which 
international actors operate. In common with realism, it is suggested the behaviour of actors 
can only be comprehended by grasping the structure of the international political economy. 
However, the nature of that international political economy is conceived of entirely 
differently. The existence of a capitalist international political economy, rather than anarchy, 
is its defining characteristic. The existence of anarchy is recognised but consequential to the 
degree it allows for the development and spread of capitalism unimpeded by central 
regulating forces. From this starting point follows globalism’s second assumption -  the 
importance of historical analysis -  particularly, attention to capitalism’s evolution, rise and 
dominance.
00The assumptions, thus far, are central to Wallerstein’s world system theory. For 
Wallerstein, the contemporary international political economy equates to the capitalist world 
economy. Globalism’s third and fourth assumptions refer to the mechanisms of domination 
by which the developing world is prevented from developing; and the centrality of economic 
factors in understanding this subordination. These two assumptions are evident in
21 Viotti, P.R., and Kauppi, M.V., op. cit.. p.449-450.
22T w o  useful collections of essays that contain the framework of his approach are The Capitalist World 
Economy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1979; and The Politics of the World Economy. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1984.
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Wallerstein’s work, and also that of dependency theorists. This school emerged in the 
1960s and 1970s partly responding to discredited US analyses of development. The 
developing world’s failure to grow resulted in greater attention to the constraints these states 
faced in the international political economy. Particularly, it was argued their dependence on 
major industrialised states (through unequal terms of trade, MNCs, international banks and 
multilateral lending agencies) relegated them to being subservient and with little control over 
their economic fortunes. For Wallerstein, the post-Cold War era will be marked by trends 
that stem from two separate but coincidental developments -  the end of the Cold War itself -  
a contest that ‘...shaped all interstate relations...’ in the post-1945 era; and the end of the 
‘...US hegemonic era ...’ in the capitalist world economy. Wallerstein’s tentative prognosis 
of future trends suggests ‘. . .a time of great world disorder.. .’.24
Wallerstein’s two separate but coincidental developments have, indeed, been key to Russian- 
Japanese relations and been the direct result, as he stated, of the end of the Cold War and the 
end of the US hegemonic era. In Moscow, three symbolic changes took place. First, El'tsin’s 
re-election as President decided who was in charge. Second, Russian diplomacy had 
undergone transition. Kozirev’s Atlantic orientation had given way to the pragmatic policy 
of Foreign Minister Primakov, who pursued national interests in all directions, including the 
East. Third, the new elites {oligarchs) had strengthened their position on the domestic and 
international markets. A new era of financial capital emerged, although by August 1998 this 
seemed illusionary. On the basis of these changes, Japan formulated a policy that considered 
geopolitics and economics separately, one that was less influenced by the US.
Globalism understands the context, within which Russia and Japan operate -  the 
international political economy, North-East Asia, the shadow of an emerging China and 
potential conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Post-Soviet Russian-Japanese relations
23Brown, CM “Development and Dependency” in Groom, A.J.R., and Light, M. (Eds.), Contemporary 
International Relations -  A Guide to Theory. Frances Pinter, London, UK, 1994, pp.62-64.
24The summary presented here derives from Wallerstein’s “The Collapse of Liberalism” in Miliband, R., and 
Patich, I. (Eds.), Socialist Register 1992. The Merlin Press, London, UK, 1992 and his “The World-System 
After the Cold War” in Journal of Peace Research, Vol.30, N o.l, 1993, pp. 1-6. A similar approach is also 
apparent in Chomsky, N., World Orders. Old and New. Pluto Press, London, UK, 1994.
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exemplify the capitalist international political economy in their relations, in their separation 
of economics and politics, in their realisation of the mutual benefits to be gained by 
comparative advantage. Indeed, both Russia and Japan, the former in the post-Cold War era 
and the later post-WWII era, have seen capitalism’s evolution, rise and dominance in their 
domestic, international and bilateral frameworks; the realisation of the natural-fit thesis’s 
application.
1.5 The Natural-Fit Thesis -  A Basis For Bilateral Relations
The natural-fit thesis argues the complementary nature of two economies is the basis for 
developing economic cooperation in the form of mutually beneficial trade links and, 
subsequently, improved political relations. However, the notion disregards non-economic 
factors essential to understanding the foreign policies of natural-fit economies and, thus, 
their trade links. Unlike the liberal school’s natural-fit thesis, the realist school's anti- 
resource constraint (see section 1.11 and Figure 1.5) considers non-economic factors, albeit 
narrowly. The natural-fit thesis is a notion that was previously used by liberals to analyse 
German-Russian relations in the early 1900s. Though theoretically plausible, the notion 
encounters application problems; it uses economics as a basis for resolving political (and 
other) problems, given that it tries to forge natural links between two states. Yet while some 
factors facilitate trade, others hinder it. Politics can facilitate and hinder. Economics can 
encourage political change by being a basis for ending conflict. This change can be measured 
in trade. This idea has historically only been applied to states, although actors and space in 
international relations are no longer the monopoly of states.
1.6 Actors and Space in International Relations
In all social sciences scholars struggle to determine an initial point of investigation. 
Determining the fulcrum point is particularly difficult in international relations because of 
the breadth of the field. On which of many possible levels of analysis should attention be 
focused? Although most international relations theorists reject the notion individuals are
25The natural-fit thesis is not a theory but an idea that has been used by scholars and policymakers alike. It 
builds on the idea of comparative advantage, which was originally developed on the basis of mutually 
beneficial and complementary trade between Britain and Portugal in the eighteenth century.
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international actors, a classical liberal would argue the individual should be the foundation
9 ftof any social theory, since only individuals are real, while society is an abstraction. 
Subnational groups such as political parties and the media are organised non-governmental 
interest groups seeking to influence foreign policy by lobbying or shaping public opinion. 
Indeed, subnational regions may also be classified as international actors, as they fall into the 
scope of foreign policy studies, as well as national and comparative politics.27 International 
theorists, however, while not making subnational groups the centre of attention, are obliged 
to recognise their relevance because of the significant interaction between domestic and
9Rinternational politics. Realist theorists subscribe to the state-centric view of international 
relations.29 They recognise other realities but insist all other entities subordinate to states. 
Non-state actors derive their significance from states or from the degree to which they can 
influence state policies and behaviour. MNCs, in contrast to other international actors, 
regard territory as irrelevant. It is this mode of operation that enhances the importance of
on
subnational actors and borderlands in international relations/
Political geographers share this compelling interest in borders and borderlands. They focus 
on margins, not the core; they observe the local while being aware of the global.31 Political 
geographers consider boundaries in the traditional sense -  lines marking national space and
26Delanty, Gerard, Social Theory in a Changing World -  Conceptions of Modernity. Polity, Malden, 
Massachusetts, US, 1999, pp.78-112.
27Levin, Jonathan, Measuring the Role of Subnational Governments, International Monetary Fund, Washington, 
DC, US, 1991, pp.4-7; and Leach, R.H., and O’Rourke, T.G., State and Local Government -  Subnational 
Governance in the Third Century of Federalism, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, US, 1988, pp. 189-231.
28Solingen, Etel, Regional Orders at Century’s Dawn -  Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy. 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, US, 1998, pp.l 13-167; and Milner, Helen V., Interests, 
Institutions, and Information -  Domestic Politics and International Relations, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, New Jersey, US, 1997, pp.197-213.
29Crawford, Robert M., Idealism and Realism in International Relations, Routledge, London, UK, 1999, p p .l1- 
29; and Doyle, Michael W., Wavs of War and Peace -  Realism. Liberalism, and Socialism, First Edition, 
Norton, New York, US, 1997, pp. 197-234.
30Huntingdon, Samuel P., “Transnational Organisations in World Politics” in World Politics. Vol.25, April 
1973, pp.57-64; and Nye, Jr., Joseph S., “Multinational Corporations in World Politics” in Foreign Affairs. 
Vol.53, October 1974, pp.48-62.
31House, J., “Frontier Studies -  An Applied Approach”, in Burnett, A.D., and Taylor, P.J. (Eds.), Political 
Studies from Spatial Perspectives -  Anglo-American Essays on Political Geography, Wiley, New York, US, 
1981, pp.291-312.
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interfaces linking political units.32 Meanwhile borderlands are the boundaries that create a 
distinctive region, making it a mode of division for regional definition. Boundary 
characteristics, unique to either side of the line, dominate the cultural landscape. Yet these 
characteristics disappear further away from the borderland into the territorial domain of the 
adjacent states. Geographers have found some distinct advantages in applying this concept 
of borderland. It provides a basis for a legitimate and useful subnational focus that could 
otherwise be overlooked -  a small, local-scale dimension within an international context. At 
the same time the concept creates a miniature, but readable, barometer of change in the 
relations between the states divided when studied in a temporal setting.34 Hence, analysis of 
the cultural landscape of the border becomes the focus of study.
House’s operational model argued borderland transaction flows are integrated progressively 
in space and time. With national interests dominating transboundary commerce, 
transactions between frontiers across international boundaries are usually discouraged and 
often illegal. With a borderland that evolves from an extreme conflict situation, a marked 
change in the nature of transactions and a sharp rise (often a dominance) of the local 
transactions is expected. For example, a pick-up in trade. The analysis of border landscapes 
in political geography has generally been directly related to the study of boundaries. The vast 
majority of these studies have traditionally emphasised stress and conflict, viewing the 
boundary as an interface between two or more discrete national territories, subject to 
problems directly reflecting relations between the states it divides. Consequently, the ebb 
and flow of boundary studies has tended to be associated with periods of territorial conflict 
and hostility.
States continue to be central political actors while maintaining structures that have evolved. 
Globalising and localising dynamics are sufficiently powerful to encourage supranational,
32Minghi, J.V., “Boundary Studies in Political Geography” in Annals. Association of American Geographers, 
Vol.53, pp.407-428.
33Minghi, J.V., “The Franco-Italian Borderland -  Sovereignty Change and Contemporary Developments in the 
Alpes Maritimes” in Regio Basiliensis. Vol.22, pp.232-246.
^Minghi, J.V., “Railways and Borderlands -The Rebirth of the Franco-Italian Line through the Alps 
Maritimes” in Tiidschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie. Vol.75, pp.322-328.
35House, J., op. cit.
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transnational or subnational communities hoping to serve their needs and wants better than 
states of which they are a part. Such communities may or may not replace states. They may 
or may not acquire concrete, discernible form. However, the dynamics at work in the 
international political economy can make these nascent communities formidable contenders 
as engines for change, redesigners of boundaries, sources of power and/or policy. With 
technological advances, processes of globalisation and localisation, and the emergence of 
international institutions, MNCs, NGOs and other similar non-governmental phenomena, the 
issue of what level analysis should concentrate on in international relations has been raised. 
Should the focus be on actions and attitudes of individual policymakers? Is it assumed all 
policymakers act similarly when confronted with similar situations and, therefore, the focus 
should be on the behaviour of states? Each level of analysis leads to different conclusions, so 
it is essential to be aware of distinctions between them, and, indeed, to include them all.
If international relations are examined from the perspective of states, rather than from the 
system in which they exist, quite different questions arise. State behaviour can be explained 
by reference not just to the system, but also to the domestic conditions affecting 
policymaking. Wars, alliances, imperialism, diplomacy, isolation and other goals of 
diplomatic action can be viewed as the result of domestic political pressures, national 
ideologies, public opinion or socio-economic needs. This level of analysis has much to 
commend it for governments do not react just to the external environment. Their actions also 
express the needs and values of their population and political leaders. This is the usual 
approach of diplomatic historians, based on the sound premise that what is notionally 
considered to be state behaviour is really policymakers defining purposes. This level of 
analysis focuses upon ideologies, motivations, ideals, perceptions, values or idiosyncrasies 
of those empowered to make decisions for the state.
But which level of analysis provides the most useful perspective? While each makes a 
contribution, each also fails to account for aspects of reality. Essentially, theory is weak on 
the idea of regions as international actors in the international political economy. This is key 
to how this volume intends to be innovative. For example, Russian foreign policy cannot be 
understood adequately by studying only the attitudes and values of its Foreign Minister, nor
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is it sufficient to analyse Russian socio-economic needs. It is imperative to be aware of other 
factors too; of ideology, the configuration of power, influence, domination and subordination 
at the international level. The main characteristics of the external environment are no less 
important than those of the state’s domestic considerations. Therefore, all levels of analysis 
need to be employed at different times, depending upon the type and nature of the issue at 
hand. The perspectives of the international political economy are very broad and not totally 
comprehensive. Which provides the best approach for delineating the main features and 
characteristics of international political processes over a relatively long period of time? For 
example, the types of relations that existed amongst Greek city-states can be described 
without examining the character of each city-state or the motives, ideals and goals of each 
statesman in each city-state. Today, the structure of alliances, power, domination, 
dependence and interdependence set limits upon the actions of states and policymakers, no 
matter what their ideological persuasion or ideals, and no matter what domestic opinion is.
However, international relations are too often taken to be the relations between states. Other 
actors are given secondary importance. This two-tier approach can be challenged. First, 
ambiguities in the meaning given to state and its failure to tally with reality result in its 
conceptual usefulness being impaired. Greater clarity is obtained by analysing 
intergovernmental and intersociety relations with no presumption that one sector is more 
important than others. Second, it is recognised that governments are losing their sovereignty 
when faced with MNCs, regional energies and the assertion of ethnicity by different 
populations. Third, NGOs engage in such a web of global activities, including diplomacy, 
that governments have lost their political independence. Yet it is still quite common to find 
analyses of international relations that concentrate primarily on governments, give some 
attention to intergovernmental organisations and ignore transnational actors. Even in fields 
such as environmental politics, where it is widely accepted that governments interact 
intensely with UN agencies, commercial companies and environmental pressure groups, it is 
often taken for granted states are the only players. Dominant states may be actors, but 
exclusive arbiters they are not, and with globalisation, localisation and decentralisation, 
organisations at all levels have become players. It is no longer possible to ignore the 
activities of an oil company operating in a state where the regime does not respect human
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rights; it is no longer possible to push aside activists who protest and destroy fields of 
experimental crops. This has all been accentuated by globalisation -  a process that has 
questioned concepts such as sovereignty.
But is sovereignty relevant to the international political economy? It is likely to survive 
while shedding particular, outmoded uses? For the foreseeable future humans will live in an 
international political economy in which the status of political entities is far from self- 
evident. As Wright once noted: "[IJnstead of a world of equal, territorially defined, sovereign 
states we have a world of political entities displaying a tropical luxuriance of political and 
legal organisation, competence, and status.”.36 In an age of subversion and extensive 
international propaganda, states are penetrated and highly permeable to external influences. 
This is also be true in the case of federations where regions are emphasising differences, 
pushing for both greater autonomy and socio-politico-economic control -  Canada, India and 
Russia the most obvious examples. Through its conventional foundations, federalism is an 
idea whose importance is akin to natural law in defining justice and to natural right in 
delineating the origins and proper constitution of political society. Although those 
foundations have been somewhat eclipsed since the shift to organic and then positivistic 
theories of politics, which began in the mid-nineteenth century, federalism as a form of
on
political organisation has grown as a factor shaping political behaviour.
Today the local, national and international politics interpenetrate each another, reflecting 
structural changes such as the internationalisation of various fields of activity and 
technological change. Economic conditions, especially in crisis periods, have a great impact 
on the degree to which foreign and domestic policymaking become intertwined. These days 
no state can be immune to global economic events. Indeed by the 1990s, world economic 
crises had reached a genuinely global scale. Even the former communist bloc was effected
36Wright, Quincy, On Predicting International Relations -  The Year 2000. Social Science Foundation, 
University of Denver, Denver, Colorado, US, 1969, p.l 1.
37Mogi, Sobei, The Problem of Federalism -  A Study in the History of Political Theory, Allen & Urwin, 
London, UK, 1931, pp.65-79.
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whereas previously they would have been somewhat insulated from worldwide 
developments.
1.7 Post-Soviet International Relations
The end of the bipolar international system represented a turning point in the international 
political economy, in the roles and functions of states and international organisations. The 
chief cause concluding the bipolar system was the collapse of communism. Since 
communism’s collapse, the most obvious characteristic of the international political 
economy has been the absence of any clear principle of order. The events of 1989-1991, 
from the Berlin Wall’s collapse to the Soviet Union’s disintegration, represent a three-fold 
turning point. First, they marked the end of the broadly bipolar structure, based on US-Soviet 
rivalry, which the international political economy had assumed since the late 1940s. Second, 
at the state level, former communist states experienced serious transition problems from 
economic collapse, which affected them all to varying degrees, to disintegration of the state 
itself -  most strikingly in the Soviet Union, but also bloodlessly in Czechoslovakia and 
explosively in Yugoslavia. Yet those states not in the throes of post-communist transition 
have also been forced to redefine their national interests and roles in light of the change in 
the balance of power. This applied as much to large states such as the US, whose policies 
had been predicated on Soviet threat, as it did to small states that had been clients of the 
superpowers. The general point is that the collapse of the bipolar international political 
economy enforced a redefinition of national interests on all states and, in some cases, a 
reshaping of states themselves. Thirdly, the end of bipolarity modified roles of international 
organisations. Most obviously, the end of the automatic Security Council split released the 
UN’s potential. The Warsaw Pact was disbanded. NATO, WEU and CSCE struggled to 
reinvent themselves within Europe’s new geography. The EU debated expansion to include 
Central and Eastern Europe, and the Baltics. In short, the Cold War’s end saw changes at the 
system, state and international organisation levels.
An additional, often neglected, effect on international relations has been the change in space 
and geography of the former Communist bloc. Though rarely discussed by political 
scientists, politico-economic geographers have highlighted this change as a transformation of
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the former Communist bloc that has materialised in shifting geographical boundaries and 
definitions. Herrschel stated: ‘The changes to the image and perception of Eastern Europe 
not only apply to individual places within it, but also the whole entity as a major part of 
Europe. The exact form and identity of this new Eastern Europe, however, is not very clear. 
For instance, there is a synonymous use of various labels such as post-socialist, post­
communist and post-Soviet. Additionally, there is the geopolitical distinction between 
Central and Eastern Europe. To overcome this confusion, Dingsdale suggested, ...four main 
paradigms to access the meaning and nature of Eastern Europe: (1) Territorial identity and 
its meaning; (2) The process-orientated meanings of transition...', (3) The inclusive 
European perspective...; and (4) The global context of East and West\ 38 Hamilton assessed 
‘...the aspects of the debate concerning transition in Central and Eastern Europe. ...[He] 
argued the re-evaluation of space in the region is being articulated through the interaction of 
three major processes: first, progress from centralised state management towards a market 
economy; second, behaviour, cultures and institutions inherited from the socialist era and 
those more deeply embedded from pre-socialist times; and third, responses to opportunities
TOor constraints created by the transformation itself’. Herrschel, Dingsdale and Hamilton, 
mindful of the end of bipolarity, looked at regional, national and local changes of the former 
Communist bloc while most analyses focused on international change.
The end of the Cold War represented a turning point in the structure of international 
relations for the system, states, international organisations as well as geographical space. 
One key feature was the end of political blocs controlled by a central authority and the rise of 
non-state actors. These new actors have become key in changing political attitudes by 
becoming sources of foreign policy -  i.e. new decision-makers -  and, thus, changing 
international relations.
38Herrschel, Tassilo, “The Changing Meaning of Place in Post-Socialist Eastern Europe -  Commodification, 
Perception and Environment” in The Geographical Journal. Vol.65, No.2, July 1999, pp. 130-134; Dingsdale, 
Alan “New Geographies of Post-Socialist Europe” in The Geographical Journal. Vol.67, No.2, July 1999, 
pp.145-153.
39Hamilton, F.E. Ian, “Transformation and Space in Central and Eastern Europe” in The Geographical Journal, 
Vol.165, No.2, July 1999, pp.135-144.
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1.8 Sources of Foreign Policy
The post-Cold War international political economy has given rise to increasing numbers of 
outputs for decision-making and policymaking. These outputs have become sources of 
foreign policy. Decisions are, in Easton’s terminology, the outputs of the political system 
through which values are authoritatively allocated within society.40 Whatever the decision­
making structure of a state, conflicts must be resolved internally. This means making 
decisions about needs and goals and determining strategies for attaining them, including 
which goals can only be attained through interaction with others; the latter being the process 
for formulating foreign policy. The most fundamental source of foreign policy is the 
universally shared desire to ensure survival and territorial integrity. Military security is the 
minimum objective of foreign policy. A related need is the preservation of the economy. 
These are defensive objectives, but under some circumstances internal or external conditions 
may require offensive action to insure survival. Perhaps the single most important domestic 
source of foreign policy is economic need. Needs, however, are not static.
Where there is serious internal political conflict or leaders have low political legitimacy, 
decision-makers emphasise foreign policy goals preventing foreign intervention on the side 
of dissident groups. They may seek aid in preserving the system or their own place in it. 
Alternatively, political leadership may take advantage of, or manufacture, foreign threats to 
distract from domestic issues or the role of the elite in creating problems. In general, the 
viability of the system rests on the ability of decision-makers to respond to politically 
significant domestic demands. This means demands for foreign policy decisions from all 
quarters fall into this category. Psychological needs also generate strong pressures on foreign 
policymakers (for example, slow down existing actions and/or policy, change action and/or 
policy paths, speed up pending actions and/or policies). Theoretically, this may not have a 
place in rational decision-making, but is clearly a factor in foreign policymaking. Some 
writers argue capability considerations {power in Morgenthau’s words) are the most
40Easton, David, The Political System. Knopf, New York, US, 1959, pp.129-131; and Easton, David, A 
Systems Analysis of Political Life. John Wiley and Sons, New York, US, 1965, p.284.
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important source of foreign policy, and an increase in capabilities is key to all other 
objectives. This is an oversimplification while containing a grain of truth.41
There are also important external sources of foreign policy. By implication, many domestic 
sources of foreign policy have an external counterpart. The international political economy 
must be considered before policy is formulated. Most foreign policies involve domestic 
needs, which can only be met by enlisting active cooperation or at least acquiescence of 
others. There are, however, also needs that arise primarily from external sources, such as 
threats of invasion or economic blockade. These needs create foreign policy needs for 
protection that can be met by alliance or membership in international organisation. Other 
external sources of foreign policy are opportunities created by external events. For example, 
local war, empire disintegration, resource discovery, two parties on the verge of war in need 
of a mediator and other similar changes create opportunities to increase power, size, wealth 
or prestige by responding with creative foreign policy. Which of these various internal and 
external sources of foreign policy is most important is case specific. By and large, among 
domestic sources of foreign policy, the political system (institutions and rules of the game) 
and relative power of contending groups will be major determinants.
The Soviet Union’s collapse changed the international political economy, as well as the very 
actors. The growing number and recognition of non-state actors means international relations 
are no longer the sole preserve of states. Actors at every level -  from the international 
organisation to the individual -  are now sources of foreign policy. Decision-making has 
become localised and increasingly powerful. Act local think global in the current jargon. 
Domestic and external influences upon foreign policy and, subsequently, upon international 
relations, are now equally weighted in the decision-making equation. International strategic 
concerns are as influential as the needs of the community. Perhaps the most significant 
change is, as a result of the realisation of mutual concerns and interests, subnational actors 
conducting international relations. This has not only begun to exclude traditional foreign
41Morgenthau, Hans J., “Common Sense and Theories of International Relations” in Journal of International 
Affairs. Vol.21, 1967, pp.207-214; and see Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations. Knopf, New York, 
US, 1948.
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policy executors in the form of national government and its representatives but also 
international organisations. Moreover, the nature of these subnational relations emerged less 
superficially. International relations were less concerned with learning about and 
investigating other actors in the relationship. Why? Because links were being made between 
parties who shared common interests, concerns, histories, cultures, peoples and other criteria 
-  the fruits of globalisation.
1.9 Globalisation in the International Political Economy
Smith and Baylis defined globalisation as ‘...the process of increasing interconnectedness 
between societies such that events in one part of the world more and more have effects on 
peoples and societies far away’.42 They argued globalisation has many features in common 
with modernisation 43 Advocates of modernity state industrialisation brings a new set of 
contacts between societies, changing the socio-politico-economic processes that 
characterised the pre-modemised world. Very similar to how transition alters communist 
societies. Industrialisation alters the nature of the state, both widening its responsibilities and 
weakening its control over outcomes. The result is the old power politics model of 
international relations becomes outmoded. Force becomes less usable, states have to 
negotiate with other actors to achieve their goals, and the very identity of the state as an actor 
is called into question. In many respects it seems modernisation is part of globalisation, 
differing only in that it applied more to the developed world and involved nothing like as 
extensive a set of transactions. Indeed, the same ideas can be applied to the transition 
process.
The effects of globalisation on Russian-Japanese relations have already been touched on 
earlier in this chapter under different headings, in terms of a shift from Sovietism/realism to 
liberalism and globalism. Rather than repeating already covered ground the focus here will 
be on one particular aspect -  that of increased interaction between Russia and Japan in a
42Balyis, John, and Smith, Steve, “Introduction” in Baylis, John, and Smith, Steve (Eds.), The Globalisation of 
World Politics -  An Introduction to International Relations. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1997, p.7.
43Modelski, G., Principles of World Politics, Free Press, New York, US, 1972, pp.11-23; and Morse, E., 
Modernisation and the Transformation of International Relations. Free Press, New York, US, 1976, pp.36-49.
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multilateral framework, namely in North-East Asia; focusing on this particular aspect 
highlights issues of security, which thus far have not been fully addressed; it also covers 
more recent history highlighting how globalisation has impacted Russian-Japanese relations 
regionally. The US, Soviet Union/Russia, China and Japan have been major powers in 
North-East Asia and all have influenced the region’s structure. However, their relations have 
significantly changed, not only between the Cold War and post-Cold War eras but also 
during both those periods. In 1997 and 1998, each of the six logically possible dyads 
amongst the four states held bilateral summit meetings, for the first time in history.
During the Cold War, and particularly, the 1950s, the US and Japan had close security ties 
through alliance, opposing the Sino-Soviet alliance. Competition between the two dyads was 
serious not only because of military competition but also because of ideological differences. 
The international political economy witnessed what may be termed competing bilateralism 
or a competing dyad system. After the US and Japan normalised diplomatic relations with 
China in the 1970s, the three formed an implicit triple alliance vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. 
The US forged detente with the Soviet Union in the early 1970s but their relations became 
bitter especially after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. China had split from the 
Soviet Union in the late 1950s and in the late 1960s the two clashed. The 1970s saw the 
Soviet Union become China’s number one enemy as she began economic liberalisation. 
During the 1970s and 1980s Japan deepened politico-economic relations with China as she 
strengthened US security relations. The Soviet Union became the common enemy of all 
three states.
However, when Gorbachev took power in 1985 Soviet-US relations significantly improved. 
The Cold War’s end led to the Soviet Union’s dissolution and a new Russia pursuing 
democratisation and marketisation. China continued her own liberalisation in market 
socialism. The US became the sole superpower. Japan kept her status of economic giant 
while changing her security policies like sending Self-Defence Forces overseas as part of UN 
peacekeeping operations. The four states have divergent individual characteristics; their 
international status and individual dyads between them are also different. The US and Japan 
are G7 members (with Russia now G8) China is not. The US, China and Russia are
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permanent UN Security Council members Japan is not. Japan is a non-nuclear state while the 
other three are major nuclear powers. While the US and Russia are OSCE members, Japan 
and China are not. (Japan is an observer.) This may imply divisions between Europe and 
Asia amongst these four states. These differences, however, have not created structural 
cleavages between them post-Cold War. Rather, they seem to have forged implicit consensus 
regarding the international political economy; they admit the political status quo as reality.
The second half of the 1990s saw summit exchanges between the four states to be the norm 
rather than the exception. Bilateral summit meetings have been frequent. However, the 
structure of bilateral summits has changed radically over time. Figure 1.4 demonstrates 
fundamental changes in configuration of bilateral summits between the four states since 
1983. The figure shows the most stable and close relations have been between the US and 
Japan. Japan-China relations have also been close. It also reveals that it was after Gorbachev 
took office the US and the Soviet Union/Russia developed stable bilateral relations. 
However, the most important point it demonstrates is clear structural changes over time; 
changes in the international political economy. During 1983-1984, bilateral summit meetings 
were only held between the US and Japan, China and Japan, and the US and China. There 
was no bilateral summit including the Soviet Union. This clearly shows there was an implicit 
triple alliance between the US, Japan and China vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. This situation 
changed on Gorbachev’s accession to public office. Bilateral Soviet-US summit meetings 
became annual; there were none between the Soviet Union and China before 1991; and there 
were none between China and the US during 1986-1996.
Figure 1.4: Bilateral Summit Meetings in North-East Asia, 1983-1998
Years
83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 |
J-U
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J-R
U-C
U-R
C-R
Notes: J = Japan; U = US; C = China; R = Soviet Union/Russia; |  = Meeting held.
Source: Data should be considered tentative as it is sourced from the Japanese Diplomatic Blue Books.
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This might imply the US did not feel it necessary to have close relations with China because 
of improved relations with the Soviet Union. In a sense, the implicit tripartite alliance 
against the Soviet Union collapsed, and relations between the US and China deteriorated 
after Tiananmen Square. In addition, there was no Soviet-Japanese bilateral summit meeting. 
However, since all four states were directly or indirectly connected in this period, there were 
fewer structural cleavages between them than before. This continued until 1991 when the 
Soviet Union collapsed and President El’tsin took power. The Cold War’s end opened the 
way for bilateral Russian-Chinese summits -  they spoke of a strategic partnership -  while 
the US and Russia maintained stable bilateral relations. The post-Cold War era brought 
consensus amongst the four powers about fundamentals of the international political 
economy, about international institutions, about political compromise, about cooperation, 
about globalisation.
Russia and Japan do not yet have a peace treaty and the territorial issue remains to be 
resolved. During the first half of the 1990s, Japan faced the dilemma of helping Russia 
economically with the view to achieving Japanese administration of the disputed territories. 
While Japan held two bilateral summits with El’tsin’s Russia during this period, the US did 
not have any bilateral summits with China. This was the result of various issues, including 
Tiananmen Square, human rights and Taiwan. It was in 1997 that these two dyads (the US 
and China, and Russia and Japan) came to have bilateral summits. Having consolidated 
security relations with the US in 1996, Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto began to be 
proactive in relations with Russia, partly because the policy circle responsible for Russia in 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs changed its stance towards Russia. Hashimoto seemed to be 
aiming at a grand resolution in the sense both the territorial issue and the peace treaty would 
be solved simultaneously. He tried to achieve this through El’tsin. He visited Russia to meet 
El’tsin in 1997 and both agreed to a peace treaty by 2000. El’tsin returned the visit in early 
1998 and Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi visited Moscow later the same year to maintain 
this new partnership. However, Moscow-Tokyo relations and resolution of the territorial 
issue and the signing of the peace treaty were marginalised as transition issues dominated.
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1.10 Transition -  The Theoretical and the Contemporary
Between 1917 and 1950 states containing one-third of the world’s population seceded from 
the market economy and constructed an alternative economic system, culminating in the 
need for a different political system. First in the Russian Empire and Mongolia then, after 
WWn, in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics, and subsequently in China, North 
Korea and Vietnam (with offshots and imitations elsewhere), production was centralised 
through state planning.44 This experiment transformed the twentieth century. But its collapse 
set in motion just as radical a transformation that seeks to rebuild markets, employ 
democracy, reintegrate these states into the international political economy and transform the 
structure and culture of these states.45 However, transition is even more than this. It is about 
change penetrating every aspect of society. What distinguishes transition from reforms is the 
systematic change involved -  transition must penetrate the fundamental rules of the game, 
institutions shaping behaviour and guiding organisations. This is why transition is political, 
social and cultural, as well as economic; it affects the international as much as the domestic.
Conceptualising transition is difficult as each state involved in the process is, by the nature 
of their history, culture, politics, ethnicity, economics and geography, unique. Furthermore, 
as transition’s focus tends to be on states or groups of states it fails to include regions. Rarely 
are regional differences considered. In a transitional state the size of Russia this is over 
simplistic, failing to account for regional policy, differences in territorial designations, 
centre-periphery relations, regions with resources and with different roles. Accession to the 
EU is the model upon which Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics base their 
transition. Prerequisites for accession to the EU are similar to the objectives of transition. 
Geographical proximity has been a key factor in transition. For example, the three states 
located closest to the EU -  Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, initially, made the 
most progress in terms of transition and negotiations for EU accession. The experience of 
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary hold relevance for regions geographically 
proximate to more developed states or regions. The Far East exemplifies that -  a transitional
^Westby, Adam, The Evolution of Communism. Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 1989, pp.95-162.
45Koves, Andras, Central and East European Economies in Transition -  The International Dimension, 
Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, US, 1992, pp.63-79.
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region on the edge of North-East Asia aspiring to integrate and be part of Asia/Pacific -  an 
economically rich region politicising its wealth and geography with the aspiration of 
development.
1.11 The Development of Regions46
Planning for development is a preoccupation of administrators. In the former command 
economies the principal preoccupation for administrators is transition. Under communism 
large-scale planning was a basic feature. The Soviet Union became noted for its many plans 
of varying durations, purposes and regional focus. Some form of regionalisation usually 
accompanied planning. At its simplest, a specified area was set apart for particular attention 
either because of potentialities, human content, strategic importance or relative 
backwardness. Conceptually, planning, at its most complex sees the entire national area 
subdivided into regions. Geographers use the phrase regions -  tool fo r  action47 
Development regions fall under this category. They embody a dynamic concept of regions, 
one that is orientated more towards the future than the present. Development regions are 
sometimes, interchangeably, called planning or administrative regions, although these terms
A Q
highlight part of what is understood by development. Though planning leads to 
development, without implementation it cannot bring change 49 Administrative measures are
46As both development and transition are terms used to identify a process of progress and change, a lot of the 
discussion in this section has been drawn from the literature on development. The basis from where each 
process begins is the distinguishing feature in identifying the difference between the two.
47Dziewonski, K., “Economic Regionalisation -  A Report of Progress” in Berry, Brain J.L., and Wrobel, 
Andrzej (Eds.), Economic Regionalisation and Numerical Methods -  Final Report of the Commission on 
Methods of Economic Regionalisation of the International Geographical Union, Geographia Polonica Warsaw, 
Poland, 1968, p.68.
48Gore, Charles, Regions in Question -  Space, Development Theory and Regional Policy, Methuen, London, 
UK, 1984, pp. 198-212; Myrdal, Gunnar, Economic Theory and Under-Developed Regions, Duckworth, 
London, UK, 1957, pp.91-112; and Dedekam, Anders, Poor Regions in Rich Societies -  Toward a Theory 
Development in Backward and Remote Areas in Advanced Countries. With Special Reference to Norway, 
Program in Urban and Regional Studies, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, US, 1977, pp.763-786.
49Eisenschitz, Aram, and Gouch, Jamie, “Theorising the State in Local Economic Governance” in Regional 
Studies. Vol.32, No.8, pp.759-768; and Wong, Cecilia, “Determining Factors for Local Economic 
Development -  The Perception of Practitioners in the North West and Eastern Regions of the UK” in Regional 
Studies. Vol.32, No.8, pp.707-720. In many transitional states such regions have been given a special status and 
termed Free or Special Economic Zone.
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important for achieving development, but they are not the sole measures upon which the 
process depends.50
In any Soviet planning period, central authorities devoted much attention to the development 
of particular regions and concentrated considerable resources and efforts. Such regions were 
usually termed territorial-industrial complexes. However, when communism collapsed all 
subnational regions became equal, while some were better advantaged than others. 
Moreover, when communism collapsed, these regions became elements of both a new state 
and a changing international political economy. The transition of these regions was domestic 
and international, as evidenced by events in Chechniia and in Primorie, but this was 
especially true of gateway and resource-rich regions.
A gateway region is an area adjacent to a national boundary whose population is affected in 
various ways by the proximity of that boundary.51 The concept of gateway region assumes a 
socio-political organisation in a given area. Though the concept of region has gained a very 
wide currency in geographical literature it belongs to the social sciences. To speak of 
gateway regions is to treat them as political actors; it makes sense to speak of cooperation or 
conflict with them. Most of the political issues in gateway regions of contemporary states 
have four potential sources of political difficulties. These relate to geographical location -  
boundary disputes, subversive activities across national boundaries, problems of peripheral 
location and penetration of activities with neighbouring regions in other states.
50UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Planning for Balanced Social and Economic Development -  
Six Country Case Studies. UN, New York, US, 1964, pp.223-254.
51 Anderson, Malcolm, “The Political Problems of Frontier Regions” in Anderson, Malcolm (Ed.), Frontier 
Regions in Western Europe. Frank Cass, London, UK, 1983, p .l.
52See Turner, John R., Scotland’s North Sea Gateway -  Aberdeen Harbour 1136-1986, Aberdeen University 
Press, Aberdeen, UK, 1986.
53The notions of gateway and outpost emerged from the concept of frontierism. Frontierism conceptualised 
unconquered land. Gateway referred to conquered land with a special role. Outpost described the conquered 
land that either remained just that (without developing a special role) or a region in post-gateway condition. 
Frontierism owes its origins to the work of Frederick Jackson Turner. His work was concerned with the 
westward flow of settlement in the US. In 1893 he first depicted the advancing frontier line of settlement as a 
dynamic, determining, running through much of US history. As elaborated, criticised and revised, his frontier 
thesis attracted US historians and, in time, was applied elsewhere (Canada and Australia). Regions are not, by 
legal definitions, small states, in spite of their character. Regions are administrative units and problem-solving 
machinery, constitutionally geared to peaceful and cooperative goals like welfare, efficiency, development and 
planning, through politics.
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Some gateway regions share the problems of peripheral regions. Located far from the main 
centres of economic activity and political decision-making, these regions suffer from 
marginalisation. It is possible there are no genuine solutions to their problems within 
existing constitutional and political frameworks. However, there are examples of 
marginalisation that encourage gateway regions to look beyond national boundaries for 
solutions. Economic disparities, particularly if an economically disadvantaged region faces a 
prosperous neighbour across an international frontier, are one of a number of potential 
sources of conflict both within a gateway region and between the gateway region and the 
political centre. The main political problems of gateway regions stem from the very stability 
of national boundaries -  from the fact they are largely unchallenged and are unlikely to be 
modified in the foreseeable future.54 With the view to achieving transfrontier cooperation, 
gateway regions can also play the role of buffer states. While some buffers have been 
consumed in this way others maintained their territorial integrity. Others have matured to 
become gateway regions. Some gateway regions have had their status further complicated by 
the existence of resources.
Reynolds stated abundant resources are important if there is the capacity and will to exploit 
them.55 Resource-rich regions can experience problems of political control until and unless 
there is the development of communications and transportation.56 This is only achievable 
through political organisation, bringing into question the effectiveness of national, 
subnational and local political structures.57 It is from this point Brown stated regionalism
CO
and centre-periphery conflict could emerge due to differences in resource endowments. 
However, it is clear the relevance of resources to politics is conditional upon an awareness of 
their utility. Whether resources are accessible is determined by location -  value is dependent
^Fischer, E., “On Boundaries” in World Politics. V ol.l, N o.l, 1949, pp.32-49; and also see Orianne, P., The 
Legal Problems Involved in Frontier Regions Cooperation. Council of Europe, Strasbourg, France, 1972.
55Reynolds, P.A., An Introduction to International Relations. Second Edition, Longman, London, UK, 1988, 
pp.70-72.
56Kresge, David T., Regions and Resources -  Strategies for Development. Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, US, 1984, pp.98-117.
57Munsi, Sunila, India. Resources. Regions and Regional Disparity. Peoples Publishing House, New Delhi, 
India, 1984, pp.34-45.
58Brown, Lester R., The Global Politics of Resource Scarcity. Overseas Development Council, Washington, 
DC, US, 1974, pp.23-27.
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on transportation costs to points of use or sale and on the cost and feasibility of the effort 
needed to exploit them. Indeed, based on the notion a resource is something that can be used, 
a resource has to be exploitable in order to be defined as such.59 For example, through the 
existence of oil and gas in the Sahara and the North Sea has long been known or suspected, 
they were not considered resources until they were exploitable.
According to the Federal Office of Regional Development (Quebec), ‘...other things being 
equal, possession of extensive natural resources increases a region’s freedom to 
manoeuvre...’.60 This suggests a second way in which resources are important in politics. 
Foreign attention is likely to be attracted towards regions where large resources are located, 
particularly, though not exclusively, when they do not have adequate resources. As resource- 
rich areas are able to attract foreign attention in this way, attention to these regions becomes 
an issue of strategic concem.61Yet strategic considerations, unlikely as it may seem, are more 
apparent when resources are not exploited. If the domestic framework is not ready or able to 
exploit resources then worries over foreign participation in exploitation arise. From the 
international perspective, being unaware of what such unexploited resources may be used for 
is of equal concern. Resources can only be regarded as such when they are usable. Mote 
argued in some cases environmental hardships are so severe they inhibit resource 
exploitation; moreover, though it may be possible to exploit resources, costs are often so
59Orrego Vicuna, Francisco, Antarctic Bibliography -  With Particular Reference to the Legal and Political 
Issues of Co-operation and the Regime on Mineral Resources. Institute of International Studies of the 
University of Chile, Santiago, Chile, 1987, p.27.
60Federal Office of Regional Development (Quebec), The Resource Regions of Quebec. Federal Office of 
Regional Development (Quebec), Quebec, Canada, 1990, pp. 17-18.
61 Arad, Ruth W., Sharing Global Resources. McGraw-Hill, New York, US, 1979, pp. 143-159; and Solingen, 
Etel, Regional Orders at Century’s Dawn -  Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy. Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, US, 1998, pp.237-241.
62McConnell, John Wilkinson, Economic Security -  A Study of Community Needs and Resources. Cornell 
University, New York State School of Industrial and Labour Relations, Ithaca, New York, US, 1951, pp.21-27; 
and Gutteridge, William, Mineral Resources and National Security. Institute for the Study of Conflict, London, 
UK, 1984, pp.12-18.
63
great it becomes uneconomical.63 His ideas specifically relate to capital and infrastructure 
deficiencies necessary for resource development. Although it is probable natural constraints 
dominate in preventing resource development, where capital and infrastructure could assist, 
costs are likely to be such potential investors are discouraged. Indeed, problems of attracting 
labour and population settlement need consideration (see Figure 1.5).
________________ Figure 1.5: Total Costs of Resource Development________________
______________________________ TC — C 1 + Cep + (Cce) + Ci + R + (S)________________________________
TC = Total Costs; Cl = Labour Costs; Cep = Capital Production Costs (including depreciation); Cce = 
Capital Environmental Costs (including pollution abatement, reclamation and permafrost defences); Ci = 
Intermediate Materials and Transportation Costs; R = Costs inherent in unforeseen layoffs and work 
stoppages caused by macro-scale, micro-scale and technogenic constraints [costs beyond established norms 
and ordinary rates of depreciation (comparable to risk)]; and S = Social Costs (not necessarily all inclusive). 
Oudays for Cce and S are in brackets because, depending on the priority of resources designated for 
development and/or the self-purification capacity of the given environment, they conceivably maybe
ignored by developers.___________________________________________________________________________
Source: Mote, Victor L., “Environmental Constraints to the Economic Development of Siberia” in Jensen, 
Robert G., Shabad, Theodore, and Wright, Arthur W. (Eds.), Soviet Natural Resources in the World Economy. 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois, US, 1983, p.57.
While the anti-resource thesis emerges from a realist school it is only a perspective, for 
understanding barriers inhibiting resource development. In analysing resource-rich regions 
with harsh climatic conditions it has a role to play. However, the thesis fails to recognise 
non-physical factors discouraging and inhibiting domestic exploitation -  including federal 
relations, socio-politics and law -  as well as possibilities of non-domestic interaction.64 The 
realist approach of the anti-resource thesis does not, however, deter resource-rich regions 
from being driven by liberal thinking. For example, the natural-fit thesis is grounded in the 
complementary nature of two economies and is the basis for developing mutually beneficial 
trade links and, subsequently, improved political relations. Yet this liberal notion fails to
63His idea was termed The Anti- Resource Constraint. The idea can be read about in more detail in Mote, 
Victor L., Prediction and Realities in the Development of the Soviet Far East. Association of American 
Geographers, Project on Soviet Natural Resources in the World Economy, Discussion Paper No.3, May 1978; 
Mote, Victor L., The Baikal-Amur Mainline and its Implications for the Pacific Ocean. University of Texas, 
Houston, Texas, US, 1983; Mote, Victor L., and Shabad, Theodore, Gateway to Siberian Resources (The 
BAM). Scripta Publishing Company, Scripta, Technica Incorporated, Washington, DC, US, 1977; and Mote, 
Victor L., “Environmental Constraints to the Economic Development of Siberia” in Jensen, Robert G., Shabad, 
Theodore, and Wright, Arthur W. (Eds.), Soviet Natural Resources in the World Economy, University of 
Chicago, Illinois, US, 1983, pp. 15-71.
^Kovrigin, Evgeny B., “Problems of Resource Development in the Russian Far East” in Akaha, Tsuneo (Ed.), 
Politics and Economics in the Russian Far East -  Changing Ties with Asia-Pacific, Routledge, London, UK, 
1997, pp.70-86.
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consider physical factors the anti-resource thesis highlights, in the same way the anti- 
resource thesis fails to highlight non-physical factors in resource exploitation. 
Environmental constraints add to development costs.65 In harsh environments infrastructure 
is determined by climate. Labour requires financial incentives to encourage resettlement to 
the region. However, issues of turnover and limited availability of climatically adapted 
technology hamper possibilities of utilising labour.66
Resource-rich regions have emerged as political actors due to a number of reasons, including 
fragmenting domestic environments, globalising forces, resource scarcity and environmental 
destruction. Increasingly recognised as political actors, domestically and internationally, they 
have become a basis for political bargaining. Though challenging traditional notions of 
centre-periphery relations, they remain vulnerable to local geography, international markets 
and developments within the state of which they are sub-units. However, often, resources 
emerge as one of numerous facets upon which regions are able to leverage their position. 
Many regions with significant resources -  Quebec (Canada), Queensland (Australia), and 
Siberia and the Far East (Russia) -  when bargaining with central authorities highlight 
characteristics differentiating them from the parent state. Essentially, non-economic factors 
(as in the anti-resource thesis) are politicised and used for improving economic power vis-a- 
vis the centre. Resource-rich regions in transitional states, previously having been given 
special status under central planning regimes, have emerged as politically defined peripheral 
regions.67 The disappearance of federal fiscal transfers and decline of territorial-industrial 
complexes have resulted in these regions emerging as subnational frontiers, gateways and 
international actors, overturning traditional ideas of centre-periphery relations.
6501sen, Edward A., Japan -  Economic Growth. Resource Scarcity, and Environmental Constraints. Westview 
Press, Boulder, Colorado, US, 1978, pp.87-116.
66Helgeson, Ann C., “Population and Labour Force” in Rodgers, Allan (Ed.), The Soviet Far East -  
Geographical Perspectives on Development. First Edition, Routledge, London, UK, 1990, pp.58-82.
67For thought provoking reading on the topic of the idea of periphery see Baldwin, R.E., The Core-Peripherv 
Model and Endogenous Growth. Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, UK, 1997.
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1.12 Centre-Periphery Relations
The centre-periphery model has been used in various analytical frameworks.68 For example, 
for some the model functions as a symbol of the systematic structuring of space implying 
inherent opposition between a dominant centre and subordinate periphery.69 The model has 
been used to characterise at least two often-related types of dominance -  socio-ethnic and 
politico-economic. From a socio-ethnic perspective -  control is seen to be exercised by
7 0dominant groups over native peoples and/or national minorities. If modernisation is 
unsuccessful then there is likely to be an increase in ethnic conflict. The politico-economic 
view of centre-periphery relations assumes an economically dominant centre to which there 
is a net flow of resources from weaker peripheries.71 Thus, at the international scale, the 
structure of capitalism comprises a core -  the economically and technologically advanced 
North America, Japan and Western Europe. At the national scale, the centre generally 
contains the capital city, which tends to be the centre of political power. Apart from 
describing spatial aspects of the distribution of political and economic power, the centre- 
periphery model is suggestive of the likely political behaviour of those located in either the 
centre or the periphery that, in turn, can offer some insight into the causes of political 
conflict.72
Rokkan stated, ‘...the concept of peripherality can be broken down into at least four 
dimensions -  cultural, economic, political and geographical’.73 The cultural is concerned
68Some of the most diverse examples include Wright, Vincent, and Meny, Yves (Eds.), Centre-Peripherv 
Relations in Western Europe. Allen and Unwin, London, UK, 1985; Schweizer, Peter, Shepherds. Workers. 
Intellectuals -  Culture and Centre-Peripherv Relationships in a Sardinian Village. Department of Social 
Anthropology, University of Stockholm, Stockholm, Sweden, 1988; and Haglund, David G. (Ed.), The Centre- 
Peripherv Debate in International Security, Centre for International Relations, Queens University, Kingston, 
Ontario, Canada, 1995.
69Rumley, Dennis, and Minghi, Julian V., “Introduction -  The Border Landscape Concept” in Rumley, Dennis, 
and Minghi, Julian V. (Eds.), The Geography of Border Landscapes. Routledge, London, UK, 1991, p.5.
70Rokkan, S., and Urwin, D.W., Economy, Identity, Territory -  Politics of West European Peripheries, Sage, 
London, UK, 1983, pp. 11-18, 32-39, 81-97.
71Augelli, J.P., “Nationalisation of Dominican Borderland” in Geographical Review, Vol.70, pp. 19-35; 
Cosgrove, D., and Jackson, P. “New Directions in Cultural Geography” in Asia. Vol.19, pp.95-101; and House, 
J.W. “Frontier Studies -  An Applied Approach” in Burnett, A.D., and Taylor, P.J. (Eds.), op. cit.. Wiley, New 
York, US, pp.291-312.
72Rumley, D., “The Geography of Political Participation” in Australian Geographer, Vol. 12, pp.279-286.
73Rokkan, S., and Urwin, D.W., op. cit.. p. 134.
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with conflicts between elite and minority ethnic groups.74 The economic focuses on tensions 
arising from exploitation and uneven wealth distribution. The political is concerned with 
conflicts arising from disparities in participation and power. The geographical is related to 
distance and the perception of strategic territorial advantage (or disadvantage), as well as 
with local regional conflicts. The latter may well arise as a result of the geographical 
coincidence of any one or more of the other dimensions. Clearly, the potential for border 
landscape conflict is greatest where all four dimensions coincide.
In transitional states border regions have the least political power. Within the state they are 
likely to be regarded as culturally and/or economically isolated. Per capita income and state 
allocations are usually lower, save for special grants. Rumley and Minghi have argued 
‘...peripheral inhabitants tend to be more culturally independent and more conservative than 
those in central locations and are, therefore, less willing to change and to adapt to national
7 c
culture and a national set of norms’. Strong pressure to fully adopt national norms, they 
have suggested, may force peripheral inhabitants into radical political action. This is even 
more apparent when the periphery feels subjected to a declining central authority while 
international processes push it towards globalisation -  like in many transitional states.76
1.13 Internal Decline Versus Foreign Expansion
In examining transition an interesting question is why a particular transition has occurred, 
especially where reformers within the ruling authoritarian regime have initiated the process. 
Traditional spurs to liberalisation include defeat in war, economic collapse and loss of 
regime legitimacy.77 In the Soviet case, there was little to indicate Gorbachev, when he was
74Gottlieb, Gidon, Nation Against State -  A New Approach to Ethnic Conflicts and the Decline of Sovereignty. 
Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York, US, 1993, pp.47-63.
75Rumley, Dennis, and Minghi, Julian V., op. cit, p. 34.
76Lemco, Jonathan, Political Stability in Federal Governments. Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, US, 1991. 
Jonathan Lemco stated, ‘...the political elites of ...a model federation would be well advised to discourage 
rapid economic modernisation. The evidence suggested that where rapid economic change exceeded the 
adaptive capacity of the nation’s political institutions, as has often historically been the case, there has been a 
great deal of internal divisiveness’, (p.viii) suggesting the centre is best to ensure economic marginalisation in 
the periphery to avoid political confrontation.
77Charlton, Michael, Footsteps from the Finland Station -  Five Landmarks in the Collapse of Communism. 
Claridge Press, St. Albans, UK, 1992, pp. 18-28.
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named General Secretary in March 1985, would be a reformer, let alone a revolutionary.78 
True, he was younger, more vigorous than his predecessors and more impatient with Soviet 
inefficiencies and corruption. But he was also more anxious to solve foreign policy 
problems.79 In 1985 the Kremlin was involved in states, such as Angola and Afghanistan, 
which were fighting counterinsurgency struggles. It was also cut out of the Middle East
on
peace process. In Europe, Andropov backed the Soviet Union into a comer by first 
threatening to withdraw and then actually withdrawing from talks with NATO. The 
deterioration of the Soviet economy prevented Moscow from competing successfully with 
the US in the arms race. In the economic realm, the Soviet Union was, in the words of 
Rutland, living on borrowed tim e}1 Central planning had led to a marked decline in Soviet 
GNP growth, while military expenditures were taking an increasing share of the state 
budget.82 This economic downturn had implications for foreign policy for communism’s 
legitimacy. It may be questioned whether the Soviet regime ever enjoyed affective 
legitimacy; nonetheless, worsening standards of living certainly diminished prospects for 
continuing instrumental legitimisation.83
78Miller, John, Mikhail Gorbachev and the End of Soviet Power. MacMillan, London, UK, 1992, pp. 13- 28. 
Also see Lane, David Stuart, The Transition from Communism to Capitalism -  Ruling Elites from Gorbachev 
to Yeltsin. St. Martin’s Press, New York, US, 1999; and Galeotti, Mark, Gorbachev and His Revolution. 
MacMillan Press, Basingstoke, UK, 1997.
79Barylski, Robert V., The Soldier in Russian Politics -  Duty, Dictatorship and Democracy Under Gorbachev 
and Yeltsin, Transaction Publishers, New Jersey, US, 1998, pp.405-438; Young, Elizabeth, The Gorbachev 
Phenomenon. Social Democratic Publications, London, UK, 1987, pp.8-15; Steele, Jonathan, Eternal Russia -  
Yeltsin. Gorbachev and the Mirage of Democracy. Faber, London, UK, 1994, pp.287-318; and Gorbachev, 
Mikhail, Mikhail Gorbachev -  Socialism, Peace and Democracy -  Writings. Speeches and Reports, Zwan, 
London, UK, 1987, pp.147-165.
80See Nogee, Joseph L., Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II, MacMillan, New York, US, 1992.
81Rutland, Peter, “Economic Crisis and Reform” in White, Stephen, Pravda, Alex, and Gitelman, Zvi (Eds.), 
Developments in Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics. Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina, US, 1992,
p.202.
82According to the 1996 World Development Report (p.2), ‘The deep inefficiencies of planning became 
increasingly evident with time. Heavy industries such as machine building and metallurgy were emphasised, 
while development of consumer goods lagged. After posting high annual growth rates in the 1950s (averaging 
10% according to official estimates), the Soviet economy decelerated -  growth averaged 7% per year in the 
1960s, 5% in the 1970s, and barely 2% in the 1980s, and in 1990 it contracted). This trend occurred despite 
high investment rates -  returns to capital formation began a steady and rapid descent in the mid-1950s. A 
similar stagnation infected Eastern Europe. As a major oil exporter, the Soviet Union benefited from the price 
increases of 1973 and 1979, but severe shortages and the deteriorating quality of its manufactured goods 
relative to those of market economies were clear signs of stagnation’.
83Smith, Tony, Thinking Like a Communist -  State and Legitimacy in the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba. 
Norton, New York, US, 1987, pp. 11-37 and 220-231.
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In the history of Soviet expansion there was no greater or more important achievement than 
the establishment of the Central and Eastern European Empire. Leaders from Stalin to 
Gorbachev, despite differences in specific policies, were steadfast in their determination to 
preserve the empire.84 As the 1980s progressed Central and Eastern Europe was a source of 
critical vulnerability for the Soviet Union. For forty years it was fortunate to confront one 
crisis in one colony at a time. However, on this occasion her luck did not hold out. 
Successive explosions rocked the region. The whole notion of centre-periphery relations was 
in disarray.
Friedmann’s centre-periphery model and its reformulation in terms of a theory of conflict 
offered a link between Western regional development theory and some of the central issues
o c
of Marxism. Models of centre-periphery relations never consider the centre collapsing. All 
models remain focused on the sustained progression of the centre (which is covered in the 
literature about end of empire). The obvious question in the transitional context is does 
internal decline lead to foreign expansion? Foreign expansion, not in the colonial sense but, 
in the sense of looking outside national boundaries. This may happen either when the centre 
is no longer able to guide, govern or is not recognised for its ability to do so. Moreover, it 
may occur when external forces are able to play such a role. In the case of Central and 
Eastern Europe, looking beyond the Soviet Empire was a driving force for the collapse of 
communism. However, in this case they were peripheral states that looked to areas such as 
the EU. So what about subnational regions? The same concept is certainly applicable on a 
smaller scale. The changing international political economy has seen subnational regions 
become directly involved in decision-making. In transitional states the decline of centralised 
planning, disappearance of fiscal transfers and elimination of special regional profiles have 
forced subnational regions to look to foreign partners, as the authority of central government 
has declined along with its tools o f unity. In the case of subnational regions in transitional 
states, issues of identity, history, geography, security and trade have been the key factors
^Volkogonov, Dmitry Antonovich, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire -  Political Leaders from Lenin to 
Gorbachev. Harper Collins, London, UK, 1998, pp.427-458.
85Friedmann, J., “The Spatial Organisation of Power in the Development of Urban Systems” in Comparative 
Urban Research. Vol.l, pp.5-42.
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facilitating foreign expansion. As these regions have expanded their foreign outlook, parties 
external to the state, of which they are part, have become involved and, indeed, become 
driving forces facilitating democratisation and economic transition.
As previously stated, the geographical location of states can facilitate transition. This is a 
result of external involvement in facilitating transition or external factors being the 
foundation/model upon which transition is based. This raises a further issue -  the impact of 
external actors on transition. Without question, the primary external factor until 1989 was 
the Soviet Union. Without the Soviet Union there would never have been a communist bloc. 
Yet, in the end, the Soviet Union played a crucial role in permitting communism’s collapse; 
an event that can only be conceptualised retrospectively.
1.14 Conceptualising the Far East in Russian-Japanese Relations
The international political economy is the environment in which the units of international 
relations operate. Their goals, aspirations, needs, attitudes, latitude of choice and actions are 
significantly influenced by the overall distribution of power. In order to explain what 
conditions make states behave as they do it is essential to describe what they typically do. 
Theoretical frameworks include an overview of the main schools of thought in international 
relations and their insights into the basis and causes for cooperation and conflict, which can 
be applied to the understanding of Russian-Japanese relations. Moreover, given that the 
entire nature of the international political economy has changed, part of this theoretical 
framework has been built around understanding new and changing phenomenon -  namely 
new actors, changing geography and new policy sources and processes. The new 
international political economy is the framework that has changed traditional notions of 
Russian-Japanese relations. As a result of the Soviet Union’s collapse, its position on the 
domestic and international stages has shifted.
The Far East’s geography -  in terms of location with respect to the centre and the 
international system -  as well as its phenomenal resource wealth and harsh environment has 
politicised this once subdued, isolated and protected region. Having once been the focus of 
intense energies, the Far East has been left to fend for itself in the post-Soviet international
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political economy. Though part of the Russian state it feels detached and looks eastwards 
with the view to developing ties with North-East Asia. This has raised questions of its role 
both within the Russian Federation and beyond. The notion of complementary economies 
between Russia and Japan, and the Far East’s position between these two actors, provides 
for an interesting case study of the roles of gateway, resource-rich and frontier regions in 
international relations that are themselves changing in nature, both at state and system levels.
1.15 The Relevance of Theory
The questions why theorise? and what theory should b& used? are questions that need 
answering in the context of any research. Almost every thesis will have a theoretical 
element, but it is important not to lose sight of the original objectives while deciding what 
form theory should take. In a utopian world there would be no need to theorise -  there would 
be no problems to solve. But theory stems from the fact that the world is not perfect and that 
problems have be confronted. It might be argued that theory is spurred on by the failure of 
common sense to understand certain situations. The mind immediately proposes possible 
reasons, and so theorises in its attempt to find a solution to a problem. This is the positivist 
approach to theory. Positivism takes a Sherlock Holmes approach, using theory to aid in 
explanation. The positivist method might be characterised by a search for general rather than 
individual fact -  for trends that will explain a phenomenon.
The problem of borrowed theory and consequent hypotheses is one that has pervaded the 
social sciences. It may stem from the way that sociology has been done in the past. The drive 
to be recognised as a science led to an emphasis being placed on quantification as a method 
-  this has brought too great an emphasis on verification as the chief criterion for excellent 
research. The bulk of theory has been the product of sociological imagination and not always 
the result of investigation in the field. Hence, its relation to many areas of behaviour is at 
least dubious and for the most part irrelevant. Being able to show some part of a theory to be 
provable is no judgement of its worth. The worth of theory must be based on its relevance 
and that will he in its applicability to an area of study and its ability to explain particular 
problems. Theory, while providing the basis for analysing such phenomenon, tends to be 
built around historical evidence and trends, and it is history that is the focus of chapter two.
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Chapter Two:
The Emergence of the Far East as an International
Actor
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2.0 The Emergence of the Far East as an International Actor
When historical phenomena are analysed, not just listed as facts, common properties can be 
found. Events may be unique but they are also comparable. History timelines trends. It logs 
what has passed and offers answers to the present and future. History is often linked to 
geography as policy may be formulated on geographical characteristics. For example, 
climatic, demographic and resource characteristics can create socio-economic needs that 
can only be fulfilled through intra-regional or international interaction. Geographic 
conditions may be so obvious they are not acknowledged as crucial. However, almost every 
political objective and diplomatic action implicitly gives them recognition. Although 
technology can alter the socio-politico-economic significance of geographic characteristics, 
both technology and geographic characteristics can, either separately or collectively, 
influence policies by providing opportunities or placing limitations on what is feasible. 
Geographical size, population, natural resources, climate and topography all have an 
important bearing on socio-politico-economic development, vis-a-vis other regions and 
global access. Moreover, these conditions also have the greatest relevance to defence 
policies. Indeed, geography determines neighbours, which has influenced history.
The relevance of history to this study is key. Traditionally, international relations have been 
the monopoly of states, in spite of history talking of non-state actors -  city-states, 
kingdoms, regions and political and/or economic unions. One such non-state actor is the 
Far East. The Far East was historically an international actor -  both prior to and since its 
incorporation into the Russian Empire. The region was a crossroads for North-East Asia, a 
gateway for Eurasia vis-a-vis North-East Asia and a buffer between the Russian Empire 
and North-East Asia. The Far East’s history is the development of a political economy 
based on international interaction. A history of a region with a developmental legacy of 
colonisation. Indeed, it is one of a political economy formed in the context of international 
relations, where economics and politics have taken turns to preside over each other.
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2.1 Russian Conquest of the Far East
‘Wedged between China, Korea, Japan and the US, the... Far East has emerged as a volatile 
arena where forces that tore apart the former Soviet Union interact with dynamics 
energising Pacific Asia’.1 Lying between Siberia and the Pacific Ocean, the Far East 
comprises the ten easternmost Russian territories (see Figure A 1.2). It has brought together 
North-East Asia’s cultures, politics and economics, creating a unique historical dynamic. 
During the last ice age the Far East was an Asian-American migration bridge.3 Priamur and 
Primorie Neolithic communities shared affinities with Chinese, Korean, Japanese, Siberian 
and North American counterparts dating back to the first millennium.4 This is reflected in 
the aspirations of regional actors to mould a special post-Soviet role for the Far East.
The Far East took shape through the successive occupation of frontiers. Ivan the Terrible’s 
eastward expansion began a process that brought Northern Eurasia and its indigenous 
peoples into recorded history. Russians and their descendants invaded one resource region 
after another with frontiers of fishing, fur trading, lumbering and mining. By the nineteenth 
century frontier growth spanned to the Pacific, implanting large regional communities that 
transformed the realms of sparsely populated natives.5 For three centuries, Russia’s Far 
Eastern colonisation was staged through the settlement of frontiers.6 Cossack forts became
’Stephan, John J., The Russian Far East -  A History. Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, US, 
1994, p .l.
2Tass. September 4, 1987; and Armstrong, Terence, “Introduction” in Wood, Alan (Ed.), Siberia -  Problems 
and Prospects for Regional Development, Croom Helm Publishers Limited, London, UK, 1987, p.l. For 
excellent accounts see Armstrong, Terence, Russian Settlement in the North. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, UK, 1965; Czaplicka, M.A., Aboriginal Siberia -  A Study in Siberian Anthropology. Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, UK, 1914; and Forsyth, James, History of the People of Siberia -  Russia’s North Asian 
Colony 1581-1990, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1992.
3Stephan, John J., “Curtailed or Derailed? Historical Reflections on Far Eastern Development” in Miller, 
Elisa (Ed.), The Russian Far East -  A Business Reference Guide. 1997-1998. Third Edition, Russian Far East 
Update Publications, Seattle, Washington, United States, 1997, p.59.
4Okladnikov, Aleksey Pavlovich, The Soviet Far East in Antiquity. University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 
Canada, 1965, pp.148-168.
5For a study of the concept of fronterism, using Canada as an example, see Careless, J.M.S., Frontier and 
Metropolis -  Regions. Cities and Identities in Canada Before 1914. The Donald G. Creighton Lectures 1987, 
University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Canada, 1989.
6See Rodgers, Allan (Ed.), The Soviet Far East -  Geographical Perspectives in Development, First Edition, 
Routledge, London, UK, 1990; and Sumner, B.H., Survey of Russian History, Duckworth, London, UK, 
1944.
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cities; serving as administrative and economic centres for the Russian Empire’s eastern
n
periphery they became gateways to further expansion. By 1917 the Far East was a 
settlement system linked by rail, river and sea, providing a network for natural resource 
exploitation by the European core, securing a gateway to North-East Asia.8 However, the 
foundation of relations between what were now Russia’s Eastern populations and the 
peoples of North-East Asia were in place centuries earlier.
The Suifen and Tumen river valleys were settled by Chinese and Koreans during the third 
century. Evidence of Korean and Japanese presence during the fourth and fifth centuries 
has been uncovered in magnificent burial mounds.9 The Tang Dynasty built an 
administrative centre curbing Korean expansion beyond the Khanka Plain. Collecting 
tributes from Sakhalin natives Tang officials established control points along the Amur. 
However, when the Tang Dynasty collapsed in the tenth century Primorie first became part 
of the Jurchen,10 and then Mongol Kingdoms.11 After struggles with natives, the heirs of 
Genghis Khan crossed the border between China and Russia in the thirteenth century after 
conquering China south of the Great Wall. In 1368 a Han Chinese presence, in Priamur and 
Primorie, was re-established when Mongol rule in China was overthrown. Consequently, 
temples were built during the Ming Dynasty’s Amur expeditions. Cossack appearances on 
the Amur coincided with the rise of the Manchu dynasty after the fall of the Ming 
dynasty.12
7Dmytryshyn, Basil, “The Administrative Apparatus of the Russian Colony in Siberia and Northern Asia, 
1581-1700” in Wood, Alan (Ed.), The History of Siberia -  From Russian Conquest to Revolution, Routledge, 
London, UK, 1991, p. 17.
8North, Robert N., Transport in Western Siberia -  Tsarist and Soviet Development. University of British 
Columbia Press and The Centre for Transportation Studies, Vancouver, Canada, 1979, pp.84-112.
9Stephan, John J., The Russian Far East -  A History, op. cit., pp. 12-13
,0Before 1100 the Jurchen were a confederation of hunting and fishing tribes in North-Eastern Manchuria. 
From 1115 to 1234 they rose to power and formed the Jiang kingdom, occupying a large portion of Northern 
China.
1'Hermann, Albert, An Historical Atlas of China, Aldine, Chicago, Illinois, US, 1966, p.6.
12Stephan, John J., “Curtailed or Derailed? Historical Reflections on Far Eastern Development”, op. cit.. 
pp.59-60.
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1 ^Russian settlement, five thousand miles from the imperial capital, began in the 1500s. At 
that time Northern Eurasia was to the Russians what the Americas were to the Spaniards -  
immense and rapid wealth. While the American lure was gold, the Asiatic attraction was 
fur. As early as 1555 Moscow was receiving annual tributes of one thousand sables from 
some Far Eastern indigenous communities.14 Cossack adventurers, fleeing Siberianward as 
the Russian Empire expanded, conquered chieftains. With these territorial prizes taken in 
Russia’s name Cossacks purchased imperial pardons.15 Ivan the Terrible established 
frontiers to open up Siberia and the Far East. Afraid of Russian expansion, Ediger -  Khan 
of the Sibir Tatars, offered Ivan the Terrible a tribute of sable pelts and became his vassal.16 
In 1558, Ivan the Terrible authorised the merchant Strogonov family to open trading posts 
east of the Urals under the protection of Cossack mercenaries. When Ediger’s successor 
Kuchum began plundering these settlements, Cossacks and soldiers, led by Ermak, set out 
to teach him a lesson. In 1582, they took the Tatar capital -  Kashlik -  near today’s Tumen. 
In 1584, during a Tatar counterattack, Yermak drowned. Far Eastern settlement had begun 
and the next fifty years saw one of history’s most explosive territorial expansions fuelled 
by furs, based on the notion of frontierism.17
Each stage of eastward expansion represented a frontier that became a gateway between 
Moscow and unconquered lands. Ermak and his successors exported their pelts to Western 
Europe where European fashions made them the prized possessions of the aristocracy and 
prosperous merchants. This pioneering advance was promoted, rather than hindered, by 
nationals and natives. The principle (not sole) incentive for this push eastwards was 
imposition upon natives for fur tributes. In theory, at least, these eastern lands became 
colonial enterprises, providing income. Subsequently, fur became vital to Russia’s
13Vinacke, Harold M., A History of the Far East in Modem Times. Third Impression, Ruskin House, George 
Allen and Unwin Limited, London, UK, 1964, pp.392-393.
14Norton, Henry Kittredge, The Far Eastern Republic of Siberia. Allen and Unwin, London, UK, 1923, p. 19.
15Kemer, Robert J., The Urge to the Sea -  The Course of Russian History -The Role of Rivers. Portages. 
Ostrogs, Monasteries and Furs. University of California Press, Los Angeles, California, US, 1942, pp.23-24.
16Lantzeff, George V., and Pierce, Richard A., Eastward to Empire -  Exploration and Conquest on the 
Russian Open Frontier to 1750, McGill-Queens University Press, Montreal, Canada, 1973, p.81.
17For an excellent and detailed account on Yermak, see Armstrong, Terence, Yermak’s Campaign in Siberia -  
A Selection of Documents. Hakluyt Society, London, UK, 1975.
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economy and by the 1650s half-a-million furs were being gathered annually -  making-up 
10% of Russia’s national income.18 This colonial legacy continues today -  a European 
centre conflicting with a liberal, detached and neglected Asian periphery.
The local administration, military in character, sought alliance with native aristocracies to 
secure income from fur tributes. For utilitarian reasons the Muscovite government 
emphasised a benevolent attitude towards natives, trying to prevent enslavement and 
compulsory baptism. Yet there was considerable difficulty in carrying out these policies 
through local agents.19 Although the fur trade liberated the Far East the exile system 
populated it -  becoming official punishment in 1649. This penal policy both settled and
9 0developed the eastern lands with Russians and rid society of its loathsome elements. The 
1600s saw Cossacks conquer territories from Sakha to Kamchatka. However on entering 
the Middle Amur Valley, they became entangled in confrontations with the Qing
9 1Dynasty. The 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk cooled tensions between Beijing and Moscow. 
Russia withdrew from the Amur Basin in exchange for rights to continue border trade with 
Mongolia. Russia lost out on rich lands between Siberia and the Pacific, but managed to 
extend her spheres of influence in the North Pacific, establishing footholds in Alaska and 
the Aleutians.22 The 1600s and 1700s saw Russians, Tatars, Poles, Swedes, Lithuanians, 
Germans, Chinese, Koreans and Japanese all scrambling for the territories between Lake 
Baikal and Kamchatka.
18Azulay, Erik and Azulay, Allegra Harris, The Russian Far East, Hippocrene Books, New York, US, 1995,
p.22.
19For a detailed account see Lantzeff, George V., “Beginnings of the Siberian Colonial Administration” in 
Pacific Historical Review. No.9, 1940, pp.47-52.
20For a good overview of the exile system in Siberia and the Far East, see Wood, Alan, “Avvakum’s Siberian 
Exile -  1653-1664” in Wood, Alan, and French, R.A. (Eds.), The Development of Siberia -  Peoples and 
Resources. St. Martin’s Press, New York, US, 1989, pp.89-102.
21Vinogradov, A., V Dal’nykh Kraiakh, I.N. Kushnerev, Moscow, Russia, 1901, p. 125; Panov, Viktor 
Ananevich, Amerikanskie Podlozhnve Dokumentv. Iosif Korot, Vladivostok, Russia, 1918, pp.5-37.
22But Russian influence in Alaska and the Aleutians declined and the territories were sold to the US for 
US$7.2 million in 1867. Petermann, Heiko, The Wide Country -  The History of Siberia. Higrade, Cepoy, 
France, 1988, p.47.
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2.2 Initial Contact With Japan
In the late 1600s, the Cossack peasant Atlasov set out for Siberia. His fame came in 
claiming the Kamchatka Peninsula for Peter the Great.23 By 1700 Atlasov had told 
Moscow about the Kurils and their proximity to Japan. In 1702 Japanese sailor-adventurer 
Dembei welcomed Peter the Great and hired him to teach him Japanese.24 Subsequently, 
Peter the Great ordered a collection of information on Japan for the purposes of expanding 
trade. Over the next quarter-of-a-century Cossacks, hunters and government agents 
ventured to the Kurils. Though the foundations of Russian-Japanese relations were being 
laid, the precise details were not recorded due to the parsimonious mercantilist approach to 
Russian expansion across Eurasia. Moreover, Japanese law at the time was stringent on 
isolationism and mercantilist control over international commerce. National policies on 
both sides punished individuals profiting from Siberia and the Far East. Russian and 
Japanese entrepreneurs had to be vague and secretive. However the Russians continued 
their adventures -  1713-1714 to the Kurils and Sakhalin; and 1721 to the port city of 
Okhotsk -  established as the basis of Russia’s expedition to find Japan via the Kurils.
Initially, information the Russians had on the Japanese came from the Dutch who retained
9Sa foothold in Japan while becoming welcome guests and teachers to the Russian capital. 
The government-inspired translation, into Russian, of a Dutch work -  the atlas of Flemish
0f\geographer Mercator, in 1637 -  formed the basis for subsequent Russian manuscripts 
mentioning Japan. Russia established permanent settlements in Kamchatka around the 
1600s, occupying some of the Northern Kurils in 1711.27 Several attempts were made to 
initiate trade with Japan in the first half of the 1800s. Bering was ordered by St. Petersburg 
to explore the North Pacific for Japan. In 1738 Bering set out on his first expedition in
23See Armstrong, Terence (Ed.), Yermak’s Campaign in Siberia -  A Selection of Documents, Hakluyt, 
London, UK, 1975.
24Riasanovsky, Nicholas V., The Image of Peter the Great in Russian History and Thought. Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, UK, 1975, pp.l 13-137.
25Bishop, Carl Whiting, “The Historical Geography of Early Japan” in Geographical Review, Vol. 13, 1923, 
p.63.
26Mercator was the leading mapmaker of the 1500s famed for his rounded world map.
27Lensen, George Alexander, Russia's Eastward Expansion, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, US, 1964, p.32.
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search of Japan.28 It was on his second expedition, a year later, that Bering discovered 
Japan and went ashore. However, when he reported his findings they were rubbished. 
Fortunately the Japanese had witnessed the expedition off Shimoda. This was the birth of 
documented contact between the Russians and the Japanese (including the Ainu). Though it 
was a time of material, scientific and human progress, continued tensions caused by 
imperialism, international rivalries and cultural uncertainties undermined these initiations. 
From the start, due both to national and international concerns, mutual distrust and hostility 
marked Russian-Japanese relations.
2.3 The Emergence of the Far East as a Gateway Region
Russian, Chinese, Korean and Japanese interaction contributed to the Far East’s 
internationalisation. This was facilitated by both the gateway and buffer roles the region 
commanded. The initial gateway role grew into that of a buffer. The Far East’s location 
positioned it to foster political consensus among regional actors to initiate and encourage 
trade. However politics became a secondary concern as prospects of economic gains took 
precedence.
Initial foreign contact, with China, was established through habitual and equitable trade in 
the early 1700s. This was not displaced by maritime trading until 1900.29 Chinese traders, 
ginseng collectors and gold smugglers merged the Far East with Manchuria. Chinese trade 
with Russia through Kiakhta, from the 1700s, saw the bartering of Chinese tea and wool 
for Russian furs and gold. Indeed, it was visions of trade with China and Japan that 
encouraged Peter the Great to send geologists to seek further information on Siberia and 
the Far East.30 After Sino-Russian trade regularisation, through Mongolia in the aftermath 
of the Kiakhta Treaty, furs and other animal merchandise found their route into the sublime 
realm. In the 1740s furs were still a major contributor to the Russian treasury. From the
28Steller, Georg Wilheim, Journal of a Voyage with Bering. 1741-1742. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 
California, US, 1988, pp.45-62.
29Lattimore, I.O., Manchuria - Cradle of Conflict, MacMillan, New York, US, 1932, pp. 10-16.
30See Russko-Kitaiskie Otnasheniia, 1689-1916, AN, Moscow, Russia, 1958.
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1750s Korean immigrants settled Lake Khanka, engaging in rice farming and ginseng 
collecting. Japanese importers, shop owners, barbers and prostitutes settled today’s 
Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Nikolaevsk, Chita and Blagoveshchensk in the late 1700s. This 
was the birth of Japan’s trade with the Far East, which was initially based on the tsarist 
timber trade. The Far East’s demographics illustrated its internationalisation. By 1897, of 
Vladivostok’s twenty-nine thousand residents, twelve thousand were Chinese, Japanese or 
Korean.31
However, until the 1850s, Far Eastern international ties were severely curtailed. Harsh 
climates, measureless distances, inadequate infrastructure and the absence of an ice-free 
Pacific port all deterred commerce. The insignificant and widely dispersed Far Eastern 
populations were insufficient to initiate internal markets. Neither Japan (locked in self- 
imposed isolation) nor China (confined to trade through Kiakhta as Russian ships were 
barred from Chinese ports) presented commercial opportunities. Most Tsarist 
administrators, conscious of the Far East’s role as a repository for exiles and convicts, as 
well as its remoteness and potential for unrest, discouraged international contacts. 
Unsurprisingly, foreigners, like Ledyard, interested in encouraging Far Eastern trade with 
North-East Asia, met with an icy reception. Circumstances in the 1850s and 1860s, 
however, challenged Far Eastern insularity. Innovative administrators and naval officers 
regarded the establishment of links with North-East Asia as fulfilling Russia’s imperial 
destiny.33 Mid-century North-East Asian geopolitics also coincided with growth in US 
commercial interest in the Far East. During the 1850s, US merchants opened import 
businesses at Nikolaevsk-na-Amure. In 1858 US President Buchanan commissioned a 
commercial agent on the Amur anticipating opportunities.34
31 Stephan, John J., “Siberia and the World Economy -  Incentives and Constraints to Involvement” in Wood, 
Alan (Ed.), Siberia -  Problems and Prospects for Regional Development. Croom Helm Publishers Limited, 
London, UK, 1987, p.217.
32For a full account see Watrous, Stephen D. (Ed.), John Ledvard’s Journey Through Russia and Siberia. 
1787-1788. University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, Wisconsin, US, 1966.
33Symons, L., Russia and the Pacific -  The Geography of Involvement. Proceedings of the Fifth New Zealand 
Geography Conference, Auckland, New Zealand, 1967, pp.25-31.
^Bassin, Mark, “Inventing Siberia -  Visions of the Russian Far East in the Early Nineteenth Century” in 
American Historical Review. Vol.106, No.3, June 1991, p.768.
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Acquisition of one million square kilometres of North-Eastern China, between 1858 and 
1860, granted Russia North-East Asia’s main waterway -  the Amur.35 Extending Russia’s 
eastern coastline southward several hundred kilometres along the Sea of Japan, it led to 
Vladivostok’s creation in 1860. From the late eighteenth century, US traders began 
frequenting the North Pacific seaboard. Silk, spirits, tobacco, sugar and textiles dominated
-j/:
imports, meeting the growing demands of the great Far Eastern migratory waves. Far 
Eastern international economic participation received a strong impetus from the 
construction of the Trans-Siberian, Ussuri and Baikal-Amur Mainline railways. The need 
for steel, rolling stock and bridge materials for these projects generated hefty British, 
German and American orders.
During the period 1848-1857, under the orders of Eastern Siberia’s Governor-General 
Muravev-Amurskii, Russian military officers left a trail of settlements along the Amur and 
on Sakhalin.37 Muravev secured St. Petersburg’s approval for Amur expeditions, 
highlighting joint Anglo-French expeditions in the North-West Pacific. By emphasising 
precaution in dealing with the British, Muravev was able to find mutual ground with 
Manchu officials. Securing domestic support by informing natives they were Russian 
subjects, Muravev’s precaution was not in vein, for in 1858 he signed an agreement with 
the imperial Manchus.39 Russia’s gain was China’s loss -  access to the Sea of Japan. 
Muravev’s final triumph came when the Manchu Dynasty signed the 1860 Treaty of 
Beijing.40 Beijing requested Moscow’s assistance, as she had come under Anglo-French
35Stephan, John J., “The Crimean War in the Far East” in Modem Asian Studies. Vol.3, No.3, 1969, pp.257- 
277.
36Dikov, N.N. (Ed.), Ocherki Istori Chukotki c Dreveishikh Vremen do Nashikh Dnei, Nauka, Novosibirsk, 
Russia, 1974, p .l 11. Also see the excellent Gibson, James R., Imperial Russia in Frontier America. Oxford 
University Press, New York, US, 1976.
37Quested, R.K.I., The Expansion of Russia in East Asia. 1857-1860. University of Malaysia Press, Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia, 1968, p.55; and Alekseev, Aleksandr Ivanivich, Amurskaiia Ekspeditsia. 1849-1855 gg. 
MysT, Moscow, Russia, 1974, p.89.
38Polansky, Patricia, “The Russians and Soviets in Asia” in International Library Review. Vol. 14, 1982, 
pp.217-262.
39The Treaty of Aigun saw China cede one million, six-hundred thousand square kilometres of territory on the 
Amur’s left bank, including the city that later became Vladivostok.
40Russia and China confirmed the 1858 Aigun agreement. China ceded to Russia territory north of the Amur 
and the Pacific coast south of the Amur, east of the Ussuri and north of Korea.
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occupation, suffering from the Taiping Rebellion. In return Moscow was awarded 
Primor’e.41 Subsequently, Russia introduced the concept of national boundaries to North- 
East Asia after her gains in Priamur and Primorie, and the sale of Alaska in 1867. 
Excluding Sakhalin and the Kurils, these boundaries have remained in tact to the present 
day and are fundamental to Russia's territorial integrity 42 This was the birth of the Far 
East’s role as a gateway from where Russia built and projected her power on the edge of 
North-East Asia, confirming her presence in the region.
2.4 The Far East -  The Tsarist Colony
From the start, the Far East's role was determined by a centre not wholly aware of North- 
East Asian geopolitics. Being military men Priamur Govemor-Generals saw Far Eastern 
development from a security perspective. Military and strategic concerns preceded socio­
economic issues -  a policy that prevailed during the Soviet era too. The imperial 
government subsidised huge expenditures on goods and services by her army and navy. 
The 1861 and 1862 imperial decrees encouraged European settlement in the Far East. But, 
confusion and disputes reigned over territorial integrity. It was not until the 1855 Treaty of 
Shimoda that a formal boundary was laid down between Russia and Japan (see Figure 
A1.5). This territorial integrity was confirmed in the 1875 Treaty of St. Petersburg that 
transferred control of Sakhalin to Russia in return for Japan's control of the islands at the 
centre of today's territorial dispute (see Figure A1.6).43 However, competition for North- 
East Asia resurfaced with the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway.44 Mutual distrust 
and hostility continued, materialising in Russia's inspiring of the Triple Intervention of
41Prokhorov, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, K Voprosu o Sovietsko-Kitaiskoi Granitse. Mezhdunarodnie 
Otnoshenia, Moscow, Russia, 1975, pp.255-258.
42Melikhov, Georgii Vasilevich, Manchzhuri na Severo-Vostoke, Nauka, Moscow, Russia, 1974, p.195.
43Stephan, John J., The Kurile Islands -  Russo-Japanese Frontier in the Pacific. Clarendon Press, London, 
UK, 1974, pp.237-238.
^Dallin, David J., Soviet Russia and the Far East. Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut, US, 1948, 
pp. 1-21; and Malozemoff, Andrew, Russian Far Eastern Policy 1881-1904 -  With Special Emphasis on the 
Causes of the Russo-Japanese War, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, California, US, 
1958, pp.1-19.
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1895, her seizure of Port Arthur,45 and her 1895-1896 penetration into Korea.46 During this 
time Japan bided her time, as she was not yet strong enough to protest, let alone resist47
Following the 1904-1905 War, Russia and Japan became virtual Allies 48 This was through 
adjustments necessary for pursuing respective interests and through delimiting spheres of 
influence in North-East Asia 49 There was a tacit agreement to counteract any third power, 
primarily the US, in Northern China and Manchuria.50 Milestones of the alliance were the 
treaties of 1907,51 1910,52 191253 and 1916,54 which sought restraint through limiting 
political options and deflecting hostile alliances. However, the alliance did not eliminate 
strategic disharmony. It was an alliance of mutual expansion and conquest based on 
premises of eventual conflict. Indeed, the Far East was interacting with many nationalities. 
Despite turning a blind eye to foreign commerce in the Far East, tsarist authorities 
prohibited alien property and land ownership, though loopholes existed. Foreign commerce 
thrived. Emery of Massachusetts introduced Detroit steamers to the Amur.55 Hamburg 
merchants Kunst and Albers built a Far Eastern department store network.56 Concessions 
were given to foreigners exploiting certain resources. The Tetiukhe lead mines went to
45See Connaughton, Richard M., The War of the Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear -  A Military History of the 
Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). Routledge, London, UK, 1989.
46The 1896 Yamagata-Lobanov Agreement between Russia and Japan was considered to settle conflicts over 
Korea. But it was the 1905 Portsmouth Treaty that gave Japan absolute control over Korea and permitted her 
interests (alongside Russia’s) in Manchuria.
47Yakhontoff, Victor A., Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East. George Allen and Unwin Limited, 
London, UK, 1932, p.43.
48White, John Albert, The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New 
Jersey, US, 1964, p.27. Also see Westwood, J.N., Russia Against Japan. 1904-05 -  A New Look at the 
Russo-Japanese War. MacMillan Press Limited, London, UK, 1986.
49Lensen, George Alexander, Russia's Eastward Expansion. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, US, 1964, pp. 135- 
137.
50Dillon, E.J., The Eclipse of Russia. Doran Company, New York, US, 1918, pp.299-300. Also see Whiting, 
Allen S., Siberian Development and East Asia -  Threat or Promise?. Stanford University Press, California, 
US, 1981 for a good study of Siberia and the Far East in the struggle for North-East Asia between Russia, 
Japan and China, pp.1-21, 65-71, 85-87, 112-113, 134-145, 152-159, 182-185.
5IThe Motono-Iwaliski Agreement maintained a status quo and mutual respect for territorial integrity.
52The second Motono-Iwaliski Agreement.
53This agreement divided Inner Mongolia, enabling Russia and Japan to maintain and respect each other's 
separate spheres of influence.
MThe Secret Convention that bound the two states into a relationship of alliance.
55Vanderlip, W.B., In Search of the Siberian Klondike. Century, New York, US, 1903, pp. 11-12.
56Vinogradov, A.V., op. cit., p. 148.
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Switzerland’s Julius Bryner, the Lena goldfields to a British consortium and the 
Komandorski Islands to the US firm Hutchinson and Kohl. The 1875 Treaty of St. 
Petersburg and 1907 Fisheries Convention provided Japan with extensive privileges along 
the Far Eastern littoral and the Lower Amur. Vladivostok’s Hotel de Louvre flew the 
French tricolour.57 However, tsarist authorities were discrete in determining foreign 
involvement.
Border trade with Manchuria was enhanced by Russia’s sphere of influence there. This 
culminated in her occupation of Northern Manchuria in 1904 after the Boxer Revolt. At 
this time the Chinese-Eastern Railway provided Russia with her sole Pacific outlet via 
Vladivostok. The Baikal-Amur Mainline, completing the Trans-Siberian Railway on 
Russian territory, was not finished until 1916. With the railway’s construction, movement 
of goods accelerated, freight costs fell substantially, and risks of loss or damage to supplies 
from European Russia eased. Western Siberian wheat was transported eastward, 
eliminating Chinese imports from the Far East.58 Enhanced infrastructure and the 
establishment of an Odessa-Vladivostok steamer service facilitated peasant migrations 
from European Russia between 1891 and 1914.
At the turn of the century Vladivostok personified the Far East’s new-found cosmopolitan 
exuberance. As a gateway, it welcomed cargoes and passengers travelling between Europe, 
North-East Asia and the US. Ships from London, Hamburg, Odessa, Hong Kong, 
Yokohama and San Francisco found shelter in Vladivostok’s Golden Horn. Europe was 
accessible via the Chinese-Eastern Railway across Manchuria, which was linked to the 
Trans-Siberian Railway. Danish-built undersea cables secured Vladivostok’s telegraphic 
communications with Nagasaki and Shanghai. Numerous foreign firms, such as London’s 
Brynner and Company, who fostered Amur timber and ran the Tetiukhe lead mines, located
57Khisamutdinov, Amir, Vladivostok -  Ehudi k Istorii Starogo Goroda. Far Eastern State University, 
Vladivostok, Russia, 1992, pp.21-22.
58“Pervie Shagi Russkogo Imperializma na Dal’nem Vostoke, 1888-1903gg” in Krasnvi Arkhiv. Vol.3, 
No.52, 1932, pp.34-124. pp.83-93; and Lensen, George Alexander, Russo-Chinese War. Diplomatic Press, 
Tallahassee, Florida, US, 1967, p.278.
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their regional headquarters in Vladivostok. Neither the Russian-Japanese War nor 
revolutionary discord derailed the Far East’s thriving international involvement. 
Merchants, manufacturers, professionals and Far Eastern peasant cooperatives all saw the 
advantages of freer trade and greater regional interaction with North-East Asia. There were 
no barriers to foreigners visiting the Far East -  many of them reported enthusiastically on 
the potential export of agricultural produce and other raw materials, primarily gold. A great 
market was being inaugurated. Foreign establishments and businessmen became 
preoccupied with securing positions in the Far East. Two fervent supporters of Far Eastern 
trade, via the Kara Sea Route, were Alfred Derry (of the Kensington Emporium Derry and 
Toms) and the Norwegian Lied (who established his national consulate in Krasnoiarsk). 
Locals saluted this trade. Far Eastern farms were better supplied with agricultural 
equipment in 1914 than central Russian or Ukrainian farms, and the quantities of 
merchandise per capita surpassed those of European Russia.59 All in all, during the period 
1862-1917, the Far East had matured into what was effectively a protected free trade zone 
-  a gateway Unking Europe to Asia, a buffer where pohtics was suspended in order to 
facilitate trade, but also a region where strategic concerns overrode all others.
Local East Asians, whose reputations had become tarnished by vibrant regional smuggling, 
could be seen in all aspects of Far Eastern life. The Chinese dominated retail food markets, 
they were the majority in the Amur goldfields, the Baikal-Amur Mainline’s construction 
and Vladivostok’s shipyards. In 1914 there were sixty-four thousand officially registered 
Koreans in Southern Primor’e -  the majority being tenant farmers for Russian and 
Ukrainian landlords. The Chinese were less communal than the Koreans. Some of the latter 
became Russian Orthodox. However suspicion toward East Asians exploded after Russia’s 
defeat in the 1904-1905 war against Japan. A number of local Japanese spies emerged. The 
Chinese welcomed Japan’s victory.60 This suspicion materialised in Priamur Govemor-
59Ford, W.C. (Ed.), Letters of Henry Adams. Vol.l, Houghton-Mifflin, Boston, Massachusetts, US, 1930, 
p.511; and Lied, Jonas, Return to Happiness. MacMillan and Company Limited, London, UK, 1943. Lied 
spoke of the prospects of Siberian and Far Eastern economic development in the pre-WWI era.
60Beveridge, Albert J., The Russian Advance. Harper, New York, US, 1904, pp. 128-129.
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Generals’ encouraging mass Chinese deportation but this was unsuccessful as St. 
Petersburg officials and local mine operators were unwilling to cooperate.61 The final years 
of imperial authority in the Far East were dominated by such phrases as New America and 
Amur California. Notions of Vladivostok being a northern Shanghai were conjured up. The 
Norwegian explorer Nansen, while attending the three-hundredth anniversary celebrations 
of the Romanov Dynasty in Khabarovsk, expressed his belief that Priamur faced a vibrant 
future.62 He supported General Kuropatkin’s 1909 prediction that one hundred million 
Russians would be living on Russia’s Pacific coast by the year 2000.
All of the Far East’s roles were driven by its geographical location, especially its distance 
from Moscow, most notably as a base for projecting power. As the final frontier of the 
Russian Empire, St. Petersburg wanted to firmly cement its accomplishment. It grew into a 
gateway and a buffer between Russia and the political centres of North-East Asia. The 
trade relations that emerged between the Far East and surrounding regions were a sign of 
political compromise. The Russian periphery’s resources were a driving force in achieving 
this political compromise and also served to release the forces that lead to what would 
today be considered globalisation -  international free trade, telecommunications lines, 
cultural exchanges and diluting of politics to achieve economic progress. Yet this soon 
turned into autarky as revolution was waiting in the wings.
2.5 The Far Eastern Republic
zro
During the first decade of Soviet rule the Far East’s value was certainly appreciated. By 
not destroying the vestiges of pre-revolutionary capitalism, Tsarist-style policies towards
61Popov, Nikita Aleksandrovich, Oni c Nami Srazhalis’ za Vlast Sovetov -  Kitaiskie Dobrovol’stv na 
Frontakh Grazhdanskoi Voinv v Rossi. 1918-1922. Lenizdat, Leningrad, Russia, 1959, pp. 12 and 17; and 
Siegelbaum, Lewis H., “Another ‘Yellow Peril’ -  Chinese Migrants in the Russian Far East and the Russian 
Reaction Before 1917” in Modem Asian Studies. Vol.12, No.2., April 1978, pp.323-324.
62Nansen, Fridtjof, Through Siberia -  The Land of the Future. Heinemann, London, UK, 1914, pp.346-349.
63The Communist movement, which found fertile ground in Western Russia, received much less support in the 
Far East. Far Eastern urban centres were smaller and with fewer proletariats. Moreover, Far Eastern peasants 
were richer with larger land holdings than their western counterparts. The shortages that plagued western 
cities causing unrest were unfelt in the Far East.
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the periphery continued.64 However, for pragmatic reasons, ideological modifications 
ensured Far Eastern dependence on European Russia. This was particularly true during 
Stalin’s reign when investment and settlement were concentrated in European Russia.
A world war, two revolutions, civil war and foreign intervention buffeted the Far East 
between 1914 and 1922, modifying its prosperity but not interrupting its international 
economic ties. By immobilising Baltic and Black Sea ports, the European war made 
Vladivostok one of Russia’s principal gateways through which vast volumes of 
commodities and military supplies from the US and Japan flowed to European Russia. The 
1918-1922 Allied intervention energised the Far Eastern economy by attracting US and 
Japanese investment and commercial enterprises.65 Soviet allegations notwithstanding, it is 
debatable whether the US sought to impose economic control over the Far East between 
1918 and 1920. Some concessions were awarded to US firms by anti-Bolshevik authorities 
but were ineffective. The 1905 Portsmouth Treaty (see Figure A 1.7) guaranteed Japanese 
access to Far Eastern fisheries, but between 1918 and 1925 they increasingly came under 
Japanese domination.66 The Far East emerged as a buffer between the centres of Soviet and 
Japanese power -  a confrontational, yet vulnerable middle ground between two empires.
Soviet rule was proclaimed in Far Eastern settlements soon after the revolution but in spite 
of numerous dissidents exiled under the tsarist regime this was not fertile Bolshevik 
ground. Cossacks, merchants and peasants were uneasy about Lenin’s promises. Once the 
civil war ended and Bolshevik rule was established, Far Eastern development became a 
matter of strategic concern.67 Development and further exploration of Far Eastern resources 
reduced raw material imports and created a stronger shift towards autarky. The early
^Hauner, Milan, What is Asia to Us? Russia’s Asian Heartland Yesterday and Today. Unwin Hyman, 
Boston, Massachusetts, US, 1990, pp. 165-190.
65White, John Albert, The Siberian Intervention, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, US, 
1950, pp. 194-195.
66Morley, James William, The Japanese Thrust into Siberia. 1919. Columbia University Press, New York, 
US, 1957, p.219.
67Dibb, Paul, Siberia and the Pacific -  A Study of Economic Development and Trade Prospects, Praeger 
Special Studies in International Economics and Development, Praeger Publishers, London, UK, 1972, pp.l- 
20 .
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globalisation the region had experienced and the gateway role the Far East had played in 
forging and, indeed, buffering local international relations ended. A policy of isolation was 
actively pursued in a series of Five Year Plans, curtailing, but not eliminating, Far Eastern 
participation in the international economy. For pragmatic reasons, Moscow allowed trade 
connections with Manchuria, Japan and the US, suggesting the new government was aware 
of the gateway and buffer roles the Far East could play. Moreover, they were willing to 
compromise certain political concessions for economic gain. To some extent political 
ideology was overcome by economic logic. From the Far East, coal, oil and fish exports 
were made to Japan during the 1920s and 1930s. Japan was also awarded Northern 
Sakhalin oil and coal concessions in 1925. By allowing restricted Far Eastern trade with 
surrounding regions, Bolshevik authorities limited the Far East’s gateway role, while re­
affirming the role of political compromise and generating trade and hard currency essential 
to the Soviet economy. However, within the Far East there were different plans being 
constructed -  those of an independent republic.
The Far Eastern Republic’s story is one of a struggle for independence against a Bolshevik 
drive for unification. Despite obstacles, placed by militarists of neighbouring states and 
national reactionaries, various separate and disconnected territories aimed to form a new 
state based on democratic principles. The republic became a model for a possible 
independence movement -  an appeal derived from history and myth. Its character, 
however, quickly emerged to resemble a buffer. The difference was that this was now a 
characteristic intentionally pursued, in theory, by regional authorities to enable them to 
achieve both compromise with Moscow and to develop independent international relations. 
In reality Moscow agreed to the Far Eastern Republic for tactical reasons.
Created on April 6, 1920, the republic was a nominally independent nation-state 
encompassing most of the Far East between Soviet Russia and Japanese-occupied
68The Special Delegation of the Far Eastern Republic to the United States of America, A Short Outline of the 
History of the Far Eastern Republic. Washington, DC, US, 1922, p.7.
Primor’e. Lenin intended the Far Eastern Republic to be a tactical vehicle to effect 
Japanese withdrawal. Indeed, the republic liquidated soon after the last Japanese troop ship 
steamed out of Golden Horn Bay in October 1922. Though communist in content, officials 
-  non-communist, socialist and regionalist -  hoped the republic would become genuinely 
democratic and independent.69 With the view to rekindling the globalisation and gateway 
roles that had been central to the region’s development previously, Far Eastern Republic 
representatives went to New York and Los Angeles to solicit investment. Such initiatives 
worried Moscow and the republic’s President Krasnochekov was removed in 1921 for 
being unmanageable. From here on in the foundations for regional unruliness were laid. 
The republic appealed to patriotism, anti-Japanese animosities and sympathies for 
international communism. It had a bourgeois democratic character -  its constitution had 
no Soviet provisions, but provided for national assembly elections. The republic’s flag 
discarded the hammer and sickle for an anchor and pickaxe crossed over a wheatsheaf.70 
There were no People’s Commissars, only Ministers; no Red Army, only a Revolutionary 
People’s Army.
Disputes emerged amongst Far Eastern communists regarding the republic’s capital. Those 
for greater independence suggested Vladivostok where contact with the non-Russian world 
was most intimate. Moscow, realising the dangers inherent in such a move, ruled the 
capital be in the very Russian Chita, not cosmopolitan Vladivostok. Accordingly, the 
republic’s government exercised nominal sovereignty over certain provinces. Paradoxically 
enough the Japanese presence was not only the chief source of weakness but also its 
principal raison d ’etre. The Far Eastern Republic’s creation enabled Far Easterners, 
particularly peasant colonists, to support Soviet foreign policy and fight foreign
69A Declaration of Independence was made to the governments of the US, Britain, Japan, China, France, Italy 
and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, as well as internationally, on April 6, 1920. Chicherin -  
People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic -  sent a letter in 
recognition of the Far Eastern Republic to Krasnochekov -  Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Far Eastern 
Republic -  on May 14, 1920. On April 17, 1921 the Constitution of the Far Eastern Republic was drawn up. 
See Elesh, Viacheslav Mikhailovich, Na Bereeakh Volgi e Tikhogo Okeana. Sovietskaia Rossia, Moscow, 
Russia, 1970, pp. 100-101; and Smith, Canfield F., Vladivostok Under Red and White Rule, University of 
Washington Press, Seattle, Washington, US, 1975, p.54.
70Nikiforov, Peter Mikhailovich, Zapiski Prem’era DVR. Politizdat, Moscow, Russia, 1968, pp. 118-120.
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intervention without identifying with the Communist Party and its economic aspirations. 
On October 25, 1922, the last Japanese soldier left the Russian mainland and the Far 
Eastern Republic’s viability ceased. The republic’s constituent assembly, where 
communists had 80% of seats, handed over to Dalrevkom71 -  a Soviet body.72 The 
communists constituted a minority in the Far East; smaller than anywhere in the Russian 
Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. Early in 1922 there were only seven thousand 
members in the republic and this was on the eve of a purge intending to reduce 
membership by 15-18%. The party relied on the support of the forty thousand member 
Far Eastern Trade Union Congress. In view of numerical weaknesses and isolation, the 
Far Eastern communist movement had to tread carefully, making concessions to regionalist 
tendencies. Many Far Easterners continued to favour a special status for their homeland 
hoping the republic’s abolition would not mean it becoming just another Russian region.
In spite of the Far Eastern Republic’s collapse the region remained removed from Moscow 
(and not just because of distance). The Japanese occupied Northern Sakhalin and anti­
communist nationalism percolated in Sakha. Regional authorities turned to foreign 
investors and private enterprise. While the Far Eastern Republic held a special status in 
communist Russia, its conclusion did not end the region’s special status. The region’s 
melting pot nature, its distance from Moscow and its historical gateway role had already 
become part of the Far East’s culture and character. The Far East, as recognised by 
Moscow, was a buffer while being under their jurisdiction.
2.9 The Soviet Far East
Having barely thrown off the tsarist autocrats, Russians found themselves in the throes of 
Stalinist terror. Concentration camps were full to overflowing -  this was Stalin’s 
contribution to Far Eastern development. The command system’s great claim was that the
71The Far Eastern Revolutionary Committee.
72Mukhachev, Boris Ivanovich, Sovetv Severo-Vostoka SSSR v Period Sotsialisticheskoi Rekonstruktsii 
Narodnogo Khoziaistva, 1926-1936 gg, MKI, Magadan, Russia, 1987, p.7.
73Zhizn’ Natsionalnostei. March 22, 1922.
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Far East’s potential belonged to the people and, thus, it was viable to utilise forced 
labour.74 The importance of foreign commerce for capital accumulation in the Far East 
clarifies why the New Economic Policy was licensed to proceed there even after the birth 
of the first Five Year Plan.75 Indeed, the Far East was recognised -  not for the first time, 
but officially -  for its potential to play the role of a resource base to fuel the Soviet 
machine, as well as to generate revenues from exports. Gosplan’s first president -  
Krizhizhanovskii -  stated, as early as 1930, the question of Far Eastern resource 
exploitation and development was not one just for the Soviet Union, but for the whole 
world.76 However the changing international political economy, accompanied by Soviet 
ideology and planning, meant that this role would be postponed for yet another role -  that 
of a base for projecting power.
The 1930s induced Far Eastern global seclusion. Flanked by antagonistic and expansionist 
regimes in Germany and Japan, Stalin opted for rearmament and autarky. The Japanese 
haunted Stalin. He believed, or pretended to believe, unspecified party oppositionists were 
conspiring with Japan to remove the Far Eastern maritime region. There were, however, 
such real deliberations amongst Japanese military and civilian leaders at the time -  Japan’s 
Foreign Minister Yosuke, writing to US President Roosevelt in 1938, suggested a 
Japanese-American purchase of the Far East.77 The forced resettlement in 1937, of two- 
hundred and fifty thousand Koreans from Primorie to Central Asia, underlined Moscow’s 
nervousness about unofficial communications with neighbouring states.78 No longer was 
the Far East a land of compromise, but a region of strategic importance to be shielded from 
the domestic and international communities. The Far East’s insulation from foreign 
commerce during the 1930s was also due to the Soviet authorities’ desire to shield harsh
74For an excellent study of Stalinist Siberia and the New Economic Policy see, Hughes, James, Stalin. Siberia 
and the Crisis of the New Economic Policy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1991.
75Raikhman, E., The Economic Development of the Soviet Far East, American Russian Institute, New York, 
US, 1936, p.3.
76Kirby, Stuart, Siberia and the Soviet Far East, The Economist Intelligence Unit, The Economist Publications 
Limited, London, UK, Special Report, No. 177, 1984, p.44.
77Abend, Hallet, Pacific Charter, Doubleday, New York, US, 1943, pp.241-256.
78Suh, Dae-Sook (Ed.), Koreans in the Soviet Union. Centre for Korean Studies, Honolulu, Hawai’i, US, 
1987, p.40.
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domestic reality from the international community. Although hundreds of youths from the 
US and Europe offered to participate in the construction of the Magnitororsk metallurgical 
complex in the early 1930s in Norlisk, Eastern Siberian and Far Eastern projects were 
secured against foreigners. Only involuntary footings, such as Polish deportees who 
laboured in Kolima’s mines, were accepted. They were subjugated to the authority of
70 onDalstroi -  a Narodnyi Komitet Vnutrennikh Del agency.
Construction work on the Baikal-Amur Mainline, temporarily suspended after the 1941 
German invasion, involved thousands of forced labourers and no discernible foreign
oi
participation. However, it also forced the Soviet authorities to re-expose the Far East 
slightly. As during WWI, the Far East became an important gateway for vital materials and 
foodstuffs. 75% of US lend-lease to the Soviet Union, between 1941 and 1945, proceeded 
through Vladivostok. Additional cargoes were flown from Alaska to Yakutsk. The Far 
East’s economic and geopolitical significance in a new air age, dramatised by lend-lease 
and US Vice-President Wallace’s visit in 1944, gave birth to a new Pacific era. Some 
American writers envisioned a trade boom between the Far East and the US West Coast 
after WWII, but what emerged was the Cold War. The Far East became a ground for 
projecting Soviet military power. The Soviet Union faced Japan, which fell under 
American influence, with the annexation of Southern Sakhalin and the islands at the centre 
of today’s dispute. The two annexed regions, subsequently, became part of the Far East. 
The latter of the two annexed regions went on to dominate Soviet and post-Soviet Russia’s
79The Far Eastern Construction Trust. A state corporation in Magadan and North-East Sakha. Between 1930 
and 1957 it exploited mineral resources.
80The People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs. During the period 1934-1943 it was the Soviet security 
service in charge of the police, the civil registry and labour camps. In 1943 it was divided into two 
commissariats -  Narodnyi Komitet Vnutrennikh Del (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) and 
Narodnyi Kom itet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (People’s Commissariat for State Security), the latter more 
commonly known as Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB).
81Lamin, Vladimir Alexandrovich, Kliuchi k Dvum Okeanam. KKI, Khabarovsk, Russia, 1981, p.145.
82Wallace, Henry A., Soviet Asia Mission. Reynal and Hitchcock, New York, US, 1946, p.32; Lattimore, 
Owen, “New Road to Asia” in a compilation by Isono, Fujiko, China Memoirs, The University of Tokyo 
Press, Tokyo, Japan, 1990, p.657; and Hazard, John A., Recollections of a Pioneering Sovietologist. Oceana, 
New York, US, 1984, p.67.
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relations with Japan. The two regions also became an issue of contention during the Cold 
War, placing the Far East in a special position during the post-WWH ideological conflict.83
Soviet-Japanese rivalry for North-East Asia was replaced by the Cold War.84 The US 
rejected Moscow's suggestion of Soviet occupation of Northern Hokkaido.85 Japan came 
under US occupation. Consequently, the Soviet Union sought to minimise US influence on 
Japan by controlling the occupation policy. Trying to weaken Japan -  economically and 
politically -  Moscow insisted surrender terms be strictly applied and the emperor be tried 
as a war criminal. These policies were calculated with the belief that a weak Japan would 
turn to communism. Soviet objectives were, however, frustrated because of changes in US
07
policy towards Japan during the period 1948-1949. The US began to treat Japan as a
00
potential ally in its confrontation with the Soviet Union. A policy that continued until 
1991.
2.7 The Far East Between the Soviet Union and Japan
In February 1918 the Bolshevik regime cancelled all obligations and debts. This damaged 
Japanese enterprises, like Mitsui and Mitsubishi, who had had a Far Eastern presence
83Upon Stalin’s death, in 1953, a new role for the Far East emerged. Large-scale uses of forced labour in 
construction projects ceased and shortages of free labour became a constraint. Soviet planners realised that it 
was easier to transport energy and raw materials from the Far East to European Russia, than to induce 
eastward migration to foster economic development. The Far East’s role of resource base, as during the Far 
Eastern Republic, was reinaugurated. Under the resulting geographical division of labour, manufacturing 
activities with large labour requirements were located in European Russia -  where population and markets 
were concentrated -  while power-intensive industries were located, to a greater extent, in the Far East.
84Saturdav Evening Post (San Francisco), November 23, 1946. Also see Swearingen, Rodger, The Soviet 
Union and Japan -  Escalating Challenge and Response, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, California, US, 
1978.
85The Japan Times. January 1, 1997. In a secret message, on August 16, 1945, to President Truman, Stalin 
proposed Hokkaido be divided. [See Truman, Harry S., Memoirs, Vol.l (Years of Decisions), Harper Collins, 
New York, US, 1955, p.440.]
86Pravda, October 20, 1946; and The New York Times, September 1, 1946.
87Feis, Herbert, Contest Over Japan, Columbia University Press, New York, US, 1967, p.6.
88Hoffman, Stanley, “Revisionism Revisited” in Miller, Lynn H., Pruseen, Ronald W. (Eds.), Reflections on 
the Cold War -  A Quarter Century of American Foreign Policy, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, US, 
1974, pp.3-26. Also see McCauley, Martin, The Origins of the Cold War, Seminar Studies in History, 
Longman Group Incorporated, New York, US, 1983.
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during Tsarist times.89 Japanese fishery rights in the Amur Delta, along the coast of 
Primor’e and in the Sea of Okhotsk, were also cancelled. This situation motivated Japan to 
take part in the Allied intervention in Eastern Siberia and the Far East in 1918. Japan alone, 
however, provided nearly four times the combined forces sent by the rest of the Allies.90 In 
spite of the success in securing the withdrawal of Japan’s presence from the Soviet 
landmass by 1922, Lenin authorised the sale of Northern Sakhalin to Japan in 1923 for 
US$lbillion.91 In 1925 the Convention on the Main Principles o f the Relationship between 
the USSR and Japan was signed in Beijing. The convention restored the functioning of the 
Portsmouth Peace Treaty and gave Northern Sakhalin back to the Soviet Union. Later that 
year the last Japanese soldier left Northern Sakhalin and Soviet power firmly controlled the 
whole of Sakhalin. Lenin had called Japan’s bluff and succeeded.
In view of the Soviet fear of Japan, the Soviets concentrated their energies on the Kurils 
and Sakhalin. Sakhalin was controlled by the KGB as the search for enemies (real and 
perceived) started with the departure of the Japanese. With every year the intensity of this 
search increased and eventually became devastating. Between 1932 and 1938 in excess of 
two hundred thousand people were shot. The KGB paid most attention to the 
representatives of the local population, the workers of Japanese concessions, persons of 
capitalist nationalities (Japanese, Chinese, Koreans, Poles, Germans, Latvians and so on). 
Such a policy of distrust continued until the Soviet Union’s collapse, especially in the 
disputed territories. From 1925 Southern Sakhalin and the Kurils carried extreme strategic 
importance, and allowed Japan to control the main shipping routes connecting the Far East
89Author’s interview with Nakagawara, Sunsuke, Manager, Overseas Coordination and Administration 
Department, Corporate Planning Division, Mitsui and Company Limited, Tokyo, Japan, October 30, 1997.
90Silverlight, John, The Victors’ Dilemma The Victors’ Dilemma -  The Allied Intervention in the Russian 
Civil War. Barrie and Jenkins, London, UK, 1970, pp.104-137; and Mints, I.I., Angliiskaia Interventsiia i 
Sevemaiia Kontrrevoliutsiia. Gosudarstvennoe Sotsialna-Ekanomicheskoe Izdatel’stvo, Moscow, Russia, 
1931, pp.65-79.
91Stephenson, M., The Kurile Islands. Conflict Studies Research Centre, Partnership For Peace Information 
Management System, No.E98, London, UK, 1998, p.9. Stephenson has said Volkogonov, a Russian historian, 
made this claim in 1990.
92Kantorovich, Vladimir I., Soviet Sakhalin, Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the 
USSR, Moscow, Russia, 1993, pp. 17-32.
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with the world. It was on these islands that Japan built numerous military bases and 
stationed comparatively large military forces. But Japan only once used the disputed 
territories for a huge operation of strategic importance -  the bombing of Pearl Harbour.
In 1951 the peace treaty between Japan and the Allied Powers was signed in San Francisco 
(see Figure A1.8). The Soviet Union participated in the conference but did not sign the 
treaty. As a result, there are two important points regarding the disputed islands in the 
context of the San Francisco Peace Conference and Treaty. First, Japan’s renunciation of 
all rights to the Kurils and Southern Sakhalin in accordance with the treaty. The Kurils that 
Japan renounced did not include those at the centre of today’s territorial dispute. Secondly, 
the Soviet inclusion of Southern Sakhalin and the Kurils into her territory did not receive 
international recognition. The Soviet Union made efforts, including submitting proposed 
amendments to the draft treaty, to have her sovereignty over these areas recognised, but this 
was not accepted by the conference, and was not included in the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty. For this, and for other reasons, the Soviet Union did not sign the treaty. The San 
Francisco Peace Treaty expressly stipulates that the treaty shall not confer any benefits on 
any non-signatory. Taking both these two points into consideration Japan sees that there is 
only one inevitable conclusion. Within the terms of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, it is 
quite natural for Japan to maintain that the disputed islands are Japanese territory.
Khrushchev established diplomatic ties between Moscow and Tokyo.94 He promised to 
give up Shikotan and the Habomai group of islands only after the two states had signed a 
peace treaty (see Appendix 2).95 Some fifty years later there is still no treaty. Since the 
Soviet Union did not sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan and the Soviet Union
93Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi, The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations. University of 
California, International and Area Studies, Berkeley, California, US, 1998, pp.38-64.
94The 1956 Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration: ‘...Japan and the Soviet Union were fully agreed that the 
restoration of diplomatic relations between them would contribute to the development of mutual 
understanding and cooperation between the two nations in the interests of peace and security in the Far 
East....’.
95This is a key point, as it could be argued it illustrated that the Soviet Union did not see the islands are part 
of her sovereign territory. She was, after all, willing to return some of the islands.
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negotiated for the conclusion of a separate peace treaty. During these negotiations, Japan 
claimed territorial rights to Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and Habomai, and demanded the 
return of these islands. However, the Soviet Union maintained that they would return 
Shikotan and Habomai, but could not return Etorofu and Kunashiri.96 Thus, the 
negotiations did not reach a satisfactory conclusion. Consequently, in place of a peace 
treaty, the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration was signed which provided for the termination of 
the state of war and the resumption of diplomatic relations. This treaty stipulates, in Article 
9, that after diplomatic relations have been established, the negotiations shall be continued 
and the Soviet Union shall hand over the Habomai and Shikotan islands to Japan after the 
conclusion of a peace treaty. The Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration was ratified by both states
Q7and registered with the UN. In principle, the issue of Habomai and Shikotan had already 
been resolved by this declaration. So, in theory, only the question of Etorofu and Kunashiri 
remains to be resolved in the peace treaty negotiations. Of course, the conditions under 
which negotiations originally took place have somewhat changed.
From the mid-1960s onwards Japan focused her policy towards the Soviet Union in order 
to achieve two objectives -  a general improvement in relations (with special emphasis on 
economic cooperation) and the conclusion of a peace treaty (including settling the
QO
territorial issue). Trade Payment Agreements were the foundation for the development of 
Soviet-Japanese relations in the 1960s.99 Subsequently, bilateral trade grew during the 
1960s and 1970s, in spite of the Cold War and the territorial dispute (see Figure 2.1). 1965
96Ministry of Foreign Affairs -  Japan, The Position of the Japanese Government on the Northern Territorial 
Issue. Ministry of Foreign Affairs -  Japan, Tokyo, Japan, 1965, pp.3-4.
97McGuire, Sumiye O., Soviet-Japanese Economic Relations. Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, 
US, 1990, pp.35-57.
98Tikhvinsky, Sergei, “Normalising Relations with Japan After the Second World War” (continued from Far 
Eastern Affairs, No.4, 1995) in Far Eastern Affairs. No.5, pp. 15-39.
" News and Views from the Soviet Union. March 5, 1960.
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saw Dal'intorg100 mount a commercial exhibition of coastal trade goods on Japan's 
Western coast and the establishment of the Japan-Soviet Economic Committee and the 
Soviet-Japan Economic Committees.101 These committees were first to establish a 
cooperative agreement on Siberian and Far Eastern development which were key in 
expanding Soviet-Japanese trade and economic relations during the 1960s and 1970s, see 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2. Despite trade growth, the Soviet Union failed to account for more than 
2% of Japan's trade. From the 1960s to early 1970s, Soviet exports to Japan outstripped 
Japanese exports to the Soviet Union.102 This situation did not sustain. From the early 
1970s Japanese exports to the Soviet Union grew slowly, while Soviet exports showed few 
signs of expanding.103 Large-scale resource development projects in Siberia and the Far 
East contributed to improved Soviet-Japanese relations, and were key in economic
, ........  104terms.
In the 1970s, though post-WWII principles remained unchanged, a new approach, owing 
much to practical political pressures at home and abroad. This was most apparent in Japan. 
Domestic pressure on the government to exercise more foreign policy initiatives 
independent of the US, without compromising vital security and economic ties and changes
100The formation of Dal'intorg was important in Soviet regional trade thinking. It provided machinery for 
expanding, albeit modest, coastal trade with Japan. Recognising the Far East’s distance from European 
Russia’s markets, it admitted to regional consumer good and industrial equipment shortages. It did not 
remove central control of Far Eastern trade from the Ministry of Foreign Trade (Moscow). Dal'intorg 
recognised the worsening trade situation with China and the complementary nature of the Russian and 
Japanese economies, emphasising the Far East. D al’intorg was given the right to work directly with Japanese 
firms.
101These two committees were responsible for the first cooperative agreement on Siberian development. 
Between 1966 and 1979 these committees held eight sessions.
102Mendl, Wolf, “The Soviet Union and Japan” in Segal, Gerald (Ed.), The Soviet Union in East Asia -  
Predicaments of Power. Heinemann, London, UK, 1983, pp.50-69.
103Dibb, Paul, op. cit., pp.227-231. The committees recognised the complementarity between the Soviet and 
Japanese economies, placing special emphasis on the Far East and Siberia.
104The first Soviet-Japanese Siberian development cooperation project involved the first Far East Forest 
Resources Development Project, agreed in 1968. This project, commonly known as the KS Project (in 
respect of Kawai and Sedov -  the chiefs of the original Soviet and Japanese delegations), significantly 
expanded Soviet-Japanese trade; almost 25% of Japanese exports to the Soviet Union between 1969 and 1970 
were accounted for by products related to the KS Project. In 1969, 52% of Japanese machinery and metal 
goods exports to the Soviet Union were related to the project, 63% in 1970.
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in world economic relations during the 1970s all encouraged Japan to be more 
independent. Subsequently, Japan turned to the Soviet Union for some of her resources.105
Figure 2.1: Soviet-Japanese Trade, 1965-1986
4 0 0 0 - |-  
3 0 0 0 
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Source: Bradshaw, Michael J., “Japan and the Economic Development o f the Soviet Far East” in Liebowitz, 
Ronald D. (Ed.), Gorbachev's New Thinking -  Prospects for Joint Ventures, Ballinger Publishing Company, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, US, 1988, p. 192.
Note: Figures are in millions of foreign trade Roubles (1987).
l05Fukushima, Akiko, Japanese Foreign Policy -  The Emerging Logic of M ultilateralism, St. M artin’s Press, 
New York, US, 1998, pp. 162-187; and Bunker, Stephen G., and Ciccantell, Paul S., “Restructuring Markets, 
Reorganising Nature -  An Examination of Japanese Strategies for Access to Raw Materials” in Journal of 
World-Svstems Research. V ol.l, No.3. 1995, pp. 1-55.
98
Figure 2.2: Major Soviet/Russian-Japanese Projects in the Far East
Year: Project: Credit/Capital
(US$m):
Principal Exports: Duration of 
Exports:
1967 First KS Far Eastern Forest 
Development Project
163 Timber and Lumber 1969-1973
1971 Wood Chip and Pulp 
Development Project
50 Pulp and Wood Chip 1972-1981
1971 Vostochni
Port
80 (Seven-Year Deferred 
Payment)
To Be 
Determined
1974 Second KS Far Eastern 
Forest Development Project
550 Timber and Lumber 1975-1979
1974 South Yakutian Coal 
Development Project
540 Coking Coal 1983-1998
1974 Yakutian Natural Gas 
Development Project
50 Exploration To Be 
Determined
1975 Sakhalin Continental Shelf 
Project (Sakhalin 1)
185 Exploration, Crude 
Oil and Gas
To Be 
Determined
1981 Third KS Far Eastern Forest 
Development
910 Timber and Lumber 1981-1986
1985 Wood Chip Agreement 200 loan Wood Chips 1981-1995
1991 Fourth KS Far Eastern Forest 
Development Project
1,400 Timber and Lumber To Be 
Determined
1992 Sakhalin Continental Shelf 
Project (Sakhalin 2)
To Be 
Determined
Exploration, Crude 
Oil and Gas
To Be 
Determined
Source: Carlie, Lonny E., “The Changing Political Economy of Japan's Economic Relations with Russia -  
The Rise and Fall of Seikei Fukabun” in Pacific Affairs, Vol.68, No.3, Fall 1994, pp.411-432.
Notes: The Yakutian Natural Gas Development Project (1974) involves US firms; The Sakhalin 1 (1975) and 
Sakhalin 2 (1992) Projects involve US and/or European firms.
While economic relations accelerated, Japan and the Soviet Union continued intermittent 
peace treaty negotiations, but no substantive results were achieved. One particular reason 
for this political stalemate was that the Soviet Union was adamant that no territorial dispute 
existed. After the US and Japan signed the 1960 Security Treaty, Khrushchev retracted the 
Soviet Union’s offer as laid out in the 1956 Joint Declaration.106 However, Japanese 
leaders once again sought to cultivate relations with the Soviet Union in the 1970s, as part 
of a move to keep Japan involved in Far Eastern diplomacy during this period of great flux. 
In 1971 the Japanese government was alarmed at the surprise decision by the Nixon 
administration to normalise relations with China. The Nixon Shock left the Japanese feeling
106Slavinsky, Boris, The Soviet-Japanese Postwar Peace Settlement -  Historical Experience and Present 
Situation. An unpublished paper presented at the conference: Japan and Russia -  Postwar Relations, Mutual 
Influences and Comparisons, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, US, 1997.
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betrayed.107 Consequently, Japan’s Tanaka was the first Japanese politician to attempt to 
negotiate a land-for-money deal with the Soviet Union.108 During his 1973 Moscow trip, 
Tanaka dangled the carrot of economic aid, in the hope a deal could be reached over the 
islands. Tanaka was also interested in gaining access to Siberian and Far Eastern resources. 
The 1973 oil crisis and easing East-West tensions generated more substantive Soviet- 
Japanese agreements.109 In 1973, after a Moscow summit, Japan agreed to finance Siberian 
and Far Eastern development projects by extending credit through the Export-Import Bank 
of Japan.110
As the 1970s came to a close the rise in Soviet-Japanese trade resulted from credit 
availability and Soviet profits from resource exports.111 However the 1979 Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan saw Japan cancel credit of US$1.4 billion while enforcing sanctions and 
suspending discussions.112 Despite this, Soviet-Japanese trade continued to expand.113 
Figure 2.1 shows growth in Soviet-Japanese trade from 1965 (when Soviet-Japanese 
Economic Committees were established) until 1986 (the year before Gorbachev’s reforms 
were implemented).
107Tanaka, Kakuei, Building a New Japan -  A Plan for Remodelling the Japanese Archipelago. First Edition, 
Simul’ Press, Tokyo, Japan, 1972, pp. 113-119.
108Kusano, Atsushi, Two Nixon Shocks and Japan-US Relations. Woodrow Wilson School of Public and 
International Affairs, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, US, 1987, pp.21-26.
I09Sen Gupta, Bhabani, Soviet-Asian Relations in the 1970s and Beyond. Harper and Row, New York, US, 
1976, pp.286-287.
110Author's interview with Kumabe, Kensaku, Assistant Director General, Loan Department 2 (Europe, 
Middle East and Africa), Export-Import Bank of Japan, Tokyo, Japan, January 23, 1997.
11'Author's interview with Ogawa, Kazuo, Director General, Institute for Russian and East European Studies, 
Japan Association for Trade with Russia and Central-Eastern Europe, Tokyo, Japan, January 13, 1997 and 
October 29, 1997. These large-scale projects were a kind of economic diplomacy, see Bryant, William E., 
Japanese Private Economic Diplomacy -  An Analysis of Business-Govemment Linkages. Praeger Special 
Studies in International Politics and Government, Praeger Publishers, New York, US, 1975. Brezhnev is 
reported to have openly stated his high expectations from Japanese participation in Siberian resource 
development projects at the 1976 special Soviet-Japanese economic conference held in Yalta.
"2Dienes, Leslie, Soviet Asia -  Economic Development and National Policy Choices, Westview Press, 
Boulder, Colarado, US, 1987, p.512.
113Ogawa, Kazuo, “Japan-Soviet Economic Relations -  Present Status and Future Prospects” in Journal of 
North-East Asian Studies. Vol.2, N o.l, 1983, pp.3-15; and Smith, G.B., “Recent Trends in Japanese-Soviet 
Trade” in Problems of Communism. Vol.36, N o.l, 1987, p.62.
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2.8 The Far East -  The Cold War Years
China and the US required, and still require, consideration due to their ability, separately or 
jointly, to impede or facilitate Far Eastern development. The Far East’s potential 
international prospects withered in the face of Soviet-US rivalry. The termination of lend- 
lease, the Cold War, the Korean War, the Vietnam War and Japan’s emergence as a US 
ally, while reinforcing Far Eastern insulation, secured the region’s role as a base for 
projecting power. Sustained pressure from senior naval officers compelled Vladivostok to 
develop as a military port closed to foreign commercial traffic. The Japanese and US 
consulates there were closed. A new commercial port was developed at Nakhodka, but its 
facilities remained limited. Throughout the 1950s Far Eastern international ties centred 
around communist Mongolia, China and North Korea, despite increasing trade with Japan. 
In 1954, Khrushchev and Mao discussed the possibilities of one million Chinese settling 
and working in the Far East.114 The Far East, in spite of being internationally secluded, was 
becoming a buffer between the motherland of communism and other (communist and non­
communist) states. Not only was trade with other communist states developed through the 
region, the Far East was once more a land of political compromise. Though no consensus 
was reached between Khrushchev and Mao, the issue of mixing Chinese labour and Soviet 
resources re-emerged in 1985 on Moscow’s initiative, with the possibility of Japanese 
capital.115
Border trade with China flourished in the 1950s but regressed in the 1960s and during the 
cultural revolution.116 Purchasing Chinese commodities rather than those from European 
Russia reduced transportation costs. The deterioration in relations between China and the 
Soviet Union severely reduced Far Eastem-Manchurian links. However, this brought with 
it awareness of the potential of commercial intercourse with North-East Asia (especially 
Japan) again emphasising the Far East’s role of buffer. Notwithstanding this deterioration
114Talbott, Strobe (Ed.), Khrushchev Remembers. Little, Brown, Massachusetts, US, 1974, pp.249-250.
ll5The Japan Times. June 13, 1985.
ll6Turkin, Vladimir, Moskva-Pekin -  Stikhi, Primizdat, Vladivostok, Russia, 1951, p. 17; and Klopov, Sergei 
Vaselevich, Amur -  Reka Druzhbi. KKI, Khabarovsk, Russia, 1959, p.78.
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in relations between China and the Soviet Union, and the resulting breakdown in trade 
between the two, the Far East’s international economic ties continued to develop
throughout the decade. Soviet-Japanese economic cooperation, negligible in the 1950s,
assumed a much more prominent profile in the Far East. Bilateral trade with Japan
progressed with significant mutual gains due to the Soviet appreciation of Japan as a
possible provider of manufactures and equipment. In turn the Far East offered Japan access 
to natural resources. Geological exploration during the 1960s unearthed vast quantities of 
minerals, oil and gas. This all enhanced the region’s global visibility as a prominent 
resource base, while rejuvenating its gateway role. Moreover, it highlighted the 
complementary nature of the Far Eastern and Japanese economies.
1963 saw the birth of Far Eastern-Japanese coastal trade in the form of regional bartering 
peripheral to official bilateral trade. In 1967 Trans-Siberian shipments began operating 
between the Far East and Europe. 1968 saw Japan begin participating in five major Far 
Eastern projects -  the exploitation of Amur timber, wood chip production, the construction 
of a container port at Vostochni, the exploration of Sakhalin’s offshore petroleum and the
117mining of South Yakutian coal. A coastal trade accord was concluded with North Korea. 
Largely due to the Vietnam War, maritime traffic between Vladivostok and Hanoi swelled 
during the 1960s, developing both solid economic links between the Far East and North-
1 1 o
East Asia, and the Far East and the Pacific. There was, however, no significant 
expansion of trade with South-East Asia,119 despite the Soviet Union signing trade 
agreements with Singapore (1966), Malaysia (1967) and Thailand (1970). The 
establishment of an Export-Import Research Institute at Khabarovsk in the mid-1960s 
signalled mounting interest in North-East Asia. In 1971 an Economic Research Institute 
was established in Vladivostok to examine the trade policies of Japan, Canada, Australia,
117Shipov, Y., “Economic Relations Between the USSR and Japan” in International Affairs (Russia), 
December 1969, pp.90-91.
118The Japan Times, May 27, 1967; and The Mainichi Daily News, May 16, 1964.
119With the exception of India who made her first shipment of goods (steel line and tea) to the Far East in 
1971.
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North Korea, Mongolia and Latin America.120 All Far Eastern economic research was 
coordinated by this latter institute, in conjunction with the Pacific Geography Institute, 
which, upon its opening, assumed the role of assessor of natural resources in North-East 
Asia. These developments highlighted changing Soviet policy towards North-East Asia, 
specifically, and Asia Pacific broadly. Vladivostok’s Far Eastern Science Centre made 
significant international contributions to economic research in many fields. The Far East’s 
role as a buffer separating communism and liberalism, and a gateway between Europe and 
Asia was being reasserted.
There were few Far Eastern export products to sell outside North-East Asia. It was 
unlikely, for instance, that timber, fish or minerals would be exported to the West coasts of 
Canada and the US due to the parallel nature of production there. However, Canadian 
wheat, Australian and New Zealand meat, as well as trial quantities of Australian fruit, 
were sent to the Far East in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In December 1966, Soviet 
Agricultural Minister Matskevich said it was sensible, in his opinion, to purchase wheat 
abroad on a continuing basis for the Far East. There were also prospects for timber sales to 
Australia, but the Japanese market was, and remains, larger and more proximate. All this 
was key in establishing Far Eastern resource base and gateway roles, along with a 
realisation that Japan was first and foremost in confirming this status. Soviet trade with 
North-East Asia more than doubled in the late 1960s and early 1970s, as a result of the 
war-induced exports to North Vietnam. The Chinese impeded shipments of Soviet aid and 
arms through their territory. Upon the Suez Canal’s closure in 1967 most Soviet aid went 
through the Far East -  the region becoming central/pivotal to Soviet power projections, 
global aid programmes and significant trade. The Far East had achieved the status of 
compromise by simultaneously playing both the political and economic cards. In 1970 
three-hundred thousand tonnes of dry cargo and large quantities of oil products were sent 
from Nakhodka to North Vietnam. The Far East concentrated on directing natural resources 
to North Vietnam with twenty Soviet ships operating between Vladivostok/Nakhodka and
120BBC-SWB. October 8, 1971, p.5.
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North Vietnam. The Far East was becoming an outlet for communism in Asia. It was a 
power projecting base from where Moscow’s foreign policy decision making could take 
root.
2.9 The Far East -  International Relations Through Resources
During the 1970s, as the Soviet Union shifted from autarky towards global economic 
integration, the Far East began to shed its isolation, though by North-East Asian standards, 
she remained detached. Numerous events and policies underlay this move but most 
markedly, Soviet planners realised Far Eastern resource exports could generate hard 
currency to acquire of Western technology and equipment imperative to sustain the pace of 
Soviet economic development. The advent of detente, signalled by the 1972 Vladivostok 
Nixon-Brezhnev Summit, resultant arms control, trade, as well as scientific and technical 
agreements, all created a political backdrop conducive to Soviet and Far Eastern 
international economic integration. Further, it emphasised the Far East’s buffer role. North- 
East Asia’s dynamism boosted Far Eastern resource prospects -  attracting wider 
international attention due to soaring natural resource prices in light of the 1973 Arab oil 
embargo as well as 1973 and 1979 oil price hikes. In 1974 resumption of work on the 
Baikal-Amur Mainline committed the Soviet Union to making Eastern Siberia’s untapped 
resources available to international markets. The Far East was being prepared for more 
active economic participation in North-East Asia -  a limited form of regional integration. 
However this was driven by economics while being conceived as a political compromise 
(without intending to be so).
Disintegrating Sino-Soviet relations saw trade being diverted to Mongolia, North Korea, 
North Vietnam and Japan, consisting mainly of fruit and clothing. From North Vietnam 
came tea. From North Korea, agricultural products and cement. Mongolia supplied the beef 
deficit. Soviet trade with China was only a small proportion of that with Mongolia or North
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Korea.121 North Korean building materials, electrical and chemical goods were imported 
into the Far East in exchange for fish and oil products. Flourishing border trade followed 
Soviet-North Korean railway freight agreements. The Soviet Union became North Korea’s 
major trading partner and these cross-border exchanges were important to the Far East. 
However, though regionally significant, this local trade was minor by international
1 99standards. Yet what was important was that the Far East had become a regional actor 
again.
During the period 1974-1975, Beijing’s protests contributed to Tokyo’s reluctance to assist 
in the construction of a pipeline-railway network for shipping Western Siberian oil to the 
Far East. Although China subsequently overcame her concerns over the ventures, the 
renewal of pressure on Japan to refrain from additional cooperation confused affairs 
significantly. Deepening ties between China and Japan afforded Beijing new channels of 
influence aimed at reducing, if not eliminating, Tokyo’s participation in Moscow’s 
programmes. Japan, meanwhile, set limits of 20% for overall imports that were allowed 
from the Soviet Union. However, by 1976 the Soviet Union was providing 28% of Japan’s
1 9 0
imported coal; and by 1977 24% of its imported asbestos and 20% of its imported nickel. 
Furthermore, joint Soviet-Japanese joint development of South Yakutian coal and Sakhalin 
oil and gas, initiated in the mid-1970s, began to advance. The importance of Japan as a 
trading partner was being realised.
Unsurprisingly, large proportions of Soviet technology imports were destined for the Far 
East. During the 1970s the region received about 15% of all foreign investment in the 
Soviet Union -  some forty contracts for major projects were concluded with European,
121Dienes, Leslie, “Soviet-Japanese Economic Relations -  Are They Beginning to Fade?” in Soviet 
Geography. Vol.26, No.7, September 1985, p.517; and North, Robert N., “The Soviet Far East” in Pacific 
Affairs. Vol.101, No.2, Summer 1978, p.214.
122Ekonomika i Zhizn. various 1972 issues.
123Edmonds, Richard L., Siberian Resources and Development and the Japanese Economy -  The Japanese 
Perspective, Association of American Geographers, Project on Soviet Natural Resources in the World 
Economy, Discussion Paper No. 12, August 1979, pp.24-25.
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Japanese and US firms. Historically, Eastern Europe had worked closely with the Soviet 
Union to develop Far Eastern energy, contributing labour, equipment and hard currency. 
And now Soviet-US rivalry was curbing Far Eastern economic links with the Americas and 
Japan. Washington’s embargoes on capital and technology transfers, in light of events in 
Afghanistan (1979) and Poland (1981), slowed the momentum of Soviet-Japanese 
cooperation in the Far East. Despite these restraints, Soviet-Japanese trade still managed to 
remain relatively steady, during the period 1980-1985.
By 1984 the Soviet Union had become the leading global energy exporter. This 
accomplishment was largely due to Far Eastern (and Siberian) oil, gas and coal exports. 
The Soviet Union exported about 15% of its primary energy -  27% of oil, 12% of gas and 
4% of coal124 -  most exports going to COMECON states. Nonetheless, significant exports 
also went to Europe. However, the Far East’s international economic role was not solely 
that of energy exporter; regional factories also manufactured an assortment of goods. 
Offering comparatively rapid delivery and favourable freight rates, the Trans-Siberian 
landbridge became an essential international artery accounting for 15% of shipments 
between Europe and Japan in 1980.125 The Far East became a gateway for Siberian 
resources destined for North-East Asia.
The Far East also assumed growing significance in international aviation offering the 
fastest route between North-East Asia and Europe. In 1985 Japan and the Soviet Union 
agreed to allow Japan Airlines to fly from Tokyo to Western Europe non-stop over the Far 
East (and Siberia), covering in twelve-and-a-half hours what takes fifteen hours via 
Moscow and seventeen hours via Alaska.126 Japan, the US and the Soviet Union agreed, in 
late 1985, to link Khabarovsk air controllers to North Pacific flight monitor systems to help
1 97avert recurrence of September 1983’s Korean Airlines disaster. By the mid-1980s the
124Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), USSR Energy Atlas. GPO, Washington, DC, US, 1985, p.6.
125Mote, Victor L., The Baikal-Amur Mainline and its Implications for the Pacific Basin. University of 
Houston, Houston, Texas, US, 1983, p. 135.
126The Japan Times. February 11, 1985.
127The New York Times. November 22. 1985.
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Far East’s potential political, economic and geographic roles (domestic and international) 
were being recognised and reinvigorated to aid an ailing Soviet system.
2.10 The Gorbachev Factor
Soviet-Japanese relations under Gorbachev were like a pendulum -  a positive development 
was always pulled back by a negative one.128 In the end, neither side was willing to make a 
leap to settle the territorial dispute (see Figures A1.4, A1.5, A1.6, A1.7, A1.8 and 
Appendix 2). As soon as Gorbachev assumed power in March 1985, he met Prime Minister 
Yasuhiro at Chernenko’s funeral and signalled his intention to thaw Soviet-Japanese 
relations. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze’s visit to Japan in January 1986 was an important 
turning point. Later, in his 1986 Vladivostok speech, Gorbachev declared his intention to 
see a more conciliatory Asian policy and to join the Asia-Pacific region as a constructive 
partner. Both sides began preparations for Gorbachev’s visit to Japan in late 1986/early 
1987. However the trip never materialised. Instead, after the Japanese government 
tightened certain technology regulations under US pressure as a result of the 1987 Toshiba 
incident (where the Toshiba Machine Company admitted selling highly sensitive 
technology to the Soviet Union) the Soviet government expelled a Japanese diplomat, 
prompting the Japanese government to retaliate with a similar action. Soviet-Japanese 
relations returned to the deep-freeze again. It was not until mid-1988 that both sides began 
to mend fences again. Prime Minister Nakasone met Gorbachev in July, and a frank 
exchange of opinions created a momentum for improvement.
In September 1988, Gorbachev delivered his Krasnoiarsk speech in which he declared his 
intention to improve relations with Japan. In December that year, Shevardnadze made his 
second trip to Tokyo. One of the major achievements at the ministerial conference was the 
creation of the Working Group for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty. For the first time 
since diplomatic ties were re-established, in 1956, both sides had established a mechanism
128Carlie, Lonny E., “Changing Political Economy of Japan's Economic Relations with Russia -  The Rise and 
Fall of Seikei Fukabun” in Pacific Affairs. Vol.67, No.3, Fall 1994, pp.411-432.
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through which to create a favourable environment for the conclusion of a peace treaty. 
Nevertheless, the creation of the Working Group did not settle the territorial dispute. On 
the contrary, negotiations revealed irreconcilable differences. During 1989-1990, when 
revolutions swept away Communist regimes and Germany reunified, the Soviet Union and 
Japan stood still, unable to resolve the territorial dispute.129 By the time Gorbachev finally 
went to Japan in April 1991, his authority within the Soviet Union had deteriorated to such 
an extent that he was not in a position to offer any compromise that would satisfy Japan, 
even had he been inclined to do so. Moreover, El’tsin had mobilised Russian nationalism 
against concessions.
Traditionally, Soviet interest in North-East Asia was to be heavily biased towards military 
and political concerns despite economics and commercial interests being the greatest 
source of potential mutual gain. In the mid-late 1980s economic interest in Asia developed 
rapidly after Gorbachev assumed office, confirming a new role for the Far East. 
Gorbachev’s advisers argued Far Eastern international participation was minor and 
excessively resource-export dependent. The importance of the Far East’s links with the 
world economy could be gauged from the fact that its exports (along with those of Siberia) 
accounted for 75% of the former Soviet Union’s hard currency earnings by the time 
Gorbachev came to power. Gorbachev’s advisers counselled that Far Eastern imports were 
excessively biased towards grain and metal manufactures, and imported machinery and 
equipment was often inappropriate for the region. The need to reduce Far Eastern resource- 
export dependency was made more urgent by three critical factors early in Gorbachev’s 
reign -  a dramatic fall in Russian crude oil output, collapsing world crude oil prices, and 
new oil discoveries, such as in the North Sea, meant some international demand would 
shift away from the region.130
129 Ibid.
130See Manezhev, Sergei, The Russian Far East. Post-Soviet Business Forum (PSBF), The Royal Institute for 
International Affairs (RIIA), Chatham House, London, UK, 1993.
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The Government Statement on Measurements to Expand the Scope o f Cooperation with the 
Asian and Pacific Regions was made in April 1986. And, in July 1986 Gorbachev 
honoured Vladivostok with the Order of Lenin by making a speech about the Far East’s 
potential and relations with North-East Asia. These events attracted substantial attention in 
Japan. In July 1987 the Central Committee adopted a Comprehensive Far East Plan to the 
year 2000 aimed at Far Eastern economic revitalisation. This intended to raise industrial 
output, power generation, petroleum and gas production, and forest and fishery resource 
development by 250%. The plan stipulated that over two-hundred and thirty billion roubles 
were necessary for the plan’s implementation (the equivalent to tens of millions of US$ at
ioi
the time). In March 1988 the Soviet Domestic Commission on Economic Cooperation 
with the Asia-Pacific Region was established. And then, in May 1988, Director of the 
Research Institute of the World Economy and International Relations -  Primakov -  was an 
observer at the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference held in Osaka.
Gorbachev’s September 1988 Krasnoiarsk speech alluded to both detente in North-East 
Asia and to activating Far Eastern development. A month later an international conference 
was held in Vladivostok under the banner Asia-Pacific Region -  Dialogues, Peace and 
Cooperation}32 A Far Eastern role, emphasising a position vis-a-vis North-East Asia, was 
being reborn. Growing Soviet interest in Asia was largely due to a shift to economic 
interests/concerns away from military/strategic/political/ideological matters, as well as 
changes in Far Eastern (and Siberian) policies, and the phenomenal growth of North-East 
Asian economies. Gorbachev was aware of the emergence of Japan as a world economic 
leader, her need for resources, as well as the necessity to reach a political compromise over 
the bilateral territorial dispute by placing emphasis on trade and economics. This new 
Soviet policy towards the Far East was geared to developing the region. By promoting the 
region as a gateway to the east, Gorbachev hoped to once again rekindle the historical role
131Kanamori, Hisao, “Future Prospect of Economic Relations Between the Far Eastern Region of the Soviet 
Union and East and South Asian Nations” in ROTOBO’s Joint Japan-US Symposium on the Russian 
Economy. No. 10. 1989, pp. 11-26.
132The Japan Times, various October 1988 issues.
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the Far East had played. Despite this international outlook, the Far East was still not 
immune from the economic and political shocks that were about to hit the Soviet Union. 
When the Soviet Union did dissolve on December 26, 1991, Far Eastern resources ceased 
being Soviet in terms of ownership, strategy and geography. Indeed, they had only 
theoretically been Soviet. In reality they had always been Russian.
2.11 The Far East and Russian-Japanese Relations -  Some Historical Conclusions
Apart from her Alaskan and brief Hawai’ian and Californian ventures, Russia did not 
participate in European colonisation. Instead she colonised territories adjacent to the 
motherland. By encouraging waves of exploration followed by settlement, Russia 
consistently established frontiers until she reached the Pacific. The motives for expansion 
were akin to those that impelled the European powers to colonise -  wealth and natural 
resources. State planning and administrative policies played a decisive role in encouraging 
or inhibiting Far Eastern international relations. Soviet commentators generally tended to 
be optimistic about the Far East’s future international participation in the region’s 
development in the form of compensation agreements. Considerable attention was 
accorded to projects enhancing the Far East’s international profile -  pipelines, the Baikal- 
Amur Mainline and the construction of Vostochni Port. Soviet writers described these 
international ties as helpful but not indispensable to Far Eastern development. The Far East 
was, and is, portrayed as having significant potential for economic interaction with North- 
East Asia, as Gorbachev’s 1986 Vladivostok and 1988 Krasnoiarsk speeches suggested.
The history of the Far East’s political economy has been dynamic and international. In 
many ways it is akin to that of a state. Though the region has been seen as an important 
gateway at one end of the spectrum and as an outpost at the other, there has never been any 
argument about its special status. From being an epicentre of North-East Asian geopolitics, 
it became the focus of Russia’s quest for economic growth. Politically, the region was the 
focus of the tsarist and Soviet developmental models. The Far East was also represented a 
buffer zone between European Russia and Japan under the guise of the Far Eastern 
Republic, as well as a base for the projection of Soviet power within the region. When the
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Soviet Union collapsed, a new Russia, keen to find her feet and adjust to a changing 
international political economy, re-opened the debate over what role a new Far East should 
play. But this was further complicated by changes at the local, subnational, national, 
regional and international levels, as well as the region’s resources, geography, distance 
from Moscow and strategic location politicising all aspects of the Far East’s interactions 
and situation.
The Far East was, historically, a crossroads between the major powers of North-East Asia, 
as well as a lure for wealth by Moscow. Before the Sovietisation of the Far East it was a 
frontier, a gateway and a buffer between Moscow and North-East Asia. The region was key 
to Russian-Japanese relations -  it was the location of economic cooperation, it was the 
conference centre for meetings, and it was the focus of political and territorial issues. 
Today the Far East has shifted attention away from the territorial dispute. Along with other 
subnational regions, the Far East has changed the entire nature of Russian-Japanese 
relations. It has diluted the traditional structures of relations in this bilateral framework and 
it is building cleavages based around the many aspects of international relations. In many 
ways the Post-Soviet Far East is recreating its pre-Soviet role -  one of an actor in a 
changing international political economy. Russian-Japanese relations are older than most 
textbooks. Relations existed between regions that now form parts of both states prior to 
them being parts of their respective states. Russian-Japanese relations will always exist 
simply based on the geographical proximity of the two states. Indeed, the Japanese have 
been key in the economic development of the Far East. The Far East was the initial point of 
contact for Japan with the territories that are part of Russia today. Moreover, the Far East 
remains key to Japan’s interest in Russia, and illustrates the roles regions can play in the 
international political economy.
The Far East exemplifies -  both now and previously -  both sides of the debate for 
communism and capitalism. It has benefited from both and been the victim of both also. 
However, its resources, geographical location, strategic importance and history mean the 
region will always be political -  both nationally (intra-territorially in the Far East and in
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relations with Moscow) and internationally (vis-a-vis North-East Asia). Much like when 
the imperial centre collapsed and the Far East sought to assert its identity and establish a 
special status with the new Soviet centre, similarly the post-Soviet Far East tried to achieve 
a similar status for the region under El’tsin.
During the Cold War political ideology was key in determining economic relations. There 
existed international blocs with different political and economic systems. To talk of regions 
was to talk of areas within states not as international actors. With the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the processes of globalisation, there has been a rise in the interconnectedness of 
politics and economics as there has, indeed, been a growth in non-state entities as 
international actors -  such as regions. However, the role of the Far East in Russian- 
Japanese relations demonstrates that regions were international actors long before the onset 
of the Soviet Union’s collapse and globalisation. Indeed, Russia and Japan, traditionally 
thought to interact based either on politics or economics, managed to interact combining 
politics and economics in a new subnational political economy.
Having analysed the theoretical and the historical, the third piece of the jigsaw is to 
introduce the contemporary. Using both primary and secondary resources the focus of the 
next chapter is to analyse the contemporary nature of the Far East and how that can change 
and has changed Russia’s relations with Japan. The chapter will focus more on how regions 
have changed as analysis of the changing international political economy has carried out in 
chapter one. Then, conclusions from the fieldwork undertaken will be introduced to 
emphasise local change and its impact on Russian-Japanese relations.
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Chapter Three:
Regions in the Changing International Political 
Economy -  The Case of the Far East
113
3.0 Regions in the Changing International Political Economy -  The Case of the 
Far East
It is in the context of post-communist transition the Far East must be analysed -  
through part of Russia it is isolated from the heartland; faces West politically, East 
economically; five million people overshadowed by China’s billion plus to the South- 
West; the world’s second economic power (Japan) to the East; and a delicate Korean 
Peninsula to the West. In the context of such a fragile, strategic, dynamic and 
changing international political economy advocacy of independence for this wealthy, 
yet peripheral, region is low priority. Yet the quest for greater autonomy continues. 
The Far East’s natural resources furnished the immense Soviet (previously tsarist) 
military, a sizeable portion of which were stationed there. The region’s natural 
resources were the engine driving the Soviet development model. Intra-territorial and 
intra-regional intercourse was limited; formidable politico-ideological barriers 
inhibited international contact. Today these barriers have largely gone. However of 
those remaining the greatest has been the decline of the economy -  due to military cuts 
and the massive costs of exploiting or utilising resources. Nonetheless, the Far East is 
an eminently logical candidate for growing economic interaction with neighbouring 
states. It is a region susceptible to both the domestic and the international. Indeed, it is 
a region emerging as an actor in the changing international political economy.
This chapter will reach some conclusions on the changing role of regions in the 
international political economy, with the view to determining the role of the Far East 
in Russian-Japanese relations. The changing international political economy has given 
rise to and been affected by new phenomena -  one of which is the rise of regions as 
actors. The Far East is such a region. It has been key in developing Russian relations 
with Japan. The region’s rise is the consequence of changes domestically and 
internationally. Having already examined how the international political economy and 
the Far East have changed, this chapter looks at domestic changes within the Russian 
state and how they have affected regions. The aim is to better understand how regions, 
such as the Far East, have been able to play a significant role in the international 
political economy, and in particular with Japan. What factors contribute to the rise of 
this role? Is this role a new aspect of politics, of international relations, of the domestic 
framework of the state, of the international political economy? Has the role changed? 
Is this a model for other or similar regions?
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3.1 Introduction
‘No country, including those of vast territory and rich resources, can afford to isolate 
itself from extensive interstate exchanges and develop its economy behind closed 
doors. ...while fully exploiting its own resources... -  it should actively make use of 
foreign investment and advanced technology abroad to speed up its own economic 
development’.1 Robinson’s statement, though referring to China, holds true of all 
resource-rich territories. Russians, like the international political economy, are aware 
of Far Eastern potential. However unlike parallel American and European lands, the 
region remains backward and unable to fully exploit its immense wealth. Evidence 
shows foreign investment remains at the edge or on the shelf; inland investment is 
perceived as risky; foreign investment tends to be in projects with direct access to 
infrastructure or, as in oil and gas, is located offshore. Being peripheral, and a well 
endowed resource frontier, it is both a gateway and borderland, the Far East is deeply 
involved with bordering states -  Japan, China, South Korea, Canada and the US. 
Japan, China and South Korea are the largest trading partners but in foreign 
investment no state dominates. Japanese, South Korean and US investors eye timber. 
Mining has US and Canadian capital. Japanese, US and European consortia are 
involved in oil and gas; fishing is the most internationalised industry. Moscow’s 
influence is substantial. Understanding the Far East means understanding its 
relationship with Moscow.3
The Soviet Union’s collapse and subsequent liberalisation of the Far East rekindled 
hopes of prosperity with an international flavour. However the Far East faces 
numerous obstacles -  domestically, regionally and internationally. In spite of her huge 
expanse, difficulties in settlement and resource extraction are key obstacles. Soviet 
industrial planning forced the Far East to send much of her wealth to European Russia 
for processing while she relied on imports. Communist Moscow’s focus on the Far 
East was based around resource extraction and security. Today her relationship with 
the region is, to say the least, uncertain. The latter’s location suggests a future
’Robinson, Richard D. (Ed.), Foreign Capital and Technology in China. Praeger Publishers, London, 
UK, 1987, p.xiii.
2See Bothe, Michael, Kuzidem, Thomas, and Schmidt, Christian (Eds.), Amazonia and Siberia -  Legal 
Aspects of the Preservation of the Environment and Development in the Last Open Spaces. 
International Environmental Law and Policy Series, Graham and Trotman Limited, London, UK, 1993.
3RFE Update. October 1997, p.l.
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orientated towards North-East Asia. However transition problems and dependency 
upon Moscow mean the Far East is unable to integrate into either the Russian or 
international economies. Each of the Far East’s ten territories has different relations 
with Moscow as well as different levels of economic development, industrial 
production, infrastructure, natural resources and political problems, all of which are 
affected by territorial assignation.4
Following Gorbachev’s policy gestures, El’tsin pushed for Russia to become an 
Asia/Pacific power. Part of this process involved redirecting the Far East’s role. 
However, at the same time came de-industrialisation; in the Far East this was 
associated with the collapse of defence-related production and resource production 
restructuring.5 Further, the loss of traditional markets produced a desire to increase 
processing levels in key resource industries. These initiatives occurred regionally, not 
nationally, as regionally orientated market mechanisms replaced the centralised 
system. Moreover, inter-territorial competition has prevented unified Far Eastern 
economic policy. New regional development strategies prioritise processing capacity 
in forestry, minerals, fishing, transport, arms conversion, tourism, food-processing and 
socio-industrial infrastructure. Local or regional authorities and businessmen have 
established agencies promoting trade and investment.6 However obstacles remain, 
including high levels of disclosure required by local government, legal difficulties and 
issues in the anti-resource thesis. Inadvertently, when the Soviet Union was trying to 
deal with these issues, Russia’s second revolution came and redefined the concept of 
region.
3.2 The Concept of Region
The geographically informed are aware of and understand regions are created to
n
interpret complexity. According to Geography fo r  Life -  National Geography
4Minakir, Pavel A., and Freeze, Gregory L. (Ed.), The Russian Far East -  An Economic Survey. Second 
Edition, Revised and Supplemented, Russian Academy of Sciences Far Eastern Branch Economic 
Research Institute, with the sponsorship of The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, RIOTIP, Khabarovsk, 
Russia, 1996, p. 185.
5Bradshaw, Michael J., and Lynn, Nicholas J., The Russian Far East -  Russia’s Wild East, Post-Soviet 
Business Forum (PSBF), Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA), Chatham House, London, UK, 
1997, p.2.
6Pravda, October 23, 2001.
7Stoddard, Robert H., “The World as a Multilevel Mosaic -  Understanding Regions” in Social Studies. 
Vol.88, No.4, 1997, p.167.
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Standards 1994 understanding and appreciating geography inevitably confronts the 
concept of regions. Yet regions are also socio-economic, political, strategic, cultural 
and administrative. ‘A region has certain characteristics that give it... cohesiveness 
and distinctiveness that... set it apart from other regions. As worlds within worlds, 
regions can be used to simplify... [based] on the... presence or absence of selected... 
characteristics. As a result, regions are human constructs whose boundaries and 
characteristics... derive from sets of specific criteria. They vary in scale from local to 
global; overlap; are mutually exclusive; exhaustively partition; ...or capture... selected 
portions...’.8
It is within the context of regions that humans organise themselves spatially, though 
the basis may be geographic, social, religious, economic or other. An administrative 
region may not always be the most suitable entity for examining trends, issues or 
ideas; but it is convenient, in a scholarly scence, for gathering data and for organising 
information. Regions of the international political economy that form states contrast 
with those used scholastically (the Mediterranean) or those used in common 
communication (the Middle East); these regions typically have imprecise boundaries 
and do not carry regulatory importance. Indeed, most political regions are also 
expressed as areas with well-defined boundaries and are associated with specific 
jurisdictional control. In the Far East’s case she is an administrative region defining a 
unique socio-economic, geopolitical and historic area. Others use the Far East to 
distinguish the direction of policy and strategy. How political regions effect varies 
with levels of government. Locally, taxes and public services can differ. Division of 
the international political economy into regions, each defining a state’s territory, has 
tremendous effects. However this was not always the case. Prior to the modem state, 
humans identified with groups on the basis of kinship or other non-territorial 
relationships. Today humans are citizens of states subject to rights and obligations. 
Russia is one such state -  a state with eighty-nine separate regions. Moreover, there 
are divisions amongst those regions.
8Geographic Educational Standards Project, Geography for Life -  National Geography Standards 1994. 
Geographic Educational Standards Project 1994, US, 1994, pp.70-71.
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In 1996 Hanson economically classified the diversity that is Russia’s regions. Though 
his classification was simple (see Figure 3.1), he confirmed that more than one 
classification might be relevant to each region. Moreover, in spite of being economic 
classifications, they highlight how regions can politicise their position. For example, 
of the five types of region identified, three were applicable to the Far East. Moreover, 
within the Far East individual regions had different roles, while the area as a whole 
had several roles -  resource, gateway and ordinary. In 2000, based on the 
identification and classification of regional strategies, Bradshaw and Treyvish 
identified six types of regions (see Figure 3.2). Using Bradshaw and Treyvish’s 
typology four roles can be identified for the Far East -  urbanised, gateway model, 
searching for federal support and separatist. But these roles are politically biased and 
do not consider the economic. Similarly, Lysenko and Matveev classified regions on 
the basis of economic interests and market orientations (see Figure 3.3). Nonetheless, 
these three typologies are a starting point for developing and interpreting the Far East 
-  its role, image and position. Though these models are broad, vague and simplistic, 
they do highlight the fact that the Far East cannot and does not fit into any box. To use 
the three models, a region can, for example, be a resource region and a gateway region 
(Hanson). Primor’e is a prime example. Indeed, there are also regions that are 
international liberal and separatist (Bradshaw and Treyvish). Sakha is the perfect 
example. And, regions can also be mining-export regions interested in liberal and open 
policy and relative independence and border regions in favourable positions interested 
in most liberal trade policy and an offshore model of development (Lysenko and 
Matveev). Amur is such an example.
A further point that can be made is that all models talk of regions and not territories. Is 
not the Far East a region and Primorie a territory in that region? Each of these models 
looks at the local (territories) and not the subnational (administrative regions). This is 
important because it realises local differences (for example, say Primor’e and Sakhalin 
in the Far East). However, it maybe less useful when attempting to classify 
subnational regions (such as the Far East, Eastern Siberia and Western Siberia). What 
is certain is that the Far East is an area (composed of ten regions) with many roles. 
Yet, for the purposes of this study the Far East will be considered a region comprising 
of ten territories. The region has no one role. Indeed, as history has shown, it has had 
many roles and often simultaneously. However, what is central to this chapter is the
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region’s role in Russian-Japanese relations. Furthermore, as has been seen from 
history and will be seen from analysis here, those different roles are key to the Far 
East’s role in Russian-Japanese relations. Later in this chapter the conclusions from 
the fieldwork will also provide perspectives on different roles of the Far East as a 
region.
Figure 3.1: Hanson’s Typology of Russian Regions
Region Type Description
Rural Where at least 45% of population is rural; 11 regions in the south accounting for 
10.9% of population
Resource Regions where fuel-energy, non-ferrous metal and timber industries account for at 
least 50% of 1993’s industrial output; 8 regions -  Karelia, Komi, Leningrad Oblast’, 
Tumen, Krasnaiiarsk, Sakha, Magadan -  collectively 17.8% of population
Gateway Regions that had major ports and/or foreign currency exchanges in 1994, with a total 
population of 30.2%; 13 regions -  most important (in descending order of 1994 
foreign exchange market turnover) are Moscow, St. Petersburg, Sverdlovsk, 
Novosibirsk, Primorie and Samara. Nizhny Novogorod, the region with the most 
conspicuous reform profile, ranks 10th on this list
Hi-Tech Regions with numerous factories and research institutes in the radio, electronics, 
communications and aerospace sectors; 10 regions -  Moscow City, St. Petersburg, 
Moscow Oblast’, Nizhni Novogorod, Novogorod, Samara, Voronezh, Sverdlovsk, 
Novosibirsk and Kaluga, containing 26.3% of population
Ordinary The rest, comprising 36% of the Russian population
Source: Hanson, Philip, “Russia’s 89 Federal Subjects” in Post-Soviet Prospects. Vol.4, No.8, August 
1996, pp.l.
Notes: Hanson added these categories are not mutually exclusive. One rural region, Krasnodar, is also a 
gateway region. Several gateway regions are also in the hi-tech category.
Figure 3.2: Bradshaw and Treyvish’s Typology of Russian Regions
Political Region Type Description
Conservative-Communist Basically agrarian
National-Liberal Urbanised
International Liberal Gateway model
Lobbyist Searching for federal support
Separatist Strong republics bargaining with Moscow
Patemalistic-Clientalistic Moscow-biased
Source: Bradshaw, Michael, and Treyvish, Andrey, “Russia’s Regions in the Triple Transition” in 
Hanson, Philip, and Bradshaw, Michael (Eds.), Regional Economic Change in Russia, Economies and 
Societies in Transition, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2000, p.39.
Figure 3.3: Lysenko and Matveev’s Typology of Russian Regions
No. Description
1 Mining-exporting regions interested in liberal and open policy and relative independence
2 Manufacturers interested in a large and unified national market and state protectionism, but
protesting against anti-inflationary policies
3 Self-sufficient agro-industrial regions interested in internal development and often isolationist
4 Republics whose elites the ethnic card and enjoy exclusive economic regimes
5 Border regions in favourable positions interested in most liberal trade policy and an offshore
model o f development
Source: Lysenko, V.N., and Podoprigora, Matveev (Eds.), Ekonomicheskie Reformv v Regionakh 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii. Institut Sovremennoi Politiki, Moscow, Russia, 1999, p.99.
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3.3 The History of Regions in the International Political Economy
The history of regions in the international political economy has its origins in 
centralisation. Centralisation in Western Europe can be traced to the development of 
European states, which displaced and defeated autonomous cities, feudal 
principalities, Roman Catholic Church claims and the confederal impotence of the 
Holy Roman Empire. State formation from Western Europe accelerated from the 
sixteenth century. In 1500, there were five hundred (semi-)independent political units 
in Western and Central Europe. By 1900, there were only twenty-five.9 State 
formation in Western Europe was stimulated by factors contributing to centralisation 
through expansion. Expansion was achieved through military conquest at the expense 
of feudal principalities bordering the state building centralising core. To maintain 
military strength, it was necessary for centralising monarchs to raise and supply large 
standing armies.10 Certain socio-economic factors had to be present for military 
expansion and centralisation to be feasible. By the sixteenth century, a growing 
merchant class in Western Europe, inhabiting a network of prosperous urban 
commercial centres, ensured financial resources would be available for extraction.11
During the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, numerous self- 
governing political communities chose to unite to form federal systems. These 
systems were often described as alternatives to centralised unitary systems. Yet their 
formation represented a centralising tendency as opposed to the separate existence 
each member states or provinces previously enjoyed. A sizable body of literature has 
formed around federalism. Numerous authors raise questions over what factors are 
responsible for establishing federations. In many instances, factors cited are similar to 
those contributing to centralisation. For example, one factor frequently mentioned is
9Tilly, Charles, “Reflections on the History of European State-Making” in Tetlock, Philip E., 
Husbands, Jo L., Jervis, Robert, Stem, Paul C., and Tilly, Charles, Behaviour. Society and International 
Conflict, Vol.3, Oxford University Press, for the National Research Council of the National Academy 
of Sciences, New York, US, 1993, p. 15.
10Badie, Bertrand, and Bimbaum, Pierre, The Sociology of the State. Translated by Arthur 
Goldhammer, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, US, 1983; and Tilly, Charles, “Sinews of War” in 
Torsvik, Per (Ed.), Mobilisation Centre-Peripherv Structures and Nation-Building. Universitetsforlaget, 
Oslo, Norway, 1981.
1'Friedrich, Carl J., Limited Government -  A Comparison. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey, US, 1963, pp. 549-550.
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19the desire to attain protection or greater military security. Another attributed cause is 
the existence of an interdependent economy, with convenient transportation and 
communication networks linking prospective federation members. This type of 
interdependence suggests certain economic advantages probably result from the 
establishment of a federal union.
In the twentieth century, growing complexity and increasingly acute problems
confronting industrial and post-industrial governments, and newly aroused appetites
of former colonies, combined to generate additional pressures for expanding
centralisation. With the welfare state’s emergence, there has been a rise in
1 ^expectations regarding services governments are supposed to provide. This growing 
clamour for governmental assistance placed public authorities under financial stress 
and imposed weighty burdens on local and regional governments -  burdens rendering 
them increasingly dependent on central government aid in the form of grants and 
direct expenditures. As possessor of superior fiscal resources, particularly more 
broadly based powers of taxation, central government was bound to become a primary 
dispenser of services and carve out positions of apparent superiority of 
intergovernmental relations. The cost of defraying expenses of two world wars has 
even compelled central federal governments to expand their tax base and amplify their 
taxing powers at the expense of regional and local authorities.14
As is readily discernible, a formidable combination of socio-historical factors 
favoured expanding central government powers over the periphery. These factors 
included centralising effects of burgeoning bureaucracies; fiscal impositions that 
military conquests of absolute monarchs brought; support monarchs obtained from
12Birch, Anthony H., “Approaches to the Study of Federalism” in Political Studies. No. 14, February 
1966, pp. 15-33; Dikshit, Ramesh Dutta, The Political Geography of Federalism -  An Inquiry into 
Origins and Stability. Wiley, New York, US, 1975; Riker, William H., “Federalism” in Greenstein, 
Fred I., and Polsby. Nelson W. (Eds.), Handbook of Political Science. Vol.5 -  Governmental 
Institutions and Processes. Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, US, 1975, Chapter 2; Sawer, 
Geoffrey, Modem Federalism, Watts, London, UK, 1969; and Wheare, Kenneth C., Federal 
Government, Fourth Edition, Oxford University Press, New York, US, 1964.
13Friedrich, Carl J., Limited Government -  A Comparison. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey, US, 1974, pp.62-63; and La Palombara, Joseph, “Penetration -  A Crisis o f Governmental 
Capacity” in Binder, Leonard, Crises and Sequences in Political Development. Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, New Jersey, US, 1971, pp.222-23.
14Livingston, William S., “Canada, Australia, and the United States -  Variations on a Theme” in Earle, 
Valerie (Ed.), Federalism -  Infinite Variety in Theory and Practice, Peacock, Illinois, US, 1968, 
pp.125-139.
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wealthy and powerful merchant classes; impacts of democratic and industrial 
revolutions; advent of the welfare state; and purposeful, self-generated initiatives of 
central government seeking to extend their domains. Central government historically 
succeeded in centralisation due to its relative power, its need to hold onto power and 
its tools for exhibiting power, vis-a-vis regions. This is illustrated in the history of the 
Far East’s international political economy, and especially relevant where the centre is 
worried about foreign influence on regions.
3.4 Decentralisation and Power
To understand politics, the distribution of power needs consideration. This means 
grasping the dynamics of political processes and to understand how power is 
exercised, in what ways and to what degree it is restrained. The positions adopted by 
various actors in the domestic and international political economies in regard to such 
questions provide insight into material interests involved in key controversies in 
political philosophy. Also, normative aspects of power cannot be overlooked. It is 
impossible to meaningfully speculate about the nature of good society and the 
political system without considering the values at stake when power is wielded. What 
methods of distributing and checking power are most likely to advance certain values 
while neglecting or threatening others? Where power is concerned, hard choices 
amongst competing values are often inescapable. The study of political power tends to 
confine itself to the national level, to relationships amongst various functional 
agencies of national government, and between agencies, parties and interest groups 
attempting to influence their decisions.
Except for the flourishing literature on federalism, little attention has been paid to 
central government and local or regional authority interactions. Yet this territorial 
division of power has always constituted an important problem. It has spawned 
continuing debate over respective virtues of centralisation and decentralisation. This 
debate has intensified recently in modem industrial democracies; doubts about 
efficacies of central power and decision-making have become increasingly audible. 
Moreover, the issue has taken on strong normative overtones. The centralisation- 
decentralisation controversy is more than a disagreement over questions of efficiency 
and administration; it involves conflicts amongst fundamental values as well. One 
form of decentralisation is federalism, where the constitution divides power between
122
national and regional government; authority retains some exclusive powers. Another 
is from regional devolution where national power is paramount over regional powers; 
central government agents intervene directly to block regional legislation. Regional 
devolution is a response by numerous unitary states, such as Italy, Spain, and to a 
lesser degree, France and Russia. It is a system possessing unitary and federal 
features.
What seems to emerge from this array of pleas for greater participation through 
decentralisation is a certain underlying normative consensus. Federalism and other 
forms of decentralisation result in greater freedom for those being governed and also, 
by expanding participation, promote socio-political unity.15 Another normative 
consideration raised by advocates of decentralisation is the need to restrain abuses of 
power by central government. Thomas Jefferson regarded local self-government as an 
essential bulwark against corruption and tyranny.16 Others have elaborated this thesis, 
pointing to the desirability of providing minorities with local and regional power 
bases as a means of establishing a countervailing force at the subnational level to 
check central encroachments on human liberty.
3.5 Transition -  Systematic Transformation and Regional Change
Tocqueville stated revolutions do not occur when regimes are most repressive but 
when they are self-adjusting. He stated in striving to reform, regimes give way to
1 n
opponents and subsequently weaken their power base. Gorbachev’s reforms confirm 
Tocqueville’s philosophy. Aware of Soviet stagnation, Gorbachev implemented socio- 
politico-economic reforms. In doing so, he sympathesised with liberals and democrats, 
eroding the powers of his office and governing institutions across the entire former
15Teune, Henry, ’’The Future of Federalism -  Federalism and Political Integration" in Earle, Valerie 
(Ed.), op. cit.. pp. 220-33.
16Huntington, Samuel P., “The Founding Fathers and the Division of Powers” in Maass, Arthur (Ed.), 
Area and Power, Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, US, 1959, pp. 173-179; and Tarlton, Charles D., 
“Symmetry and Asymmetry as Elements of Federalism -  A Theoretical Speculation” in Journal of 
Politics. No.27, November 1965, pp. 864-65.
17Tocqueville, Alexis Comte de, The Phenomenon of Revolution, Dodd, Mead, New York, US, 1974.
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communist bloc.18 Gorbachev’s reforms had specific regional policies that put 
emphasis on certain Russian regions, such as the Far East. Gorbachev highlighted the 
Far East in his 1986 Vladivostok and 1988 Krasnoiarsk speeches, but his step-by-step 
reforms were derailed by changes that destroyed the Soviet Union. Central planning’s 
deep inefficiencies became evident.
The Soviet Union’s collapse was greeted with boundless optimism, but hope was less 
sincere than history. Communism’s legacy was too substantial to break overnight. 
Eastern and Central Europe and the Baltics have been more successful than the rest of 
the former communist bloc; Russia -  centre of the former tsarist and Soviet empires -  
has been less successful. Eastern and Central European and Baltic success has been 
driven, partly, by a sense of belonging to a particular geography (for example, the EU) 
as Duchesne and Frognier stated. And, partly because of proximity to the EU as Van 
Brabant and Pinder have argued. For Russia neither of these theories holds true -  the 
largest state in the world, covering one-seventh of the earth’s land surface, stretching 
ten time zones, and belonging to Europe and Asia. She dominates Eurasia; while being 
phenomenally wealthy in resources she has been unable to establish effective national 
political mechanisms to fully exploit her wealth. Instead political energies have been 
focused elsewhere. Faced with the loss of superpower status and empire, Russia is 
trying to re-determine her international role. Simultaneously, however, globalising 
energies have resulted in domestic fragmentation, creating additional pressures giving 
rise to subnational actors and local politics. These local energies are trying to establish 
frameworks that can establish political mechanisms better able to cope with the plight 
of regions and associated issues -  ethnicity, autonomy, policy, international relations 
or resource exploitation.
Communism’s dissolution resulted in the loss of state control, faith in government and 
legitimacy. Furthermore, because relative levels of centralisation and decentralisation 
have important effects on state control, the scope and effectiveness of central and
18Kochan, Lionel, The Making of Modem Russia -  From Kiev Rus’ to the Collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Penguin Books, London, UK, 1987, pp.32-47; Matlock, Jr., Jack F., Autopsy on an Empire -  The 
American Ambassador’s Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union, Random House, New York, First 
Edition, 1995, pp.2-9; Strayer, Robert, Why Did the Soviet Union Collapse? -  Understanding Historical 
Change. M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York, US, 1998, pp. 11-13; and Grachev, A.S., Final Days -  The 
Inside of the Collapse of the Soviet Union. Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, US, 1995, pp.37-41.
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regional control are important considerations. Secondly, socio-politico-economic 
sovereignty could no longer be ignored. Is Moscow still responsible for protecting 
ethnic communities and managing transition? Finally, Russia’s regions are forging 
links internationally; they were new actors in the domestic political framework and the 
international political economy.
Initially, in March 1991, El’tsin’s reaction to regionalism in Russia was: 
‘...autonomous formations [of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic] can 
take as much sovereignty as they can administer... But they will independently have 
to answer... for the well being of their people. We make only one condition: they will 
not let anyone pull Russia down’.19 However, El’tsin’s early support of regional 
sovereignty, short of independence and secession, cannot be understood outside his 
battle for authority. Acceding to these regional demands reduced Gorbachev’s 
authority and bolstered regional support for El’tsin. After the Soviet Union collapsed 
and El’tsin became president he was no longer so tolerant of regionalism; it came at a 
high price -  a loss of his authority. By August 1993 El’tsin was declaring: ‘...the 
Russian Federation is not a piece of Swiss Cheese...’.20 Ironically, El’tsin’s strategy 
for dealing with mounting centre-periphery tensions was similar to Gorbachev’s. But 
El’tsin’s efforts to establish a Russian Federal Treaty were more successful than 
Gorbachev’s for a Soviet Treaty.
Differing initial conditions and economic policies waged by regional authorities 
increased disparities between socio-economic development and political cooperation 
of various federal units. For its part, the federal government supports regions through 
federal transfers and the Federal Fund for Support of the Regions.21 Clearly, Russia's 
centre-periphery crisis is not reducible to demands for self-determination or ethnic 
political independence. This is not to deny the ethnic factor is important in some cases 
(for example, North Caucasus, Tartarstan, Bashkortostan, Tuva and, off course, 
Chechniia). In most instances, however, challenges to the centre and decentralisation 
are driven not by ethnic consciousness but by specific politico-economic interests. For
19Checkel, Jeffrey T., Institutional Dynamics in Collapsing Empires -  Domestic Structural Change in 
the USSR. Post-Soviet Russia and Independent Ukraine. ARENA Working Papers, Working Paper 
99/2, ARENA, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway, p.l 1.
20The New York Times. August 14, 1993.
21This body was established to direct funds from Moscow to the regions on the basis of need.
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those advocating a less centralised Russia, federalism means divided or dual 
sovereignty; sovereignty shared by regions and the centre. For those advocating a 
more centralised Russia, sovereignty cannot be divided.
3.6 Centre-Periphery Relations -  Moscow and the Far East
There are a myriad of definitions of federalism, all emphasising shared, joint or equal 
authority between central and regional authorities. Elazar defined federalism as a 
‘combination of self-rule and shared rule’.22 Friedrich said federalism was a ‘process 
by which a number of separate political communities enter into arrangements for 
concluding solutions, adopting joint policies, and making joint decisions by which a 
unitary political community becomes differentiated into a federally organised 
whole’.23 Davis described federalism as an ‘intricate and varied network of 
interrelated ideas and concepts of contract, of partnership, of equity, of trust, of 
sovereignty, of constitution, of state, of international law’.24 These definitions suggest 
that beyond the balance between central and regional authority, federalism involves 
government structure and process; federalism is directed to achieving and maintaining 
unity and diversity; federalism is socio-political; federalism concerns means and ends;
OSfederalism is pursued for limited and comprehensive means.
Related to federalism is sovereignty which also has numerous definitions. Perhaps the
most popular is Hinsley’s. Sovereignty means ‘final and absolute authority in the
26political community...and no final and absolute authority exists elsewhere. . . ’. 
Thompson argued ‘...with sovereignty, states do not simply have the ultimate 
authority over things political; they have the authority to relegate activities, issues and 
practices to the economic, social, cultural and scientific realms of authority or to the
22Elazar, Daniel J., Exploring Federalism. University of Alabama Press, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, US, 
1987, p.5.
23Friedrich, Carl J., Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, US, 
1968, p.7.
24Davis, Rufus S., The Federal Principle -  A Journey Through Time in Quest of a Meaning. University 
of California Press, Berkeley, California, US, 1978, p.5.
25Elazar, Daniel J., The Ends of Federalism -  Notes Toward a Theory of Federal Political 
Arrangements. Working Paper No. 12, Centre for the Study of Federalism, Temple University, 
Philadelphia, US, 1976, p.2.
26Hinsley, F.H., Sovereignty. Second Edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1988,
p.26.
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states’ own realm -  the political’.27 Krasner noted, ‘...assertion of final authority 
within a given territory is the core element in any definition of sovereignty’.28 
Comparing meanings of federalism and sovereignty suggests the two concepts are 
intimately connected, if not contradictory. Federalism is about shared, equal, or joint 
authority. Sovereignty is about final and absolute authority. However, if sovereignty 
represents absolute authority, can there be shared rule and joint policies between 
central and regional governments? What is sovereign -  central or regional 
government? Federalism implies sovereignty, while sovereignty suggests it cannot be 
divided because there can only be supreme authority. This contradiction led Elazar to 
conclude that the ‘...federal principle represents an alternative to (and a radical attack
90upon) the modem idea of sovereignty...’.
These issues are particularly important in culturally plural transitional Russia. In the 
context of federalism, is the centre or are the regions primarily responsible for 
protecting ethnic communities and managing marketisation? Russian regions have 
been active in the international political economy, signing treaties with foreign 
companies and states. Whether regions have the authority to conduct foreign policy is 
important to the type of federalism Russia is constructing. However Russia is a post- 
Soviet state and Soviet notions of federalism and sovereignty differ to Western ideas. 
Soviet conceptions of federalism and sovereignty are unique for several reasons -  
class permeating sovereignty; federalism and sovereignty are tightly linked; greater 
discrepancy between theory and practice of federalism, or to use Elazar’s terminology, 
between structure and process; an explicit theoretical right to secede; and federalism 
based on ethno-territory. Jones described Soviet concepts of sovereignty as having 
internal and external aspects. The internal refers to supremacy within a territory and 
the external to independence in the international political economy. The relationship 
between federalism and sovereignty is complex. Western concepts of sovereignty 
disagree as to whether it can be shared between the centre and regions. Soviet concepts
27Thomson, Janice E., Sovereignty in International Relations -  Is Empirical Research Possible?. 
Working Paper, Political Science Department, University of Wisconsin, Wisconsin, US, 1992, p.5.
28Krasner, Stephen D., “Sovereignty -  An International Perspective” in Comparative Political Studies. 
Vol.21, N o.l, 1988, p.86.
29Elazar, Daniel J., The Ends of Federalism -  Notes Toward a Theory of Federal Political 
Arrangements, op. cit.
30Jones, Robert A., The Soviet Doctrine of “Limited Sovereignty” from Lenin to Gorbachev -  The 
Brezhnev Doctrine. St. Martin’s Press, New York, US, 1990, p.20.
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of sovereignty and federalism are contradictory, though in practice both subordinate to 
the party. So how did Soviet concepts of sovereignty and federalism negotiate post- 
Soviet Russia? It linked Western and Soviet concepts.
Declarations of sovereignty by Soviet republics obscured those by Russian regions. 
However regions were no less aggressive than union republics. By the time the last 
union republic -  Kyrgyzstan -  declared sovereignty in October 1990, of Russia’s 
territories, ten autonomous republics, two autonomous oblasts and four autonomous 
okrugs had declared sovereignty. Even more notable was the fact all declarations 
occurred over two months. Sovereignty declarations continued apace throughout 1991, 
until virtually every (ethno-)territory Russian unit declared sovereignty. There were 
many differences amongst sovereignty declaring regions. Due to discrepancies 
between Soviet theory and practice, with respect to territorial status, regions felt a need 
to formalise and expand their authority. An example of expanding sovereignty has 
been the precedence of regional over Soviet/Russian laws, an example exemplified by 
the Far East.
The Far East exemplifies issues central to the plight of other regions while being 
unique. Historically, resources and geographical proximity to North-East Asia have 
determined for the Far East the roles of gateway, frontier and power projection. During 
the Soviet era the Far East was a fuel line for the economy projecting politico-military 
power at the edge of North-East Asia. Problems highlighted in the anti-resource thesis 
were all, to some extent albeit for a limited time, overcome through Soviet capital 
investment. The region had numerous territorial-industrial complexes, based around its 
resources, that the state supported through federal transfers, as well as labour and 
settlement programmes.
Since the Soviet Union’s collapse the Far East has been thrown into a state of chaos. 
The lifelines that fed the Far East disappeared overnight. The vast territorial-industrial 
complexes were no longer guaranteed state subsidies. The markets of the communist 
bloc disappeared. The introduction of economic reform and accompanying political 
confusion brought recession. Transformation of military-related production failed. 
Local, subnational, national, regional and international energies emerged, pulling the 
region in different directions. Each had their agenda. Though the Far East’s geography
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politicised the region, Moscow had always been the trigger puller. The Soviet Union’s 
collapse, the processes of globalisation, the Cold War’s end and transition all meant 
the Far East was once again politicised -  domestically and internationally. Not only 
was the region’s distance from Moscow determining relations with the centre, it was 
also determining relations with North-East Asia. Resources and ethnic minorities 
became central to moulding Far Eastern relations with Moscow. Soviet technology and 
settlement and labour incentives became outdated. Territorial assignments became an 
issue within the Far East and in building domestic and international relations.
Easton’s definition of decisions being outputs of the political system by which values 
are authoritatively allocated within society is apparent.31 However, these outputs are 
no longer the preserve of political centres. Socio-politico-economic needs have led 
subnational actors to place values on their requirements. These requirements determine 
outputs of the subnational political system that, in many cases, differ to those 
nationally. Experience and tradition have collectively, along with basic values and 
norms, created a set of relatively inflexible principles that, at least in part, originated as 
a means to achieve certain objectives. And while the domestic arena and international 
political economy may have changed, these principles take on a life of their own and 
tend to persist even after they have ceased to serve.
Due to the nature of Russia’s central politics, regional and local politics remain 
unstable. The local duma has significant powers, but these are answerable to the 
governor. The separation of powers, stated in Russia’s constitution, have never been 
detailed in supplementary legislation. Constitutional statute No.71 details areas where 
federal authorities have oversight and competence (constitutional amendments, federal 
organisation, human rights and the federal budget). Statute No.72 lists areas where 
joint competence is expected -  for instance, natural resource utilisation, federal and 
non-federal property delineation, environmental protection, tax policy, the judiciary 
and foreign economic relations. However, just how this joint competence manifests 
itself is determined by legislation remaining to be drafted or passed. Without specific 
laws, matters are left ambiguous. In sum, local duma powers and functions depend on 
constitutionally allocated authority, which is sketchy on such matters. A more
31Easton, David, The Political System. Knopf, New York, US, 1959.
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important local issue is the duma’s role in selecting a governor. Without a clear 
mandate over whether the local duma is able to cast a no confidence vote in the 
governor and call new elections, local dumas remain weak.
Though politically and economically apart from the centre, the Far East does 
participate in Russian politics through national legal and administrative structures. 
Russia has two chambers in its national legislative body (the Federal Assembly) -  the 
Federal Duma (lower chamber) and the Federation Council (upper chamber). In 
December 1996, Russia elected deputies to the federal duma -  eighteen are Far 
Eastern (4% of seats). The duma has 450 seats in two sections -  those determined by 
political parties and those by political districts (defined geographically with 
proportional representation). Far Easterners occupy five of the 225 federal duma seats 
allocated to political parties or blocks. The other 225 federal duma seats are assigned 
primarily on a proportional basis, based on population. All voting regions, including 
autonomous oblast’s and okrugs, have a minimum of one seat. The Far East has 
thirteen single-seat constituencies (5% of the total)32 -  Primor’e has three seats, 
Khabarovsk two and the remaining territories one each. These seats are occupied by 
odnomandatniki (single-seat deputies). Each territory also has two seats on the 
Federation Council -  one to the governor and one to the chairperson of the territorial 
duma. In principle this could represent a significant bloc in the duma but party or 
faction loyalties and differences have destroyed ideas of a coherent regional grouping. 
Moreover, exploiting regional wealth in the form of resources has been negligible.
3.7 Resource Politics and Regions -  The Case of the Far East
Many of the post-Soviet Far East’s economic problems are the direct result of the 
region’s role during the Soviet era. The centrally planned economy gave the Far East 
the role of resource periphery. The region had a highly specialised economic structure 
emphasising resource extraction, utilisation and development that fed the Soviet 
economy. The Far East’s geostrategy was further aggravated by Moscow’s policy of 
development at any cost. The massive costs of infrastructure construction, labour 
incentives, settlement development and capital investment were incurred by Moscow, 
overcoming socio-economic, socio-political and environmental issues as highlighted
^Corresponding to its share of the national population.
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in the anti-resource thesis, all of which built a regional export-led economy. By the 
time the Soviet Union collapsed the region had become a neglected colony; a 
dependent periphery with incomparable potential, immense wealth and intense 
geopolitics struggling to define its role.
The literature of economics, geography and development studies highlights the 
problems faced by developing states wealthy in natural resources. The ‘greatest 
advocate of resource-curse thesis’33 was Auty who argued inefficiencies are bred by 
rent extraction and their wasteful reapplication by natural resource price volatility in 
the international political economy and by Dutch disease effect (shrinking agriculture 
and underdevelopment of manufacturing in natural resource economies).34 
Simultaneously, several analyses of post-Soviet economic collapse have highlighted 
the role played by resource industries. Gaddy and Ickes argued the key problem in the
- j c
Russian economy is that it remains driven by resources. Economic wealth, growth, 
trade and progress continue to be driven by resource extraction, utilisation and 
associated export industries (including energy). Large resource enterprises like 
Gazprom and LukOil remain central to the national economy. The resource-curse has 
numerous implications for understanding Far Eastern economic development. 
Consensus amongst policymakers, politicians, scholars and think-tanks claim regional 
natural resources could fuel tremendous growth, especially in view of the 
complementary nature of the Far East and North-East Asia (especially Japan); a 
natural-fit that history and economics both confirm.
33Lynn, Nicholas J., “Resource-Based Development -  What Chance for the Russian Far East?” in 
Bradshaw, Michael J. (Ed.), The Russian Far East and Pacific Asia -  Unfulfilled Potential, Curzon 
Press, Richmond, Surrey, UK, 2001, p. 10. His notion of resource-curse thesis was similar to the anti­
resource thesis.
34Auty, R.M., “Multinational Resource Corporations, Nationalisation and Diminished Viability -  
Caribbean Plantations, Mines and Oilfields in the Seventies” in Dixon, C., Drakakis-Smith, D., and 
Watts, H.D., Multinational Corporations and the Third World. Croom Helm, London, UK, 1985, 
pp. 160-187; Auty, R.M., Resources Based Industrialisation -  Sowing in the Oil in Eight Developing 
Countries, Clarendon, Oxford, UK, 1990; Auty, R.M., Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies 
-  The Resource-Curse Thesis, Routledge, London, UK, 1993; Gelb, A.H., Oil Windfalls -  Blessing or 
Curse?, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1988; Roemer, M., “Dutch Disease in Developing 
Countries -  Swallowing the Bitter Medicine” in Lundahl, M. (Ed.), The Primary Sector in Economic 
Development, Croom Helm, London, UK, 1995, pp.234-252; and Wheeler, D., “Sources of Stagnation 
in Sub-Saharan Africa” in World Development, No.12, 1983, pp. 1-23.
35Gaddy, C.G., and Ickes, B.W., “Russia’s Virtual Economy” in Foreign Affairs. Vol.77, 1988, pp.53- 
67.
131
Covering 36% of Russia, the Far East, though the world’s largest untapped resource 
base, is only responsible for a mere 6% of national industrial output. Economically, 
it is extraction based. Politically, it is an arena of ten regional players forming no 
single political entity. Legally it does not have an administrative status. 
Administratively, its origins are in Gosplan. These regions were used for strategic 
long-term planning. Nonetheless, these regions have come to take on their own 
identity. Politicians, planners and population recognise these regions and the fact they 
serve as focus for the development of inter-regional economic associations. In spite of 
the creation of the Association of Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal Territories, an 
interregional association, little progress has been made in unifying autonomy and 
policy due to infighting and competition. Moscow has held onto power through a 
policy of divide and rule.
Despite economic turbulence of the early 1990s, Far Eastern mineral and mining 
industries have not suffered to the extent other industries have.38 Minerals have been
•5Q
successfully exported and have attracted foreign investment. Khabarovsk’s Governor 
Ishaev proclaimed his belief the Far Eastern military-industrial complex would 
progress to profit-making production.40 Prior to 1991, Moscow prioritised military 
production for the Far East. During 1988-1990, defence enterprise re-tooling was 
endorsed and the 1991-1995 Defence Industry Conversion Programme adopted.41 
However, the programme was unrealistic and conversion became chaotic -  limited 
federal funding was distributed amongst excessive enterprises, while restructuring was 
delayed and military production declined. The 1995-1997 Federal Defence Conversion 
Programme aimed at reducing company and plant numbers entitled to competitively
36Miller, Elisa (Ed.), The Russian Far East -  A Business Reference Guide. 1997-1998, Third Edition, 
Russian Far East Update Publications, Seattle, Washington, US, 1997, p. 121.
37Hughes, J., “Regionalism in Russia -  The Rise and Fall of the Siberian Agreement” in Europe-Asia 
Studies. Vol.46, No.7, pp. 1133-61.
38Toplivo-Energeticheskii Balans po Kraiam, Oblastiam DYER Otchetv za 1990 god, Moscow, Russia, 
1992.
39This has been facilitated by presidential decrees, tax incentives and so on, suggesting federal 
authorities are aware of potential exports and hard currency earnings the Far East can bring to Russia.
40Itar-Tass. October 14, 1997.
41The main goal was to increase non-military production. In 1992 a defence industry conversion law 
was adopted, followed by governmental decrees and orders. The 1993-1995 Federal Programme was to 
manage defence diversification and restructuring. Both programmes (1991-1995 and 1993-1995) 
assumed new defence orders, sustained employment and investment for restructuring, though limited, 
would be available. The plans suggested defence conversion would not negatively affect enterprise 
potential to produce military goods, as research and development would be maintained.
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participate in defence contracts, emphasising non-military goods.42 This has been key 
in politicising the state of the Far East’s economy to Moscow. The Far East and Trans- 
Baikal Association for Economic Cooperation attempted to forge trade development 
and economic links with North-East Asia. A string of committees, commissions and 
working groups was being established within the association framework to facilitate 
strengthening ties between Russian regions and North-East Asia.43 In June 1995 
Chernomyrdin established a programme to develop the Far Eastern economy placing 
priority on cooperation with North-East Asia, emphasising resource utilisation with 
technology. In terms of socio-economic reform, targets were set to accommodate 
expansions in relations with North-East Asia.44 On April 11, 1997, El’tsin elevated the 
programme to presidential status, setting ten-year priorities. A figure of US$65bn was 
set to implement the federal programme,45 but Moscow said it would finance no more 
than 30%. Regions and local enterprises, and domestic and international investors had 
to shoulder the balance.46 Russia’s laws and socio-politico-economics doubt the 
programme’s implementation 47 With legal deficiencies, federal programmes fail to 
attain legal status, making failure unaccountable and all issues political.
In a region, like the Far East, understanding politics has the added complication of 
geography. Socio-economic concerns have rendered Far Eastern politics hostile 
towards Moscow and receptive to external actors. Ishaev summarised this scenario in 
1995 by highlighting regional economic decline and Moscow’s inability to support the 
Far Eastern economy was encouraging rises in localism and regionalism: ‘Although
42High inflation (1992-1993) and anti-inflationary measures undermined viable defence enterprises. In 
the following years, sharp reductions in defence contracts, huge federal arrears and rising energy costs, 
contributed to undermining production capacity in military and non-military goods. As Khabarovsk 
housed 60% of Far Eastern defence, Primorie 35% and Amur 4%, these regions suffered heavily. 
Gudkova, Evgenya G., “Defence Enterprises in the Russian Far East -  Problems of Conversion and 
Economic Crisis (Summary)” in ERINA Report, Vol. 19, October 1997, pp.33-34.
43EL-RFE, October 8-14, 1995, p. 16. For example, Association for Cooperation between the Far East, 
Siberia and Korea; Far East Committee for Economic Cooperation with Japan supporting the Japanese 
Federation of Economic Organisations; Far Eastern Working Group for Economic Cooperation with the 
US West Coast. For China and Hong Kong there is the Far Eastern Committee for Economic 
Cooperation with China.
^ EL-RFE. March 17-26, 1996, p.3.
45Of that total, US$45bn has already been included in adopted federal programmes that directly pertain 
to the Far East. There are sixty-eight such programmes.
46EL-RFE. April 21-27, 1997, pp.3-4.
47Priorities were split into three periods: 1996-1997, 1998-2000 and 2001-2005. The first emphasised 
eliminating fuel and power shortages, repairs to natural resource damage, protection from floods and 
earthquakes, and resolving transportation problems. The second targeted economic recovery and 
industrial growth. The final period looked at resolving power problems and the intensive development 
of export-orientated processing, machine tool and high technology enterprises.
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Far Eastern succession seems highly unlikely, the idea is becoming more popular. 
...people are disappointed by Moscow’s empty promises to help the Far Eastern 
economy’.48 The political chaos Russia faced after the Soviet Union’s collapse was 
most devastating in the Far East. Each of the region’s ten territories has approximately 
equal stature as a federal subject, except Sakha; and, Evreiska, Chukotka and Kodak 
have only existed as separate entities since the early 1990s. In the early 1990s Far East 
regionalism grew with some local activists supporting the Far Eastern Republic’s 
recreation. In September 1990, for example, the Far Eastern Republic Freedom Party 
was established. In 1995 Ishaev called for the Far Eastern Republic’s recreation to 
counter, what he described as, unfair federal tax policies.49 Ishaev said a Far Eastern 
Republic would not be created for secessionist purposes, but to solve problems 
independently from Moscow.50
In April 1995 Far Eastern governors met to form a political organisation to lobby 
Moscow and represent regional concerns -  the Association of Far Eastern and Trans- 
Baikal Territories -  but inter-territorial conflict has ensured little success.51 The 
association's formation strengthened the region's position prior to December 1995’s 
federal assembly elections.52 With these foundations laid, the association met in late 
October 1997 to discuss a draft law creating a special status for the Far East (which 
remains to be considered by the federal duma), draft budgetary and taxation codes and 
a 1998 federal budget bill.53 In relations with Moscow, the association stated its 
intention to adopt an address to the President, Government and the Federal Assembly 
(parliament) in view of the ill-conceived and hasty privatisation of Far Eastern oil- 
extracting and oil-processing enterprises. Further, the association emphasised its 
intention to deal with threats to socio-economic security, brought on, they claim, by 
increases in crimes connected with natural resource thefts.54 However, rather than 
unite, the inter-territorial association has simply highlighted regional concerns to 
Moscow and resulted in regional fragmentation.
48Izvestiia, November 29, 1995. Quote taken from an interview with Khabarovsk's Governor Ishaev.
49EL-RFE, November 26-December 2, 1995, pp.2-3.
50Izvestiia, November 29, 1995.
51EL-RFE. April 16-23, 1995, p.3.
52Itar-Tass, April 14, 1995.
53RIA-Novosti, November 1, 1997.
54Itar-Tass, October 31, 1997.
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3.8 The Wild East -  Far Eastern Politics
The Far Eastern political situation has been turbulent. It is anti-Moscow in character. 
To a considerable extent Far Eastern politics is attributable to regional geography -  
within Russia and vis-a-vis North-East Asia. Despite a regional political association, 
Far Eastern territories fail to cooperate and generate effective autonomy. 
Understanding Far Eastern politics is best done through broad regional sub-divisions -  
the south (Khabarovsk, Primorye and Amur) is anti-Moscow and pro-nationalist. The 
north (Magadan and Kamchatka) is less anti-Moscow. Sakhalin and Sakha are special 
cases given their pro-Moscow and pro-reform natures, and their immense resource 
endowments and success in attracting foreign investment.55 However, this is a 
simplification; occasionally Magadan has been conservative while Khabarovsk has 
been moderate.
Far Eastern politics tend to be anti-Moscow, while being North-East Asia focused, 
autonomy driven and generally more Asian, rather than Soviet, Russian or European. 
During the 1990s, Moscow’s inability to guarantee basic socio-economic rights to 
regional populations, forced subnational authorities to expand their functions and 
powers. Polishchiuk said a model of ‘negotiated federalism’ has emerged in Russia, 
which results in ‘the relationships between central and regional authorities taking a 
cyclical shape’.56 In the Far East these cyclical relations have revealed themselves as a 
struggle between local authorities and the federal government over the conclusion of 
bilateral agreements demarcating powers and competence. These power-sharing 
agreements have normalised relations between individual federal subjects and the 
federal government.57 The provisions within the agreements are designed to meet the 
specific needs of that region. These agreements have supported a tactic of divide and 
rule; but in the Far East the notion of autonomy still finds currency. Despite the 
attempts by Moscow to defuse the situation, Far Eastern separatist tendencies remain
55This is probably due to Sakha’s republic status of a republic and, thus, it’s greater political and 
economic status vis-a-vis Moscow. Sakhalin has been successful in foreign investment attraction and 
has the status of a free economic zone -  presenting Russian economic reforms as successful.
56Polishchiuk, L., “Rossiskaiia Model ‘Peregovomogo Federalisma’” in Voprosv Ekonomiki, Vol.6, 
1998, pp.68-86.
57Hughes, James, “Moscow’s Bilateral Treaties Add to Confusion” in Transition. September 20, 1996, 
Vol.2, No. 19, pp.39-43.
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largely as a response to Moscow’s failure to deliver on its promises. Based on a 
number of regional research findings through secondary sources.
Two themes characterise Far Eastern politics -  tense relations with Moscow and 
growth of authoritarian executive power at the legislature’s expense. Both are also 
national trends.58 The first was due partly to lack of a strong sense of Russian 
statehood. Russia was more a collection of eighty-nine mini-fiefdoms than a cohesive 
state; the ability of Moscow to impose will over the federal units was uncertain. This 
was evident during 1992-1993 when many federal units did not transfer tax 
allocations.59 The second trend reflected El’tsin’s attempt to assert presidential rule 
over parliamentary rule. This resulted in the violent closing of the Russian parliament 
in October 1993. In the Far East, regional governors became increasingly powerful, as 
El’tsin closed Soviet councils and replaced them with less powerful dumas. Several 
regional soviets had previously managed to remove governors unfavourable to them -  
including Kuznetsov in Primor’e, Fedorov in Sakhalin and Krivchenko in Amur.60
The amount of taxes remitted to the federal budget caused considerable resentment in 
the Far East. This was exacerbated by advantages the twenty-one ethnic republics 
appeared to enjoy. Sakha, the only Far Eastern republic, did not have to remit taxes. It 
was able to develop a degree of self-financing due to its diamond wealth. The Far East 
sought concessions from Moscow in the form of subsidies and grants. Despite the 
rhetoric of integration with North-East Asia, the Far East was still highly dependent on 
external supplies. In addition, Moscow could not be relied upon to safeguard Far 
Eastern interests. After natural calamities in 1994, both Sakhalin and Primor’e looked 
internationally for help. This concerned Moscow as evidenced after the Northern 
Sakhalin earthquake (May 1995) when Moscow refused Japanese aid based on the fear 
that Tokyo was flexing its political influence.61
58Rossiiskie Vesti. December 25, 1993.
59Lapidus, Gail W. and Walker, Edward W., “Nationalism, Regionalism and Federalism -  Centre- 
Periphery Relations in Post-Communist Russia” in Lapidus, Gail (Ed.), The New Russia -  Troubled 
Transformation. Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, US, 1995, pp.79-114.
60Nezavisimaia Gazeta, April 7, 1994.
61Chugov, Sergei, “Russia and Japan -  Drifting in Opposite Directions” in Transition. Vol.2, No. 19, 
September 22, 1995, pp.12-16.
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The question of the division of powers between the Far East and Moscow contributed 
to regionalism where regional elites sought to gain greater powers at the expense of 
the centre. Far East regionalism has been closely linked with political activities of 
governors. Two examples of this are Fedorov (Sakhalin Governor, 1990-1993) and 
Nazdratenko (Primor’e Governor, 1993-2000). Both were able to exert political
f\0leverage over Moscow ensuring regional interests were considered. Fedorov, an 
Economics Professor from Moscow, gained national and international attention with 
his programme to establish capitalism on one island. The results were ambiguous. 
Detractors said the programme failed.63 But by 1993, more than 70% of firms were 
privatised which in turn were responsible for 93% of regional production.64 Fedorov 
also gained prominence as opposition leader to return the disputed islands to Japan. 
(With the view to seeking Japanese investment and establishing a new area of foreign 
policy Moscow appeared ready to transfer the islands.) Initially a democrat, Fedorov 
aligned himself with the patriotic-nationalist wing, demonstrating the fluidity of post- 
Soviet politics. Fedorov lobbied Moscow to retain the islands. His policy of seeking 
economic development on the islands aggravated Japan. Fedorov tried to abrogate 
federal powers to the regional level. He sought Japanese participation in the region, 
independent of Moscow. He proposed his fourth way -  a Foreign Economic Zone 
spanning the entire Kuril chain and Hokkaido.65
Fedorov's regionalism was successful. He managed to gain extra resources. In 
December 1992 El’tsin decreed the Kuril Islands a Special Economic Zone, giving 
Sakhalin control over the islands’ fishing resources. In August 1993 Moscow launched 
the federal programme for the socio-economic development of the Kuril Islands for 
1993-1995 and then to 2000. The programme’s long-term viability was uncertain. 
Moscow had pledged to pay an annual amount of lOObn roubles in subsidies to 
Sakhalin, but by September 1994 she had only received 5bn roubles.66 Fedorov also 
pressured Moscow in an attempt to gain control of the considerable oil and gas
62Wade, Richard, Regionalism and the Russian Federation, The Far Eastern Perspective -  Primorksii 
Krai and Sakhalin Oblast, Working Paper, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia, 1996.
63Moskovskie Novosti. August 9, 1992.
^ Kommersant, 24 February 1993
65Komsomorskaia Pravda, 23 October 1992.
66Several officials in Moscow favoured Nazdratenko's proposal to merge Sakhalin and Primorie in order 
to strengthen Russia's position in the area, and to reduce the amount of subsidies that Moscow had 
promised to pay.
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deposits located on the Sakhalin shelf. He was vocal about which level of government 
had rights to determine who would exploit deposits. In 1991, El’tsin granted control of 
the shelf to Sakhalin but retained control over oil and gas exports. Fedorov countered 
Moscow's attempt to control the tendering process by concluding his own 
arrangements with foreign firms. This contributed to El’tsin's decision not to support 
Fedorov when the regional Soviet sought his removal in early 1993. The consortium 
eventually chosen was not that preferred by Fedorov.
The most overt form of regionalism in the Far East has been in Primor’e under 
Nazdratenko. An authoritarian leader, he suppressed all opposition. He removed 
Vladivostok’s Mayor, Cherepkov, by force in February 1994.67 Nazdratenko also 
capitalised on Chinese resentment, introducing restrictions on their movements. 
Primor’e differed from other regions in the extent to which it was able to successfully 
demand greater economic assistance from Moscow. This regionalism was closely 
connected with safeguarding interests of the traditional political elite. These former 
senior communist party officials, directors of industrial enterprises and state
ZQ
agricultural concerns, and senior military personnel formed an organisation, PAKT. 
They smoothed the path to power for Nazdratenko. The latter ensured PAKT benefited 
from privatisation at the expense of outsiders. This regionalism also served Moscow’s 
interests. Although the exact nature of the links between Moscow and lower 
government levels are not fully clear, it is evident regionalism developed in Primor’e 
because many Moscow officials supported the presence of a hardline governor on 
Russia's periphery. Although the support Nazdratenko enjoyed was conditional, it 
ensured regionalism continued to develop with relative impunity.
Nazdratenko’s regionalist policies took several different forms, including demands for 
economic assistance (subsidies and soft credits), calls for creating a special economic 
regime, and for governors to be elected rather than be appointed by El’tsin. 
Nazdratenko first gained national attention through supporting the regional Soviet
67Cherepkov challenged various vested interests when he exposed offences in the distribution of 
Vladivostok's lands, operations with real estate and distribution of assets. Moscow's response was 
mixed. El’tsin approved the action, whereas a working group of deputies of the State Duma declared the 
dismissal illegal and recommended Moscow's intervention.
68Primor’e Joint Stock Corporation of Commodity Producers.
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declaration (July 1993) that the region’s status be raised to national republic.69 
Nazdratenko sought greater political and economic autonomy. His economic demands 
were most successful. Moscow regularly allocated new subsidies to the region, despite 
the problems it created for the federal budget. A distinguishing factor of such 
regionalism was that territorial interests were paramount over the Far East as a region. 
Primorie and Khabarovsk, for example, were not averse to seizing for their own use oil 
bound for Sakhalin. Nonetheless there were signs of a Far Eastern regional 
consciousness. The Far Eastern Republic, which existed as a buffer state between 
Soviet forces and Western interventionist powers (1920-1922) served as an attractive 
regionalist symbol. As the power of the Soviet state declined, the idea of an 
independent Far East proved attractive to many. Longer-term, however, the Far 
Eastern Republic proved to be a chimera. Elites were more intent on following their 
own interests than pursuing joint demands. A Far Eastern Regional Association of 
Economic Cooperation was established, but it did not have the influence of its 
prominent neighbour -  the Siberian Agreement.70 Its first director, Daniliuk, 
complained that the major problem arose when regions followed their own interests
71rather than joining forces. Nonetheless, there were signs of a common cause. In 
February 1995, deputies from Far East regional legislatures demanded Moscow 
improve their situation through regulation of fuel and energy tariffs, grant 
compensation for the costs of goods transportation, grant payments to military 
industries for state orders from 1994, and adopt a state rehabilitation programme.
Far Eastern politics must consider historical and contemporary developments as they 
have, do and will shape Russia. The post-Soviet project in Russia is ostensibly one of 
establishing democracy and a market economy. Both of these factors rest on private 
property and the rule of law, yet neither of these basic factors of modernity has deep 
roots in Russian culture. This means the development of such institutions is a long and 
difficult task, the success of which is not yet guaranteed. Absolutism characterised 
tsarism and communism, and is still present in post-Soviet Russia. The notion of a 
state in which law is supreme over both sovereign and subject is relatively new in 
Russia. Although representative institutions have existed in Russia since the
69RFE Update, August 1994.
70Hughes, J., “Regionalism in Russia -  The Rise and Fall of the Siberian Agreement” op. cit.
71RFE Update. March 1993.
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nineteenth century, their ability to act as a major restraint on absolute power has been 
circumscribed due to central control over the entire state. However, decentralisation 
has significantly complicated the foreign policymaking process. In the Soviet Union 
the constituent republics and regions had no part of play in policymaking processes 
and regional leaders were unlikely to question Moscow’s policy direction. In post- 
Soviet Russia Moscow has had to be sensitive to the interests of regions, particularly 
regions that border the international political economy -  like the Far East. It is these 
regions that are most likely to forge international ties.
3.9 The Internationalisation of Russia’s Regions -  The Example of the Far East
Kaiser stated there were three concepts of the internationalisation of subnational
79politics -  para-diplomacy, multi-layered diplomacy and multi-level governance. 
Para-diplomacy refers to the international relations of subnational actors. Such 
relations can be coordinated with and complement activities of the centre or be 
pursued in conflict or concurrence with traditional macro-diplomacy.73 Multi-layered 
diplomacy stresses the domestic dimension of diplomacy. The traditional distinction 
between domestic and foreign policy is also dismissed by the concept of intermestic 
affairs that refers to subnational actors who link international relations with domestic 
competencies.74 Multi-level governance argues for the interconnectedness of 
subnational, national and regional (regional within the international political economy 
as opposed to subnational) arenas as well as for highly complex decision-making
ne
procedures involving actors without exclusive authorities.
There can be little question the processes of systematic transformation (which includes 
the internationalisation of the economy and regionalisation in Russia) are taking place 
in an increasing globalised political economy. Globalisation poses a fundamental
72Kaiser, Robert, Subnational Governments as Actors in International Relations -  Federal Reforms and 
Regional Mobilisation in Germany and the United States, paper presented at the International 
Workshop on Regional Governance in the Age of Globalisation, Research Committee 17 of the 
International Political Science Association (IPSA) in collaboration with the Centre for Technology 
Assessment, Baden-Wurttemberg, Stuttgart, Germany, March 8-9, 2002.
73Michelmann, Hans J., and Soldatos, Panayotis (Ed.), Federalism and International Relations -  The 
Role of Subnational Units. Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK, 1990; and Keating, Michael, Plurinational 
Democracy -  Stateless Nations in a Post-Sovereignty Era. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 2001.
74Hocking, Brian, Localising Foreign Policy -  Non-Central Governments and Multilayered Diplomacy. 
MacMillan, London, UK, 1992.
75Kohler-Koch, Beate, and Eising, Rainer (Ed.), The Transformation of Governance in the European 
Union. Routledge, New York, US, 1999.
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challenge to governments who now find themselves unable to fend off speculative 
attacks of the global financial system and some cities and regions are finding their
nf\fortunes tied to the international political economy. Moscow has emerged as 
Russia’s node in the international political economy, but other cities and regions are 
also seeking a place in the hierarchy. In Russia the vertical relationship between the 
global and the local transects the relationship between centre and periphery. Regions 
are seeking to develop economic and political links with the international political 
economy to compensate for failings in the Russian federal system. Equally, regions are 
seeking to shape their own international relations with bordering states. At the same 
time, foreign assistance programmes and the investment strategies of MNCs are 
seeking to bypass the federal authorities in Moscow to deal directly with the 
governments in Russia’s regions.77
At the level of non-central governments there is recognition that local needs cannot be 
satisfied without greater involvement in the international political economy. This is 
particularly true when it comes to attracting foreign investment. Here, regions within 
states see themselves competing with one another to attract investment. By the same 
token, national governments may seek to divert some pressures by delegating their 
responsibilities. This may occur in specific functional areas. The combination of local 
domestic problems and broader international relationships can create significant 
problems for foreign policy managers. There are many issue-specific groupings, such 
as environmental organisations, whose strategies involve the internationalisation of the 
domestic and the domestication of the international. The rise of social activism at the 
local level is symptomatic of a new form of politics, which is bypassing legal and 
territorial definitions. In such a context, there are two ways in which Russia’s regions 
can interact with the international political economy. First, they can try to influence 
the decision-making process of the central state from within. Second, they can 
establish and develop their own networks of transitional contacts and start to develop 
their own foreign policy.
760 ’Brien, Richard, Global Financial Integration -  The End of Geography. Council on Foreign 
Relations Press, New York, US, 1992.
77Stoner-Weiss, Kathrin, Local Heroes -  The Political Economy of Russian Regional Governance. 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, US, 1997.
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The political decentralisation of Russia has significantly complicated the foreign 
policymaking process. In the Soviet system the constituent republics and regions had 
no part to play in policymaking and regional leaders were unlikely to question 
Moscow’s policy direction. Increasingly foreign policy formulation involves 
consultation with regional authorities. Governors are now invited to joint diplomatic 
visits as official members of the Russian delegation. For example, when former Prime 
Minster Primakov attended the APEC summit in Malaysia in December 1998 
Primor’e’s Governor Nazdratenko accompanied him. Similarly, Sakhalin’s Governor 
has been part of Russian delegations visiting Japan. Regional representatives are also 
gaining access to discussions between the federal government and international 
organisations. At the same time, such interventions are not always constructive. For 
example, Nazdratenko, was openly critical of the agreement reached between Moscow 
and Beijing to demarcate the Sino-Russian border in the Far East. The Foreign 
Ministry criticised some regions for bypassing Russian embassies in their dealings 
with foreign partners. Despite these positive developments, it is still the case necessary 
legal arrangements and procedures to enable the incorporation of regional interests in 
Russian foreign policymaking have yet to be created.
The development of a legal framework to coordinate the international activity of 
Russia’s regions is still in its infancy. Part of the reason for this lies in the lack of a 
coherent regional voice in Moscow that might coordinate with government ministries. 
The impact of regions upon Russia’s international relations takes many different 
forms, but most of them are informal and non-institutionalised. In many fields the 
regions share the same problems in their dealings with the federal government, but in 
many respects regions have divergent and even competing interests. For example, 
regional authorities lobby for foreign economic decisions, such as control over oil and 
gas quotas and taxes or revision to product sharing legislation. The struggle between 
regional elites over discontinuing the state’s diamond and gold export monopolies is 
also an example of issues with a strong regional dimension. An example of this in the 
Far East is Sakha. Sakha extracts 90% of Russian diamonds, its interests are 
marginalised with Moscow’s negotiations with DeBeers and the division of export 
revenues. In the aftermath of the August 1998 economic crisis, Sakha sought to restrict 
gold exports beyond its borders. Regions have also challenged the federal taxation of 
their export operations. For example, Khabarovsk Governor Ishaev challenged the
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imposition of federal export taxes on the grounds that they damage established links 
with the region’s foreign partners.
The second form of regional participation in international relations is through the 
creation of para-diplomacy with foreign partners, skirting the regulations of central 
authorities. On the one hand, these communications might take the rather benign shape 
of transborder cooperation between neighbouring territories, sister relations between 
cities and municipalities, cooperation between NGOs within the framework of 
people’s diplomacy or global micro-diplomacy concepts. On the other hand, regions 
might promote their own foreign policy independent of Moscow. The latter is 
potentially far more damaging to the centre, especially when regional policy 
contradicts and undermines central policy. For example, Sakha has a trade mission in 
Tokyo; Sakhalin has signed various agreements with Alaska and Hokkaido as well as 
having trade offices in Seattle.
The problem of regionalisation, the shifting of power from the centre to the regions, is 
one of Russia’s biggest challenges. Apart from national interests, the Russian state 
must now also consider the interests of subnational actors such as economic groups or 
economically influential regions of Russia. Russia’s internal stability and its 
performance in international relations will depend largely on the impact of interests 
pursued by important domestic actors -  including Russian regions. Globalisation and 
regionalisation describe the two most important trends that states are subject to. 
Politics is characterised on the one hand by accelerated socio-economic integration, on 
the other hand by an increasing demand for more autonomy and a greater voice in 
events subnationally or locally. Looking ahead, the two forces will probably 
permanently influence international trade, decentralisation or the development and 
determination of the function of regions.78
In many post-Soviet societies the state has yet to succeed in defining its post-Soviet 
role. After the revolutionary upheavals and the discrediting of old ideology the state 
forfeited its legitimacy as the unifying centre. Particularly in Russia, where the state 
traditionally held a dominant position in the economy, society and politics, change
78Sergounin, Alexander A., Russia’s Regionalisation -  The International Dimension. Working Paper 
No.20, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, Copenhagen, Denmark, 1997, pp. 11-16.
143
produced convulsions across all structures. In order to retain or regain the state’s 
dominant position, the state leaders of states of the post-Soviet area have been greatly 
tempted to look for new ideological justifications for preserving their power. In that 
respect nationalism in particular, which evokes strong emotions in those states, can be 
highly exploited politically by the state’s ambitions to retain its power.
Together with the internal prerequisites and the situation of the region in the federal 
union, the international political economy has become increasingly important for 
regional interests.79 External factors can be grouped according to the political 
(military-strategic factors, territorial disputes), the economic (proximity to economic 
zones and investment activity of foreign economic forces) and social factors (ethnic, 
religious and cultural). Thus, there are domestic and international aspects of a region’s 
position, policy, relations and prospects.
3.10 The Far East -  A Domestic and International Actor?
In foreign policy Russia rides two horses -  one is Russia as a unified federal state and 
the other constituent units of the federation. The former has a unitary temper, but the 
later, a federalist, has begun to assert itself. The two horses supplement each other 
when pulling in the same direction. But complications arise when they pull in 
opposing directions. The biggest stakeholder in foreign policy is the Russian 
Federation, which believes all authority of Russia’s foreign policy belongs to the 
federation and resides in Moscow. In its dealings with other states, Russia’s 
sovereignty is as indivisible as it would be if the state were unitary. Yet the second 
horse also roams, increasingly claiming a federated state has a stake in Russia’s 
international relations, especially with her neighbours.80
For a decade or so now, Russia’s regions have been active in the international political 
economy. The Far East’s promotion in North-East Asia is not unfamiliar. Indeed, its 
international relations are often tied to aspirations for independence, greater autonomy 
and integration into North-East Asia.81 Yet it is important to put these relations, and
79Nicholson, Martin, Towards a Russia of the Regions, Adelphi Paper No.330, International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, Oxford University Press, London, UK, 1999, p.64.
80Bradshaw, Michael J. (Ed.), The Russian Far East and Pacific Asia -  Unfulfilled Potential, op. cit„ 
pp. 182-277 (section on Bilateral External Relations).
lBlank, S., “The New Russia in the New Asia” in International Journal. No.49, pp.74-97.
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those of other regions, in a larger context. This multilateral governance need not be 
conflictual and can often be complementary and cooperative. Typically, foreign 
policy, particularly treaty making, is a central government task. More usually, federal 
government has unambiguous legal control over international relations. However, the 
world of federalism has evolved from an emphasis on divided jurisdictions, to one of 
shared jurisdiction in practice.
Increasingly, policymaking is an interdependent exercise. All governments are now 
involved and the trend is intensifying. In Russia there are three intersecting arenas of 
multilevel governance. The largest and most significant is foreign policy, conducted 
by federal government, with only the indirect involvement of the regions. This policy 
reflects the usual competitive mixture of regional, national, socio-economic and 
partisan considerations. A second arena, intersecting the first, is the direct international 
activities of the regions. Third is the arena of domestic intergovernmental relations 
between the federal government and regional governments. This often involves 
international issues. This third arena overlaps significantly with the first, and a little 
with the second. The third arena is the most familiar -  the day-to-day relationships 
between central, federal and regional governments.
Here international issues increasingly arise. There is no single agenda; issues arise 
across a variety of forums and sectors. There is little effort to coordinate all three 
arenas. Indeed, such an attempt would be counter-productive and just about 
impossible. The most formal of these relationships is in fields of exclusive provincial 
jurisdiction, such as education or labour relations. The federal government has no 
choice but to follow regions in terms of determining what Russia’s foreign policy will 
be. However the more common pattern is of an emerging shared responsibility for 
international matters, reflecting the effect of regional or international integration on 
domestic sovereignty.82 The second arena is the direct involvement of Russia’s regions 
in the international political economy. The main objective is to promote trade and 
investment. In the case of the Far East for the purposes of resource exploitation and 
utilisation. The resources deployed vary enormously because the ten territories and 
three levels of government (local, regional and federal) vary greatly in size and in
82Kaiser, Robert, op. cit..
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fiscal clout. The Far East has had the most consistent effort. It is the only one with a 
separate Ministry of International Political Economy and maintains over thirty offices 
abroad. The third arena is Russian foreign policy. Thus, the Far East is both a domestic 
and international actor. Indeed it has a role both within the Russia and the international 
political economy.
The Far East is a unique example of Moscow’s relations with regions. It reflects a 
peculiar set of circumstances, not least given its distance from the centre. However, 
some regard the problems in centre-periphery relations in Russia as being clearly 
exemplified in the Far East. For example, Sakha has continually negotiated its position 
vis-a-vis Moscow in regard to economic rights, the payment of taxes and revenue 
retention for the region’s natural resources -  namely diamonds. Meanwhile, Primor’e 
Governor Nazdratenko’s populist politics and rhetorical defiance of the government’s 
reform programme long provoked central authorities. However, although these maybe 
examples in the Far East that typify centre-periphery relations in Russia, the region’s 
distance from Moscow, its resource endowment, its history, its complementarity to and 
its focus upon North-East Asia differentiate it, especially in regard to its relations with 
Japan and its ability to act as an actor in the international political economy. Indeed, 
this can be better understood by undertaking primary research in the field to 
understand both aspects of the relationship -  Russian-Japanese relations and the Far 
East.
3.11 Russian-Japanese Relations -  Conclusions From the Field
Attempting to determine the Far East’s role in Russian-Japanese relations required the 
conduct of fieldwork. The aims of this fieldwork were to determine how decision­
makers viewed Russian-Japanese relations and the Far East -  both independently and 
as two parts of a relationship. Evidence of interaction at subnational levels clearly 
indicates that perceptions of bilateral relations differ from those at the national level, 
than those in the literature and than those in the popular press. Thus, one of the 
objectives of the fieldwork was to further investigate non-official relations. To this 
end, fieldwork was conducted in Russia, Japan and the US. The US was included due 
to its geopolitico-economic and strategic significance for both states and because many 
key academics specialising in both Russian-Japanese relations and the Far East are 
based there. Moreover, US-Japan ties -  strategically, politico-economically cannot be
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ignored. Indeed, half a century of Soviet-US ideological conflict was key in shaping 
perceptions, forming policy and developing decision-making processes for Russia and 
Japan, as well as the international political economy.
Analysis of Russian-Japanese relations at the national and subnational levels is 
insufficient. It is apparent from the literature that though different schools of thought 
exist on international relations generally and Russian-Japanese relations specifically 
the basis and decision-making factors, processes and actors differ at the national and 
subnational levels. Indeed, the impact of the changing international political economy 
needs to be considered. Were schools of thought on both sides a product of central 
government policy? Was geography key in determining difference of opinion? Were 
subnational actors regurjitators of central government policy? Was location correlated 
to marginalisation? How had the changing international political economy impacted 
Russian-Japanese relations?
Sixty interviews were conducted with officials, academics and businessmen (details on 
the interviewees are given in the bibliography by region). These were sources and 
analysts of policy, Russian-Japanese relations and the international political economy. 
The coverage of each source differed between locations due to accessibility, time and 
resources. From a location perspective it was insufficient to visit just the centres of 
political power. It was also necessary to interview individuals located in subnational 
regions of both states. Regions were where it was more apparent that efforts to initiate 
and/or improve bilateral relations were being made with the state retreating and local, 
regional and global forces energising non-state actors, these interviews were an avenue 
for confirming this. Indeed, it was primary evidence for determining the role of 
regions in a changing international political economy. All interviewees were 
extensively interviewed; each of them was asked the same set of questions. A 
succession of additional questions were asked to specifically gauge individual 
interviewee thoughts, as well as the motivation for and the sincerity of their responses. 
Occasionally interviewees steered discussions, often tactically to avoid responding to 
questions or to deviate from issues provoking emotional or expected responses. The 
results were mixed but based solely on the same set of questions asked of all 
interviewees. Responses expected from certain geographical locations were skewed by
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the fact individuals interviewed were based elsewhere. In some cases it was not 
location but institutional affiliation that determined responses.83
Ten questions in regard to Russian-Japanese relations were asked of all interviewees. 
These questions were essential for gauging how the changing international political 
economy has affected Russian-Japanese relations. How were Russian-Japanese 
relations being perceived beyond the Soviet Union’s collapse? Were pre-Soviet issues 
still alive after the Soviet Union’s death? The list of questions posed can be seen in 
Figure 3.4. A summary of the results can be seen in Figure 3.5. Detailed analysis 
follows thereafter.
Figure 3.4: The Changing International Political Economy and Russian-
Japanese Relations -  Fieldwork Questions
No. Question
1 How do you view Russian-Japanese relations?
2 Has the nature of Russian-Japanese relations changed since the Soviet Union’s collapse?
3 Is the territorial issue the main reason preventing progress in Russian-Japanese relations?
4 Are other issues important in Russian-Japanese relations?
5 Have new issues emerged in Russian-Japanese relations since the Soviet Union’s collapse?
6 Can Russian-Japanese relations progress without the territorial dispute’s resolution?
7 Do Moscow and Tokyo have the monopoly on Russian-Japanese relations?
8 Are Moscow and Tokyo necessary to good Russian-Japanese relations?
9 Are Russian-Japanese relations key to greater cooperation in North-East Asia?
10 Does the future look bright for Russian-Japanese relations?
The results of these questions are summarized in Figure 3.5.
83Sixty interviewees were carried out in eleven locations (Russia -  five in Moscow, one in Khabarovsk, 
nine in Vladivostok; Japan -  twenty-one in Tokyo, one in Kyoto, three in Niigata, three in Sapporo -  
six in Hawai’i, seven in Seattle, one in New York, one in Boston). A full list of interviewees and dates 
are detailed in the bibliography by location.
148
Figure 3.5: The Changing International Political Economy and Russian 
Japanese Relations -  Fieldwork Summary
□  M O ■  KH D V L  D T O  D K Y  H N I B S A  ■  HI D S E  D N Y  D B O
Notes: MO = Moscow; KH = Khabarovsk; VL = Vladivostok; TO = Tokyo; NI = Niigata; SA = 
Sapporo; HI = Hawai’i; SE = Seattle; NY = New York; BO = Boston; Numbers on X axis refer to 
question number as in Figure 3.6; +1 was assigned to positive responses; -1 was assigned to negative 
responses; +0.5 and -0 .5  was assigned to undeterminable responses. The disadvantages of using this 
numerical system are that where there are more positive responses than negative the negative responses 
are not identifiable they simply contribute to the positive number by reducing the total.
Summarising the results in Figure 3.5, there are two distinct observations -  where 
Tokyo responded negatively, the majority of the other interviewees responded 
positively; where there is consensus it is consensus across the board. However it 
should be noted the negative responses are skewed, as they are counted as a reduction 
of the overall responses. Tokyo was most negative on Russian-Japanese relations and 
the most sceptical as to whether the Soviet Union’s collapse has had any real impact 
on relations. Where as the majority of the rest of the respondents felt the territorial 
issue was not the main issue preventing progress in Russian-Japanese relations, Tokyo 
believed it was. Moreover, Tokyo felt no other issues were important in Russian- 
Japanese relations unlike the majority of the rest of the interview set. The majority 
agreed new issues had emerged since the Soviet Union’s collapse. Surprisingly, on 
whether Russian-Japanese relations could progress without the territorial dispute’s 
resolution the majority of negative answers appeared in Hawai’i. Tokyo overwhelming 
responded positively to the question as to whether Moscow and Tokyo are necessary 
to Russian-Japanese relations. In view of wider cooperation in North-East Asia and the 
future most responses were positive. Detailed interview results follow below.
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On the general question of Russian-Japanese relations, all Russians gave positive 
responses -  regardless of location. In Tokyo there were four positive responses -  three 
from the Japan Association for Trade with Russia and Central-Eastern Europe,84 and 
one at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation;85 (responses probably motivated by a need to 
justify their work.) Moreover, all these four positive respondents commented on the 
Far East’s role as a ground fo r  compromise -  recognition of how the changing 
international political economy had impacted Russian-Japanese relations in 
recognising non-state actors. The stance of the academic interviewed in Tokyo was 
unclear -  he was extremely negative on Russian-Japanese relations, continuously 
referring to the territorial dispute, but was positive on prospects for Russian-Japanese 
relations.86 Being an economics scholar he insinuated economics was now the lens 
through which relations would be viewed rather than politics. He emphasised the 
separation of politics and economics in the post-Soviet international political economy 
-  the defeat of realism by liberalism.
Once again, negative responses on whether the nature of Russian-Japanese relations 
had changed since the Soviet Union’s collapse were Japanese -  regardless of location. 
The Consul-General of Japan in Boston was surprisingly positive.87 Russian 
respondents believed the end of Soviet ideology was key to improving Russian- 
Japanese relations. Japanese responses were more negative. Though recognising the
Q Q
end o f the Soviet Empire, transition difficulties were emphasised.
Though the territorial dispute is the most prevalent issue in Russian-Japanese relations 
questions in regard to it produced the most surprising response sets -  notably in 
Tokyo. All subnational responses -  Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, Kyoto, Niigata and
84Ogawa, Kazuo (Director General), Hochi, Tadayuki (Research Development Department) and 
Yoshida, Shingo, all from the Institute for Russian and East European Studies (IREES), Japan 
Association for Trade with Russia and Central-Eastern Europe (ROTOBO), Tokyo, Japan, who were 
interviewed on January 13, and October 29, 1997.
85Lau, Sim Yee (Programme Officer) from the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Tokyo, Japan, who was 
interviewed on January 1,16 and October 29,1997.
86Mizobata, Satoshi (Associate Professor of Comparative Economics) from the Kyoto Institute of 
Economic Research (KIER), Kyoto University, Japan, who was interviewed on October 24, 1997.
87Kawato, Akio (Consul-General of Japan), Boston, Massachusetts, US, who was interviewed on July 
18, 1997.
88Yusa, Hiromi (Russia and Eastern Europe Section) from the Overseas Research Department at the 
Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO), Tokyo, Japan, who was interviewed on January 8 and 9, 
1997.
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Sapporo -  concluded the territorial issue was not preventing progress in Russian- 
Japanese relations. The territorial dispute was a peripheral issue; interviewees felt 
significant progress had been made in building bilateral ties. The notion of cooperation 
for mutual economic benefit overrode the stance of political stalemate; economics 
overrode politics. Regional responses insinuated central government policy was 
stagnant. Both Russian and Japanese responses in Tokyo focused on the territorial 
dispute as central to preventing progress in Russian-Japanese relations. For the Tokyo- 
based or Tokyo-visiting Russians,89 their location politicised their stance on the issue. 
It was geography not institutional affiliation that influenced attitudes and policy. With 
the exception of Tokyo, all interviewees recognised and validated how the changing 
international political economy had impacted Russian-Japanese relations -  an 
appreciation of subnational actors and the depreciation of the territorial issue in 
Russian-Japanese relations.
To the question as to whether other issues prevailed in Russian-Japanese relations, 
besides the territorial dispute, all Japanese interviewees gave an affirmative regardless 
of location. They emphasised the importance of the territorial issue. All Russian 
respondents spoke of assistance with transition, the need for de-militarisation of 
North-East Asia, formation of trade links and necessity of Japanese investment. 
Regional Russian respondents spoke of hope for Japanese assistance in their drive for 
independence from Moscow.90 For the Japanese politics emerged as the basis for 
future relations; for Russians the focus was on economics. It was clear the domestic 
situation on both sides was key to influencing responses. Following on, interviewees 
were asked whether new issues had emerged in Russian-Japanese relations since the 
Soviet Union’s collapse, all agreed. Only the Consul-General of Japan in Boston stated 
the sole issue that needed resolution was the disputed territories. It was clear the 
Soviet Union’s collapse realised a bubble of optimism for Russian-Japanese relations, 
but that this bubble required popping to release full potential.
89Kazakov, Igor (Deputy Trade Representative) from the Trade Representation of the Russian 
Federation in Japan, who was interviewed on January 21, 1997; and Minakir, Pavel (Director), Russian 
Academy of Sciences Far Eastern Branch Economic Research Institute (Khabarovsk, Russia), Tokyo, 
Japan who was interviewed on January 22, 1997.
90The most memorable advocate of this stance was Saprikin, Vladimir (Chairman) from the 
International Relations Committee, Municipality of Vladivostok City, Vladivostok, Russia, who was 
interviewed on December 12, 1996.
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On the issue of whether the territorial dispute was key to progress in Russian-Japanese 
relations, responses were mixed. The Japanese Attache in Vladivostok91 did not 
respond to this question. Meanwhile the two Japanese interviewees in Moscow92 and 
Consul-General of Japan in Boston were adamant the territorial issue had to be 
resolved prior to progress in Russian-Japanese relations. In Tokyo it was a 
combination of commercial and governmental organisations that believed resolution of 
the territorial dispute was not the basis for progress in Russian-Japanese relations. 
Indeed, it was a realisation on one hand of then separation of economics and politics. 
On the other, it was a denial changes in the international political economy had had 
any impact on decision-making and policy.
Taking the issue of Russian-Japanese relations back to their respective centres of 
political power, all interviewees were asked whether Moscow and Tokyo monopolised 
Russian-Japanese relations. It was striking to see the negativity of the majority of 
responses. This was clearly recognition of subnational relations between the two 
states. Only the Boston interviewee and the government organisations in Tokyo93 
discarded this idea. Staying with political centres, interviewees were asked whether 
Moscow and Tokyo were key to good relations. In all cases Tokyo was emphasised; 
Moscow was not regarded as critical. Many respondents on both sides highlighted the 
Far East emphasising linkages between Tokyo and Russia’s regions were key to good 
relations.
In view of the wider regional cooperation, prospects for Russian-Japanese relations 
leading to multilateral cooperation in North-East Asia were proposed. All round, with 
the exception of six parties in Tokyo and the Consul-General of Japan in Boston, the 
response was positive. Those who responded negatively seemed to believe bilateral
91Koji, Ishihara (Attache) from the Consulate-General of Japan at Vladivostok, Vladivostok, Russia, 
who was interviewed on December 4, 1996.
920kada, Kunio from the Institute for Russian and East European Studies (IREES), Japan Association 
for Trade with Russia and Central-Eastern Europe (ROTOBO) and Ohashi, Iwao (Chief 
Representative) from the Moscow Liaison Office, Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO), 
respectively interviewed November 16-17, 1998.
93Including Maejima, Akira (Division for Assistance to the Newly Independent States) from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, who was interviewed on October 17, 1997; Miyashita, 
Tadayuki [Newly Independent States (NIS) Division] from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, 
Japan, who was interviewed on January 17, 1997; and Tateyama, Akira (Senior Research Fellow) from 
the Centre for Russia Studies, The Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA), Tokyo, Japan, who 
was interviewed on October 15, 1997.
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reconciliation was necessary prior to multipolarity. Future prospects were the final 
question. As with the previous question the same respondents answered negatively, as 
did the two Japanese officials based in Moscow. The subnational regions of all states 
and the Russians, generally, appeared to be more positive on the prospects for 
Russian-Japanese relations than those in or representing Tokyo. The building of 
subnational relations has been key in diluting old conflicts and building ties outside a 
framework (Moscow and Tokyo) overshadowed by the territorial dispute.
Fieldwork provided an important insight into the thinking of key players in Russian- 
Japanese relations at all levels. As well as being striking it was a confirmation 
exercise. Confirmation of attitudes can only be made in person. From a US perspective 
all parties were positive and hopeful about Russian-Japanese relations. Most 
noticeable was the change as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The mere 
fact there was access to sixty individuals on all sides was evidence of this. It is 
probable responses given to questions posed would have differed prior to 1991. The 
broad conclusions from fieldwork can be seen in Figure 3.6. Coincidentally, all relate 
to distance from the political centre.
Figure 3.6: The Changing International Political Economy and Russian- 
Japanese Relations -  Broad Conclusions
First Parameter Factor Second Parameter Effect
1 Distance from political 
centre
Increases Attitudes to Russian-Japanese relations More positive
2 Distance from political 
centre
Increases Significance of territorial dispute Diminishes
3 Distance from political 
centre
Increases Prospects for Russian-Japanese relations More positive
4 Distance from political 
centre
Diminishes Russian-Japanese relations regarded 
important in North-East Asia cooperation
Increases
5 Distance from political 
centre
Increases / 
Diminishes
Moscow’s role in Russian-Japanese 
relations
Negative
It can be concluded from the fieldwork that location is key to determining attitudes to 
Russian-Japanese relations. Indeed, the changing international political economy has 
succeeded in changing attitudes, altering lenses through which centuries of conflict 
have been viewed, and in separating economics and politics with the view cooperation 
is mutually beneficial. There is clear evidence of the success of liberalism over realism
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as subnational regions have emerged as actors in the international political economy. 
Indeed, globalism has too succeeded.94
3.12 The Far East -  Conclusions From the Field
Interviewing individuals at all locations was key to understanding differing 
interpretations of the region -  Moscow, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, Tokyo, Kyoto, 
Niigata, Sapporo, Hawai’i, Seattle, New York and Boston. The literature on regions, 
centre-periphery relations, federalism and decentralisation continuingly emphasise 
conflict, treaties, agreements and political struggles. The Far East was different 
though. It presented an interesting case study of a region that was part of a state but 
simultaneously separate from it. Having been the focus of intense Soviet energies it 
now turned to those states against which it had previously projected an image of an all 
powerful empire. Simultaneously, as a region, it had Russia’s largest untapped 
resource base while being the most distant from Moscow. Moreover, its geography 
and history labelled it as a frontier; a gateway. What were the perceptions of this 
region? What was its role? Was it a frontier? A gateway? Another Russian region in 
decline? An international actor? A land bridge between Siberia and North-East Asia? 
In order to answer these questions it was necessary to assess what the region’s 
problems were perceived to be. Without understanding and clarifying these problems 
it was impossible to determine whether these problems were real. If they were how 
were they affecting perceptions and relations?
As with Russian-Japanese relations each interviewee was asked the same set of 
questions, as well as a number of additional questions to gauge their sentiments on 
various issues. The aim was to assess views on the Far East from different locations. 
Was geography going to be key in determining viewpoints on the Far East? What were 
the key issues affecting centre-periphery relations? What were considered to be the
94After the author’s fieldwork the building of subnational relations continued with Hashimoto’s July 
1997 Address to the Japan Association of Corporate Executives where he stated, when talking about 
Japan-Russian Federation Economic Issues: ‘...The ideas I would like to outline here consist of 
efforts... to promote development and foster cooperation, especially in the energy sector in Siberia and 
the Far East region’. Later than year in November, El’tsin and Hashimoto met in Krasnoiarsk and once 
again the Far East was focused upon: Exploit energy resources in the Far East and Convene in the Far 
East a meeting o f  the Intergovernmental Economic Commission’s Sub-Committee on Economic 
Relations between the Far East and Japan, and to strengthen ties between this sub-committee and  
business circles.
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greatest problems for the Far East? Below are the results of the key questions asked. 
The results will be presented first followed by an analysis of the findings.
Figure 3.7: W hat Role For the Far East? -  Fieldwork Conclusions
100 %
80%
60%
40%
2 0 %
0 %
Notes: MO = Moscow; KH=Khabarovsk; VL = Vladivostok; TO = Tokyo; KY = Kyoto; NI = Niigata; 
SA = Sapporo; HI = Hawai’i; SE = Seattle; NY = New York; BO = Boston; Frontier = Resource 
Frontier; Landbridge = Landbridge between Siberian resources and North-East Asia; Buffer Zone = 
Land of compromise between Russia and North-East Asia; Peripheral = Peripheral region unimportant 
to either Russia or North-East Asia; and Decline = Just another Russian region in decline. The 
disadvantages o f using this percentage system are that answers to the breakdown of results by location 
maybe swayed by the number of interviewees. For example, in Boston there was only one interviewee 
who accounts for 100% of the answer, whereas in Tokyo there was numerous interviews and only four 
results.
The first question was: “How do you view the Far East?” Frontier was the most 
popular response regardless of geographical location. Only in Vladivostok were all 
categories of response used. Negative responses -  periphery and decline -  came from 
the US Department of Commerce and the Consulate-General of Japan, respectively. In 
the case of the US Department of Commerce the response was based on the region’s 
difficulty in obtaining foreign investment.95 In the case of the Consulate-General of 
Japan the region was considered to be in decline for a number of reasons, including 
difficulty in attracting foreign investment (territorial and regional political conflicts),
95 Author’s interview with Kapelush, Tatyana, Commercial Assistant, United States Department o f 
Commerce, Vladivostok, Russia, December 9, 1996.
M O  K H  V L  T O  K Y  N I  SA H I SE N Y  B O
□  G a t e w a y  ■ F r o n t i e r  D L a n d b r i d g e
□  B u f f e r  Z o n e  ■ P e r i p h e r a l  □ D e c l i n e
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Moscow’s unwillingness to promote and assist the region, high crime rates and heavy 
bureaucracy in the Far East, as well as the region’s distance from Moscow.96
In Vladivostok (as stated above), Moscow, Kyoto and Boston was the Far East 
considered to be in decline. In each case it was Japanese respondents who reached 
these conclusions.97 Each of the respondents pointed to the same issues the Consulate- 
General of Japan (Vladivostok) highlighted. But all respondents also mentioned the 
territorial issue. Non-resolution o f the territorial dispute was key to the Far East’s 
unattractiveness fo r  Japan. Each of the respondents commented that in Moscow’s 
absence in terms of assisting in the region’s development only Japan was able to take 
on this role. Moreover, this role could only be fulfilled if the territorial issue was 
resolved. Thus, the trigger to releasing the Far East’s economic potential was 
dependent upon resolution of political issues. No mention was made, however, of 
other potential partners who could take on such a role individually or collectively, 
such as South Korea, China, the US or Canada.
The rest of the respondents saw either a gateway, frontier, landbridge or buffer zone 
role for the Far East. The region’s economic potential and unique geographical 
position were emphasised by all respondents. The Far East was a resource base that 
could link Russia with North-East Asia, whose economic complementary nature could 
be exploited, and whose unique history and position could be a focus for political 
compromise between Russia and North-East Asia, especially Japan. Geography had 
not really been key in affecting judgements of the Far East. All in all, all interviewees 
were aware of the Far East’s potential as well as its problems. Political persuasion and 
institutional affiliation is key in affecting attitudes.
Having concluded geography was not key to determining perceptions of the Far East, 
the rest of the fieldwork on the Far East was done on an issue by-issue basis rather 
than a geographical basis. When each of the sixty interviewees was asked what they
96Author’s interview with Koji, Ishihara, Attache, Consulate-General of Japan at Vladivostok, 
Vladivostok, Russia, December 4, 1996.
97Author’s interviews with Okada, Kunio, Institute for Russian and East European Studies (IREES), 
Japan Association for Trade with Russia and Central-Eastern Europe (ROTOBO), Moscow, Russia, 
November 16, 1998; Mizobata, Satoshi, Associate Professor of Comparative Economics, Kyoto 
Institute of Economic Research (KIER), Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan, October 24, 1997; and 
Kawato, Akio, Consul-General of Japan, Boston, Massachusetts, US, July 18, 1997.
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considered to be the biggest problem in centre-periphery relations (Moscow and the 
Far East), economics topped the list accounting for 45% of responses. Politics was 
second (25%), then legal issues (18%) and finally by an array of miscellaneous issues 
collectively identified under the label other (12%).
Under the label economic, the issues highlighted were: a lack of federal support, high 
inflation, unstable and unconvertible currency, and lazy and technology unfamiliar 
labour. All these problems needed resolving but it was really political and legal 
infrastructures that are the basis for resolving these issues. Indeed, it is the political 
and legal issues that tolled 42% of responses. As has always been the case in Russia, 
politics has complicated the uncomplicated, blurred the clear-cut and politicised the 
non-politicisable. Indeed, in the Far East, politics has added vigour to the region’s 
distance from Moscow, its resources, ethnic minorities, geographical location and 
proximity to North-East Asia, especially Japan. Given the Russian political system, 
central politics are key to affecting local and regional politics. At the legal level, 
confusion arises over which set of laws has seniority. At the federal, regional and local 
levels, interpretations conflict while infrastructures remain to be built, while others 
need moulding and other dismantling.
Many interviewees commented on how politics was necessary to resolve economic 
and legal problems. Politics was dominated by power struggles rather than resolution
Q O
o f key issues essential to transition. Indeed, the Soviet Union’s dissolution has 
resulted in power struggles and diverted attention away from issues key to transition. 
In the Far East this was exacerbated by the region’s isolation and position vis-a-vis 
North-East Asia and its resources. This has resulted in the creation o f local laws and 
the regional interpretation o f national laws?9 However what about other issues? 
Crime, bureaucracy and psychological uncertainty were also mentioned as other 
factors in centre-periphery relations. Indeed, these were issues that emerged
"Author’s interview with Maejima, Akira, Division for Assistance to the Newly Independent States, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, October 17, 1997.
"Author’s interview with Nakagawara, Sunsuke, Manager, Overseas Coordination and Administration 
Department, Corporate Planning Division, Mitsui and Company Limited, Tokyo, Japan, October 30, 
1997
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principally from the Soviet Union’s collapse.100 While there was previously a strong 
authoritative bureaucracy, in the new Russia external (and internal) parties are unsure 
with what, whom and how to interact. The Soviet regime had a systematic 
infrastructure of bureaucracy with clear rules and procedures. Crime was virtually 
non-existent and there was psychological fear rather than psychological uncertainty. 
Given all these issues in centre-periphery relations, the next obvious question was how 
the Far East could improve its position vis-a-vis Moscow?
Having looked at varying geographical perspectives of the Far East and the key issues 
in centre-periphery relations (Moscow-Far East), all interviewees concluded by giving 
their thoughts on how the Far East could better improve its position vis-a-vis Moscow. 
Of the responses given, deeper international ties was the most popular conclusion 
accounting for 54% of answers. All of these interviewees talked of the Far East’s need 
to develop international ties with North-East Asia, primarily with Japan. Some 
mentioned resolution of the territorial dispute was necessary for this to happen.101 It 
was clear from the responses the Far East was low on Moscow’s agenda. Considering 
this, many commented that the region’s peripheral location as well as the distance and 
resources, should be exploited to push for greater autonomy and closer ties with 
North-East Asia, especially Japan.102 Other responses given, in descending order, were 
investment, structural and autonomy. As with the need to pursue closer international 
ties, these responses highlighted the region’s need to separate itself from Moscow, 
pursue policies and strategies that attract foreign investment, create and implement 
economic, political and legal infrastructures, as well as push for autonomy. All the 
interviewees considered Moscow an obstacle to improved relations, although not all of 
them stated so explicitly.
100Specific issues mentioned in the author’s interviews with Nakamura, Motoya, Russia and Eastern 
Europe Section, Overseas Research Department, Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO), Tokyo, 
Japan, October 17, 1997; Ninomiya, Koichi, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Middle 
East Team, Development and Coordination Department, Mitsubishi Corporation, Tokyo, Japan, October 
31, 1997; and Minagawa, Shugo, Professor in Comparative Politics, Slavic Research Centre, Hokkaido 
University, Sapporo, Hokkaido, Japan, October 20, 1997.
101 Author’s interviews with Tateyama, Akira, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Russian Studies, The 
Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA), Tokyo, Japan, October 15, 1997; Yoshida, Shingo, 
Institute for Russian and East European Studies (IREES), Japan Association for Trade with Russia and 
Central-Eastern Europe (ROTOBO), Tokyo, Japan, January 13, 1997 and October 29, 1997; and Yusa, 
Hiromi, Russia and Eastern Europe Section, Overseas Research Department, Japan External Trade 
Organisation (JETRO), Tokyo, Japan, January 8, 1997 and January 9, 1997.
102Author’s interview with Minakir, Pavel, Director, Russian Academy of Sciences Far Eastern Branch 
Economic Research Institute (Khabarovsk, Russia), Tokyo, Japan, January 22, 1997.
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These fieldwork results confirmed many of the conclusions in the centre-periphery 
literature and exemplified that the Far East, despite its differences to other regions, is a 
classic example of centre-periphery relations in Russia. However, many of these 
conclusions were, as in the literature, of a socio-political and socio-economic nature. 
The issues highlighted in the anti-resource thesis had hardly been considered. 
Furthermore, while it was important socio-political and socio-economic issues were 
resolved prior to geo-environmental issues, it was essential not to discount the latter. 
Hence, an awareness of the socio-political and socio-economic issues of the Far East 
highlights the problems that need resolving in order to realise the region’s full 
potential. However, the additional problems as highlighted in the anti-resource thesis 
also need to be considered as these are really the underlying problems. Essentially, 
there is a need to politicise the issues highlighted in the anti-resource thesis.
3.13 The Far East, A Changing Region -  A Summary
This chapter has focused on the changing role of the Far East using concepts, 
contemporary phenomenon and fieldwork (including Russian-Japanese relations in the 
case of the later). Since the Soviet Union’s collapse Russia has undergone a turbulent 
transition that has affected it as a state, a collapsed empire and a dynamic geographical 
region. Subsequently, post-Soviet Russia’s constituent regions have been subject to the 
same changes. However the changes that have affected the Far East are more 
substantial than those to hit most regions due to its Soviet role, geographical location, 
resource endowment and historical ambience. However, as the Soviet Union collapsed 
the international political economy underwent significant changes and regions elevated 
from domestic to international actors. This was a result of changes within the 
international political economy and as a result of changes within the state.
The Soviet Union’s collapse and subsequent liberalisation of the Far East brought 
great expectations of the region’s prospects, role and position within the Russian 
Federation and North-East Asia. Soviet central planning forced the Far East to send 
much of her wealth to European Russia for processing while she relied on imports. 
However transition problems and economic reliance on Moscow mean the Far East 
has had difficulties integrating into the Russian and international economies. Taking 
on Gorbachev’s gestures, El’tsin pushed for Russia to become an Asia/Pacific power.
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Aware of Soviet stagnation, Gorbachev implemented socio-politico-economic reforms 
that penetrated the entire communist bloc and subsequently in its collapse. His reforms 
had regional specific policies; one such region was the Far East. A former centralised 
state began dealing with regionalism for the first time. In the Far East this was 
exacerbated by the fact the region was the focus of intense energies. As relative levels 
of centralisation and decentralisation have important effects on state control, the scope 
and effectiveness of central and regional control are important considerations. 
Secondly, socio-politico-economic sovereignty could no longer be ignored. Was 
Moscow still responsible for protecting ethnic communities and managing transition? 
Finally, Russia’s regions were forging international links; they were new actors 
domestically and internationally. In most instances challenges to the centre or 
decentralisation are driven not by ethnicity but by specific politico-economic interests. 
To those advocating a less centralised Russia federalism this means divided or dual 
sovereignty shared by regions and Moscow. For those advocating a more centralised 
Russia, sovereignty cannot be divided; federalism means the centre must be supreme.
Russian regions have been active in the international political economy, signing 
treaties with companies and states.103 Whether regions have the authority to conduct 
foreign policy is important to the type of federalism Russia is constructing. 
Communism’s collapse saw declarations of sovereignty by both Soviet republics and 
Russian regions. The Far East exemplifies issues central to the plight of other regions 
while being unique. Historically, resources and geographical proximity to North-East 
Asia, especially Japan, have determined for the Far East roles of gateway, frontier and 
power projection. Under communism the Far East was a Soviet fuel line projecting 
politico-military power at the edge of North-East Asia. Problems highlighted in the 
anti-resource thesis were overcome through Soviet capital investment. The region had 
numerous territorial-industrial complexes based around resources the state supported 
through federal transfers, and labour and settlement programmes.
Many post-communist Far Eastern economic problems are the direct result of the 
region’s Soviet role. The centrally planned economy gave the Far East the role of 
resource periphery. Far Eastern politics have been turbulent. The region is anti-
103Melvin, Neil J., Regional Foreign Policies in the Russian Federation. Post-Soviet Business Forum 
(PSBF), Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA), Chatham House, London, UK, 1995.
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Moscow in character. To a considerable extent Far Eastern politics is attributable to 
regional geography -  within Russia and vis-a-vis North-East Asia and Japan. Two 
themes characterise Far Eastern politics -  tense relations with Moscow and growth of 
authoritarian executive power at the legislature’s expense. The question of the division 
of powers between the Far East and Moscow contributed to regionalism where 
regional elites sought to gain greater power at the expense of the centre. Far Eastern 
politics must consider historical and contemporary developments that have shaped and 
do shape Russia. In the Soviet Union constituent republics and regions had no part to 
play in policymaking processes and regional leaders were unlikely to question 
Moscow’s policy direction. In post-Soviet Russia Moscow has to be sensitive to the 
interests of regions, particularly regions bordering the international political economy 
-  like the Far East. It is these regions that are most likely to forge international ties.
Russian foreign policy has two dimensions -  one is the unified state and the other 
constituent federal units. The former has a unitary temper, but the other, a federalist, 
has begun to assert itself. The two horses supplement each other when pulling in the 
same direction. For a decade or so, Russia’s regions have been active in the 
international political economy. The Far East’s promotion in North-East Asia is not 
unfamiliar. Indeed, its international relations are often tied to aspirations for 
independence, greater autonomy and integration into North-East Asia. Yet it is 
important to put these relations, and those of other regions, in a larger context. This 
multilateral governance need not be conflictual and can often be complementary and 
cooperative. Increasingly, policymaking is an interdependent exercise. All 
governments are now involved and the trend is intensifying. In Russia there are three 
intersecting arenas of governance -  federal, subnational and intergovernmental 
(federal-regional). Previously the federal monopolised all relations. Today subnational 
and intergovernmental drive to increase their roles. Indeed, the role of regions in the 
international political economy, as exemplified by the Far East in Russian-Japanese 
relations, is the central theme of this work, and in the final chapter some conclusions 
on these roles will be made.
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Chapter Four: 
Conclusions: 
Russian-Japanese Relations 
-  What Role for the Far East?
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4.0 The Concept of Roles in the International Political Economy
According to Holsti all actors in the international political economy exhibit one of 
three traditional orientations.1 These orientations reflect the system’s structure, 
perceptions of threat, level of involvement, radical-conservative attitudes, and so on. 
Many actors in the contemporary system, although proclaiming or displaying an 
interest in the system, do not see themselves as playing distinct roles in the 
international political economy. Conceptions of roles are considered to define the 
general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to the status of 
actors, and the functions they should perform in a variety of geographic and issue 
settings.
The idea of roles has traditionally been considered in the context of states being the 
actors in the international political economy -  whether individually, collectively, 
regionally or supranationally. These national roles have been closely related to 
orientations. Roles, too, reflect predispositions, fears and attitudes towards the 
international political economy, as well as systematic, geographic and economic 
variables. However, these are more specific than orientations because they suggest or 
lead to more discrete acts. While the majority of the literature on such roles has 
focused around states, today non-state actors are of increasing importance and 
influence and, thus, their roles also need considering. Indeed, non-state actors have 
increasingly become sources of foreign policy and now play a part in the international 
political economy.
Holsti conducted a study about international roles and their conceptions based on the 
content of speeches by high profile policymakers in 71 states during 1965-1967. He 
revealed there were at least sixteen types of roles that were components of foreign 
policies of states. The conclusions of his study can be seen in Figure 4.1 in order of 
the level of activity implied by the conceptions of role. Those at the top generally 
reflect high involvement, usually of an active, radical and strong character; those at the
h olsti, K.J., International Politics -  A Framework for Analysis. Fifth Edition, Prentice-Hall 
International, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, US, 1988, pp.110-115.
2Holsti, K.J., “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy” in International Studies 
Quarterly. No. 14, 1970, pp.233-309.
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bottom refer to states whose orientations tend to reflect non-involvement, few foreign 
policy actions, conservatism, passiveness and weakness.
Figure 4.1: Types and Conceptions of Roles
Type and Conception of Role Details
Bastion of the Revolution, Liberator Duty to organise/lead revolutions abroad; liberate others
Regional Leader Duties government perceives for itself in relation to states in a
region with which it identifies
Regional Protector Special responsibilities on a regional or issue area placing 
emphasis on providing protection for adjacent regions
Active Independent Supporting non-alignment as affirmation of independent 
foreign policy; involvement through diplomacy
Liberation Supporter Sympathisers not liberators; no formal responsibilities
Anti-imperialist Agent Agents against imperialism
Defender of the Faith Where foreign policy defends certain values
Mediator-Integrator Capable of fulfilling or undertaking special mediation tasks to 
reconcile other (groups of) states; they are fixers
Regional-Subsystem Collaborator Commitment to cooperative efforts with other state to build 
communities, coalesce, cooperation and integrate
Developer Special duty or obligation to assist developing states
Bridge Vague and stimulates no action; unique geographic location or 
multiethnic culture positioning a state in a unique position to 
create understanding amongst others
Faithful Ally Policymakers declare themselves supporters of fraternal allies;
not concerned in receiving aid; committed to aid
Independent Pursuit best interests; do not imply any particular tasks or 
functions in the international political economy
Example Emphasises importance of promoting prestige and gaining 
influence in the international political economy by pursuing
certain domestic policies
Internal Development Government efforts directed towards problems of internal 
development; suggests desire for non-involvement in 
international political economy
Other Role Conceptions Balancer; anti-revisionist agents; anti-Communist role
Source: Holsti, K.J., International Politics -  A Framework for Analysis, Fifth Edition, Prentice-Hall 
International Editions, Prentice Hall -  A Division of Simon & Schuester, Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey, US, pp. 111-114.
The first conclusion about national role conceptions and foreign policy is that most 
governments, and especially those that have a reasonably high level of involvement in 
the international political economy, see themselves as performing several roles, in 
different sets of relations, simultaneously. In his sample of 71 states, Holsti found the 
average number of national roles per state referred to in speeches, press conferences 
and the like, for the two-year period, was 4.6. Some of the most active states -  like 
Egypt, the US, China and the Soviet Union -  saw themselves as playing seven or eight 
national roles in various international contexts. Smaller and less involved states, such 
as Sri Lanka and Burma, Niger or Portugal, had only one role conception. Most small 
states would have none. The study concludes there is a positive correlation between
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the activeness of a state and the numbers of role conceptions it develops. If this is true, 
then expectations of national role conceptions accurately reflect different sets of 
relations in which a state is involved. However states no longer monopolise the 
international political economy and there are different sets of relations in which state 
and non-state actors are both involved. This is the result of the changing international 
political economy. Yet the relevance of role conceptions is appropriate and essential 
for background to determining the role of regions within the international political 
economy and specifically the role of the Far East in Russian-Japanese relations.
4.1 Russian-Japanese Relations -  A Changing Framework
Both Russia and Japan, like other powers, have faced domestic upheavals that have 
changed how they view and interact in the international political economy -  
emphasising how the domestic affects the international. Each state has its own 
international political economy -  how it views the world, its role in the system, its 
enemies, its allies, its prospects for cooperation and development, and so on. 
Unsurprisingly then, the Russian-Japanese bilateral framework has changed both as a 
result of these domestic changes, as well as changes in the international political 
economy framework. As with all states, Russia and Japan have both impacted and 
been impacted by the international political economy. Indeed, what is domestic and 
what is international are increasingly blurred. This blurring has come from changes in 
the international political economy -  emerging new actors, the demise of other actors, 
the location of politics, policymaking decisions, the relevance of sovereignty, 
federalism and globalisation. Russia and Japan both have their own international 
political economies -  their socio-politico-economic and strategic realities, geography 
and cultures that influenced lenses through which they saw other international actors, 
interacted with them, and essentially determined policymaking. This was the domestic 
aspect of international realities.
As with all disciplines, international political economy has theoretical schools of 
thought. Like with all theory, it captures some of the contemporary, some of the 
historical as well as being central to critical analysis. Theorising international political 
economy has captured the contemporary since 1945 -  realism and bipolarity; 
liberalism and international institutions, the separation of politics and economics and 
multipolarity; globalism and new international actors, the spread of capitalism,
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international disorder and further economic development divisions. Coincidentally all 
of these schools of thought capture certain aspects of Russian-Japanese relations -  
historically and contemporarily -  too. However, neither of them monopolises the 
framework and neither is fully able to account for regions, like the Far East, as 
international actors.
4.2 The Far East -  An International Actor
During the Cold War, political ideology was key in determining economic relations. 
There existed two or more international blocs with different political and economic 
systems. To talk of regions was to talk of either regions within states or groups of 
states, not as international actors. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the onset 
of the processes of globalisation, there has been a rise in the interconnectedness of 
politics and economics as there has, indeed, been a growth in non-state entities 
international actors. The Far East’s history proves regions were international actors 
long before the onset of the Soviet Union’s collapse and globalisation.
The Far East was historically an international actor -  both prior to its incorporation 
into the Russian Empire and since. The region was a crossroads for traders in North- 
East Asia, a gateway for Eurasia vis-a-vis North-East Asia, a buffer between the 
Russian Empire and North-East Asia and a conference centre, during the Cold War, 
between the Soviet Union and Japan/US. The history of the Far East is the 
development of an international political economy based on interaction with 
neighbouring states. The region received an impetus through Russian colonial 
expansion and later through the Soviet developmental model. The history of the Far 
East is very much that of a region with a developmental legacy of colonisation. 
Indeed, it is one of a political economy formed in the context of international 
relations.
The Soviet Union’s collapse and subsequent liberalisation of the Far East rekindled 
hopes of prosperity with an international perspective. Soviet industrial planning forced 
the Far East to send much of her wealth to European Russia for processing while she 
relied on imports. Communist Moscow’s focus on the Far East was based around 
resource extraction and security. Today her relationship with the region is, to say the 
least, uncertain. The latter’s location suggests a future orientated towards North-East
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Asia. Taking on Gorbachev’s gestures El’tsin pushed for Russia to become an 
Asia/Pacific power. Part of this process involved redirecting the Far East’s role. 
Gorbachev’s reforms had specific regional policies that put emphasis on certain 
Russian regions -  one such region was the Far East. The Soviet leader’s intentions for 
the Far East revolved around linking the region to North-East Asia, the Pacific and 
beyond, but most critically in Japan. But fast approaching Gorbachev’s step-by-step 
reforms were high-speed changes that destroyed the Soviet Union. Communism’s 
dissolution resulted in the loss of state control, faith in government and legitimacy. 
Furthermore, because relative levels of centralisation and decentralisation have 
important effects on state control, the scope and effectiveness of central and regional 
control are important considerations. Socio-politico-economic sovereignty could no 
longer be ignored. Russia’s regions were forging links internationally; they were new 
actors in the domestic political framework and the international political economy.
The Far East exemplifies issues central to the plight of other regions while being 
unique. Historically, resources and geographical proximity to North-East Asia have 
determined for the Far East roles of gateway, frontier and power projection. The Far 
East’s geography had always politicised the region but for a time these politics were 
the monopoly of Moscow. The Soviet Union’s collapse, globalisation, the Cold War’s 
end and transition all meant the Far East was once again politicised -  domestically and 
internationally. Not only was the region’s distance from Moscow determining 
relations with the centre, it was also determining relations with North-East Asia, 
especially Japan.
The Far East and Trans-Baikal Association for Economic Cooperation attempted to 
forge trade development and economic links with North-East Asia, especially Japan. A 
string of committees, commissions and working groups have been and continue to be 
established within the association framework to facilitate strengthening ties between 
Far Eastern territories and North-East Asia. During the life of the Soviet system the 
constituent republics and regions had no part to play in policymaking and regional 
leaders were unlikely to question Moscow’s policy direction. Increasingly foreign 
policy formulation involves consultation with regional authorities. For example, Far 
Eastern governors are now invited to joint diplomatic visits as official members of the 
Russian delegation. Regions are also able to participate in the international political
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economy as actors through the creation of their own para-diplomatic contacts with 
foreign partners, skirting the regulations of central authorities. On the one hand, these 
communications take the form of transborder cooperation between neighbouring 
territories, sister relations between cities and municipalities, and cooperation between 
NGOs. On the other hand regions promote independent foreign policy.
For a decade or so, Russia’s regions have been active in the international political 
economy. The Far East’s promotion in North-East Asia is not unfamiliar. Indeed, its 
international relations are often tied to aspirations for independence, greater autonomy 
and integration into North-East Asia. Yet it is important to put these relations, and 
those of other regions, in a larger context. This multipolarity need not be conflictual 
and can often be complementary and cooperative. Typically, foreign policy, 
particularly treaty making, is a central government task. More usually, federal 
government has unambiguous legal control over international relations. However as 
the state and the international political economy change so do dynamics, structures, 
procedures, sources, policies, but most of all it is the predictability of relations that 
changes. What was once static becomes dynamic.
4.3 Theorising a Changing Framework for Relations
Static frameworks are easy to theorise about. Theorising change is more difficult. Yet 
it is necessary to consider existing frameworks before theorising change. Political 
scientists are concerned with relationships amongst all actors (state and non-state, 
international and domestic) to the extent they contribute to the understanding of 
political phenomena. International relations, like all politics, represent the 
reconciliation of perspectives, goals and interests -  the decision between cooperation 
and conflict. Conflict and cooperation both attend international relations. Scholars 
argue over which one predominates, which constitutes the norm and from which 
deviations must be explained. Realists see conflict as the hallmark of international 
relations and hold cooperation to be rare, insignificant and temporary. Liberals believe 
international relations resemble other political systems in the development of norms, 
rules and a generally cooperative ambience. To them, conflict appears unusual. 
Scholars of both persuasions concentrate on developing presumptions and relating 
these to patterns of cooperation or conflict. Ironically, neither school focuses on 
explaining departures from expected patterns. Both schools emphasis what they
168
perceive to be the norm. Most basically, states choose between cooperation and 
conflict, and such decisions underlie the entire spectrum of international relations from 
alliances to war. When, how and why they choose between them, and with what 
consequences, constitute the primary foci of the study of international relations.
It is not surprising international relations scholars concentrate on the extremes of 
conflict and cooperation. These extremes have the greatest impact upon international 
relations. Both are the final states of a process and both fail to agree on who the 
dominant actors in the international political economy are and where the basis for 
relations lies. The natural-fit thesis argues the complementary nature of two economies 
is the basis for developing economic cooperation in the form of mutually beneficial 
trade links and, subsequently, improved political relations. The notion uses economics 
as a basis for resolving political (and other) problems, given that it tries to forge 
natural links between the two states as some factors facilitate trade while others hinder 
it. Politics can facilitate and hinder. Economics encourages political change by being a 
basis for the ending of conflict and the birth of cooperation. This change is measured 
in trade. This idea has historically been applied to states but actors and space in 
international relations are no longer the monopoly of states.
States continue to function as the central political actors while maintaining the 
structures that have evolved through history. Globalising and localising dynamics are 
sufficiently powerful to encourage supranational, transnational or subnational 
communities hoping to serve their needs and wants better than the states of which they 
are a part. Such communities may or may not replace states. They may or may not 
acquire concrete, discernible form. However, the dynamics presently at work in the 
international political economy can make these nascent communities formidable 
contenders as engines for change, redesigners of boundaries, sources of power and/or 
policy. With technological advances, the processes of globalisation and localisation, 
and the emergence of international institutions, MNCs, NGOs and other similar non­
governmental phenomenon, the issue of what level analysis should concentrate on in 
international relations has been raised. Should the focus be on actions and attitudes of 
individual policymakers? Is it assumed all policymakers act similarly when confronted 
with similar situations and, therefore, the focus should be on the behaviour of states?
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Each level of analysis leads to different conclusions, so it is essential to be aware of 
the distinctions between them and, indeed, to include them all.
If international relations are examined from the perspective of states, rather than from 
the system in which they exist, quite different questions arise. State behaviour can be 
explained by reference not just to the system but also to domestic conditions affecting 
policymaking. Wars, alliances, imperialism, diplomacy, isolation and other goals of 
diplomatic action can be viewed as the result of domestic political pressures, national 
ideologies, public opinion or socio-economic needs. This level of analysis has much to 
commend it as governments do not react just to the international political economy. 
Their actions also express needs and values of their population and political leaders. 
This is the usual approach of diplomatic historians based on the sound premise that 
what is notionally considered to be state behaviour is really policymakers defining 
purposes. This level of analysis focuses on ideologies, motivations, ideals, 
perceptions, values or idiosyncrasies of those empowered to make decisions.
The main characteristics of the international political economy are no less important 
than those of the state’s domestic considerations. Therefore, all levels of analysis need 
to be employed at different times, depending upon the type and nature of the issue at 
hand. The perspectives of the international political economy are very broad and not 
totally comprehensive. Which provides the best approach for delineating the main 
features and characteristics of international political processes over a relatively long 
period of time? Today, the structure of alliances, power, domination, dependence and 
interdependence set limits upon the actions of states and policymakers, no matter what 
their ideological persuasion or ideals, and no matter what domestic opinion is.
Yet international relations are too often taken to be the relations between states. Other 
actors are given secondary importance. This two-tier approach can be challenged. 
First, ambiguities in the meaning given to state and its failure to tally with reality 
result in its conceptual usefulness being impaired. Greater clarity is obtained by 
analysing intergovernmental and intersociety relations with no presumption that one 
sector is more important than the others. Second, it is recognised that governments are 
losing their sovereignty when faced with MNCs, regional energies and the assertion of 
ethnicity by different populations. Third, NGOs engage in such a web of global
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activities, including diplomacy, that governments have lost their political 
independence. However it is still quite common to find analyses of international 
relations that concentrate primarily on governments, give some attention to 
intergovernmental organisations and ignore transnational actors. Even in fields such as 
environmental politics, where it is widely accepted that governments interact intensely 
with UN agencies, commercial companies and environmental pressure groups, it is 
often taken for granted that governments are the only players. Dominant states may be 
actors, but exclusive arbiters they are not, and with the continuing processes of 
globalisation, localisation and decentralisation, parties at all levels have become 
players. It is no longer possible to ignore the activities of an oil company operating in 
a state where the ruling regime has no respect for human rights. Similarity, it is 
essential not to discount the role of regions in the international political economy -  
economically, politically and so on. This has been accentuated by globalisation -  a 
process that has thrown into disarray concepts such as sovereignty, sources of foreign 
policy, frameworks of relations, actors, processes, issues and trends.
New trends, issues and phenomenon in politics, international relations and the 
international political economy all make theorising a changing framework for relations 
difficult. Indeed, it is not always possible to theorise, and, quite often, it is not always 
necessary to theorise. Usually a theorising activity is undertaken not for the purpose of 
constructing a predictive theory of international political economy, but for creating 
ordering devices or approaches that assist in making sense of the diversity of data and 
events. Whatever the name of that device, its purpose is to assist in creating an 
understanding by ordering facts and concepts into meaningful trends and frameworks. 
Gathering facts or descriptions of events creates an understanding of those facts and 
events that otherwise do not have broader application. Only when these facts and 
events are fitted against some framework of concepts can they essentially be seen as 
illustrations of general and recurring processes in the international political economy. 
However, an organising device does more than just relate facts to general propositions.
Historians use the organising devices of time, place and subject matter as means of 
assisting them select appropriate data, for the purpose of relating data and determining 
the boundaries of their subject. Without such organising devices there would be no 
place to begin, no limits to assist in research and description, and no way to determine
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what facts, conditions or events are relevant. Social scientists also use organising 
devices; but because they are often interested in classes of social phenomena and 
processes rather than specific events bound by time, place and subject, their devices 
will be more abstract than those historians use. For instance, when defining the 
essence of international relations the term power politics may be used. However the 
boundaries of international relations based on the use of the term power politics 
depends on the assignment of the words power and politics. Power and politics are 
very abstract concepts, more difficult to deal with than concepts relating to time and 
place. If international relations are defined as power politics or the quest for power 
then some sort of framework, approach or quasi theory has been established. This 
provides the boundaries for the subject. It designates key variables that assist in 
explaining the behaviour of states in their international relations. In this case, power 
(how it is wielded and how much is available) is posited as the key explanatory 
variable to the understanding of a state’s foreign policies. There are, of course, certain 
dangers in employing any approach, theory, model or framework in analysis. Although 
these devices assist in selecting data and relate concepts and variables, they may also 
act as blinders to other significant facets of the subject. In the case of changing 
frameworks it is necessary to test existing theories and concepts. However, it is 
essential to highlight trends and issues as theories or concepts are unlikely to have 
emerged. In changing frameworks theories tend to emerge retrospectively. One change 
in the framework of international relations (the international political economy) has 
been the emergence of new actors.
4.4 The Concept of New International Actors
In diplomacy, international law, journalism and academic analysis, it is widely 
assumed that international relations consist of the relations between coherent units 
called states. However, states no longer monopolise international relations as the 
international political economy has changed. One possible approach to understanding 
political change can be obtained by analysing the relations between governments and 
other actors. Indeed, international relations also include companies and NGOs. While 
there are over 200 states in the international political economy it should not be 
forgotten there are also some 40,000 MNCs with parent companies with more than 
250,000 foreign affiliates. There are 15,000 NGOs with significant international 
activities and 300 intergovernmental organisations such as the UN, NATO and the EU.
172
All these actors play a regular part in the international political economy and interact 
with governments. In addition, even though they are not considered to be legitimate 
participants in the international political economy, guerrilla groups and terrorists also 
have their impact. Very many more companies and NGOs only operate in a single 
state, but have the potential to expand internationally.
There can be no denial of the number of these organisations and their range of 
activities. The controversial question is whether this non-state international political 
economy has significance in its own right and whether it makes any difference to the 
analysis of international relations. It is possible to define international as the relations 
between states. This is the state-centric approach (realism). Then it is only a tautology 
to say non-state actors are of secondary importance. A more open-ended approach 
(liberalism) is based on the assumption that all types of actors can affect political 
outcomes. Non-state actor implies that states are dominant and other actors are 
secondary. It also puts into a single category actors that have very different structures, 
different resources and different ways of influencing politics. The great advantage of 
the state-centric approach is that the bewildering complexity of international relations 
is reduced to the relative simplicity of interactions of some 200 units. States are 
changing, but they are not disappearing. State sovereignty has been eroded, but it is 
still vigorously asserted. Governments are weaker, but they can still throw their weight 
around. At certain times the population are more demanding but at other times they are 
more pliable. Borders are still barriers but they are also more porous. Landscapes are 
giving way to ethnoscapes, mediascapes, ideoscapes, technoscapes and finanscapes, 
but territoriality is still a central preoccupation.
The interests of a region in the area of policy result from an interaction of various 
factors. First, the general political situation within a region, the various developments 
in the state, as well as socio-economic structures. Regional players and institutions can 
exert an influence on a region’s interests, as can the socio-economic situation. 
Secondly, the situation of the region within the state it forms part of must be 
considered. Together with the constitutional status of the region, the region’s relations 
with the federal centre are of particular importance. Distinction must be made between 
the region’s legal-formal relations to the structures of state power and the informal 
relations that are based upon personal associations. According to the nature of these
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relations, a region can enjoy special rights and privileges that positions it more 
favourably over other regions. A third category of factors is concerned with the 
region’s situation in the international context. These factors acquire an important and 
increasing significance in the formation of policy interests. Amongst these factors are 
the geographical proximity of a region to prosperous or crisis-ridden zones, the 
military strategic situation of a region or the existence of ethnic and territorial 
disputes. Finally, the investment activity of foreign businesses and states is of 
significance for the determination of regional interest. All these factors collectively 
considered are responsible for the progress of regionalisation. Weightings of 
individual factors depend on specific situations of the federal constituent and must be 
applied individually in each case.
In post-Soviet Russia the regions exploited the weakness of the centre in order to test 
the limits and possibilities for extending their spheres of influence and to call into 
question the nature of the existing dependencies. Regional elites filled the vacuum 
created by the destruction of the state structure and were able to extend their control 
over territory and resources during the initial years after communism’s collapse. At the 
same time they set about consolidating the political, economic and legal structures in 
their own areas. In recent years the region has developed into the real centre of gravity 
of socio-political life. In view of the centre’s weakness and the lack of a strong 
national identity, the periphery takes control of its direction and is a model for reform 
designed to meet regional situations.
Regionalism is primarily a concern of regional elites and represents the driving 
political force in regions. The regional elite is made up of state and non-state players. 
In view of the concentration of political power within the regional executive, the 
elected chief executive (the governor or president of the republic) and the bureaucratic 
or ministerial apparatus that is answerable to them are important for an analysing 
regional policy. Accordingly, the socio-political orientation of the authoritative 
political players must be considered. The worldview and the basic political situation of 
regional political elites may, but not necessarily, influence the policy of a region. Of 
course, conflicts can arise within a region amongst the various main players and 
institutions. Regions exemplify the nature of new non-state international actors. But
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while regions are one type of actor in the international political economy there are 
different types of regions.
4.5 Different Types of Regions as Actors
In the post-Soviet international political economy there are different types of actors. 
Taking the primary example of states it is easy to identify different types of states 
based on different criteria -  for example, geography, wealth, population, size, 
resources, ethnicity, political systems or type of government (republics or 
monarchies). Similarly, it is also possible to distinguish different types of regions. 
Taking the example of the types of regions in Russia, it is possible to determine 
numerous types of regions -  landlocked, border, gateway, landbridge, peripheral, 
power projection base, resource base, strategic, ethnic, industrial, agricultural, krai, 
oblast’, republic, autonomous okrug and so on. Different types of regions give rise to 
different roles. Indeed, the nature of a region will determine the type of role it can 
play. Usually, certain regions are also able to play more than one role. Yet just 
considering the nature of a region is insufficient to determine the type of entity a 
region is. It is essential to consider numerous other factors as these determine the 
nature of a region.
An analysis of a region should include a brief survey of its general socio-economic 
situation. This includes a description of economic potential (natural resources, 
infrastructure and trade structure); a survey of regional economic policy; the activities 
of regional businesses; and a review of the social situation (unemployment, poverty, 
GNP per capita, life expectancy, education, and so on). It should be possible on the 
basis of this information to draw conclusions about the type of region a space is.
The existence of certain socio-economic conditions within Russian regions is usually 
seen as a legacy of the Soviet system. Regions were not only territorial, but also 
functional units within the national economic complex. The uniform national 
economic complex of the Soviet Union was based on a specific division of labour and 
a specialisation of the regions in the manufacture of specific products. After the 
breakdown of the single economic unit this system collapsed. Thereafter the region 
was, for the most part, left to its own devices, and the previous division of labour no 
longer functioned. The products of the region were often no longer in demand within
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the internal market, partly because they were seen to be inferior in comparison to 
foreign products and were, therefore, not competitive. After the Soviet Union’s 
collapse those Russian regions that were rich in natural resources, had a diversified 
trade structure, well-developed infrastructure and had links with important traffic 
junctions, were better able to adapt to the post-Soviet environment.
Corresponding to the varying degrees of socio-economic development, there is a 
pronounced regional variation in regard to the general standard of living in the regions. 
There are similar imbalances in respect of the unemployment quota and the degree of 
poverty. It is interesting at this point to see whether a connection can be established 
between the socio-economic situation and the political orientation of the political elite 
and population. The analysis of regional patterns of Russian elections 1991-1996 
highlights that a correlation exists between economic strength and political orientation. 
While the population and the elite of poorer areas were motivated to vote either 
conservative or nationalist, regions with economically more promising perspectives 
tend to be more liberal and open to reform. After 1996 (the second wave of elections 
of governors) this pattern either ceased or was less relevant. Nonetheless, regions 
cannot simply be divided into pro- and contra-reform camps. Regional economic 
policy presents a much more complex and uneven image and does not always 
correspond to the policy that might be expected on the basis of a given socio-economic 
situation.
Apart from elections, the population is hardly involved in political processes in the 
regions. Active participation -  through political parties -  exists only to a limited extent 
(the only party with mass membership in Russia is the communist party) and a 
regional party system only exists in embryo. In most regions, parties are created for 
short-term goals -  namely the achievement of electoral success. The role of the 
population in regional processes, however, should not be underestimated. The vital 
fact is that increasing sections of the population feel a basic affinity with their region 
and not with the state or any higher concept. Opinion polls confirm the orientation 
away from the state towards the regions. In regions where the majority of the 
population harbours secessionist desires, the regional political elite is likely to devise 
its political programme accordingly. Policy can also be influenced by fear of threats or 
images of the enemy that predominate the social strata of certain regions. Regional
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leaders can be tempted to deliberately stir up fear amongst the population and present 
the argument of an external threat in order to win imminent elections or exact more 
support from Moscow. It must be established whether regionalism is based only in the 
political consciousness of representatives, i.e. of the regional elites, or whether a 
regional consciousness can be found amongst the population. Following on from that, 
it is of interest to establish which factors constitute regional awareness. In particular, it 
is necessary to examine the role external factors play in the formation of social 
awareness and what influence these exert on regional policy.
A region’s range of interests is substantially determined by their legal status within a 
state and its relations with the centre. These factors determine what possibilities the 
region has to articulate its interests and put these into practice. The relationship of the 
region to the centre takes on individual forms. The nature of the relationship is 
dependent upon the constitutional status of the region within the state, the bilateral 
contractual relationship and the informal relationships based on personal contacts. In 
Russia the 1993 constitution lays down, in Article 5, the equality of all the constituents 
of the federation both to one another and in their relationship with the federation, the 
asymmetric structure was to remain the determining element of Russian federalism. 
Some oblast’s and krais were not allowed to retain the status of national republics. The 
leaders of the republics struggled violently against the removal of distinguishing 
between Russian and non-Russian areas, which had been demanded by the other 
regions, because they feared they might lose possibilities of national aspirations to the 
right of self-determination and, thus, the independent legitimisation of their claim to 
statehood. Russian federalism is still based on the ethnic principle of a hierarchical 
division into national and territorial entities carried over the Soviet period.
To deal with post-Soviet difficulties Moscow had no option but to treat national 
republics with preference, relative to other regions, and to grant them special rights -  
particularly on the subject of international relations. These rights are guaranteed to 
republics in bilateral treaties. Since 1996 these treaties on the limitation of powers 
have been concluded not only with national republics, but also with a number of other 
regions of mainly economic importance. The centre felt itself forced to take into 
account not only ethno-national factors, but also the economic potential of a region. 
For financial reasons Moscow is dependent upon economically and financially strong
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regions. As republics have the right to function internationally, to establish relations 
with other states and to conclude international treaties with them, the question arises as 
to how far a given bilateral relationship influences the possibilities of the region to act 
more or less independently in the sphere of the international political economy.
4.6 Prospects for Regions in the International Political Economy
Together with internal prerequisites and the situation of the region in a state, the 
international political economy has become increasingly important for regional 
interests in the fields of policy. External factors can be grouped according to the 
political, the economic and the social. The geographical factor also has particular 
significance, especially for border regions. The proximity of a region to foreign states 
can have a significant influence on the policies of regional elites, not only in respect of 
their international orientation, but also with regard to their relations with the centre. 
Tensions can arise between the centre and a region when conflicts occur between the 
centre’s international strategy and the region’s interests. Such differences can be 
observed particularly often, although not exclusively, in the case of border regions. As 
a consequence of growing activity of border regions, the contours of cross-border 
regional contact are gradually becoming clearer.
In all the regional case studies (especially the studies of border regions) it is important 
to note the special features of the new geopolitical situation and the implications for a 
region’s international orientation that arise thereof. Each region needs to be assessed 
according to the importance of strategic security factors, the proximity of prosperous 
economic zones, the proximity of crisis areas, territorial disputes, cross-border 
cultural/ethnic factors and so on.
There are two possibilities for subnational regions in pursuing international relations -  
it can influence the decision-making process of the political centre of the state of 
which it is part in international relations and it can try to develop foreign policy 
independently by means of its own network of transnational contacts. While in the first 
case the difficulty for the region consists of choosing the proper channels and gaining 
the appropriate participants for the concerns of the region, in the second case the 
challenge consists of implementing regional foreign policy in such a way as to avoid 
conflict with the centre as far as possible. Political fragmentation makes decision­
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making processes much more complicated. As a result of changing balances of 
political power, state politicians are increasingly forced to consider the interests of 
regions, not only in the formation of but also in the implementation of national 
policies. The centre involves regions more closely in decisions that deal with 
international problems and also considers regional interest in multilateral affairs, such 
as international regional agreements and forums. The second form in which regions 
deal with their international activities is by creating their own networks of para- 
diplomatic contacts with foreign partners. Due to its weakness the centre fulfils its 
function as coordinator less and less efficiently, and so this form of regional 
international relations has increased in importance.
The participation of the Far East in the international political economy is an example 
of regional actions that have consequences for the internal stability for a state. 
Increasing numbers of regions are closely integrated into the international political 
economy and are, therefore, interested in liberalisation. This process, however, does 
not proceed symmetrically but is limited to a relatively small group of regions; most 
regions hardly participate in these developments. While uncoupling from the 
international political economy would have far reaching negative consequences for a 
small (but important) group of regions, the vast majority of regions are scarcely 
affected by the changing international political economy. Occasionally, they are only 
aware of the repercussions that follow in the form of widening internal gaps and 
increasing competition from outside as from within. Two scenarios can be envisaged 
from this situation -  it could well be that the population and regional elites of those 
regions which are not linked into the international political economy increasingly tend 
towards isolationist solutions and see their interests best guaranteed through 
disconnecting the domestic from the international political economy. It would be just 
as conceivable that leaders of less successful regions realise that their participation in 
the international political economy is only possible if comprehensive structural 
reforms are introduced in their regions. The enactment of such reforms is indeed 
painful and involves high social costs. Long-term, however, the prerequisites for 
participation in the international political economy, and thus a change in fortune for 
the region, can only be achieved in that way.
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For the centre it is apparent that economically strong regions, such as those with 
immense natural resources, eventually become more irreplaceable economic 
locomotives. The centre approves the integration of regions into the international 
political economy and tries to promote this development. Not all regions are treated 
equally, however. Sometimes economically strong regions are granted privileges that 
place them in an advantageous position in comparison to other regions. By virtue of 
the freedoms and decision-making powers granted to them, privileged regions have a 
better starting point.
The Far East exemplifies the role of regions within the state and within the 
international political economy. The findings from the research conducted for this 
volume reveals that regions are not new actors in the international political economy. 
Regions have played a role in international relations throughout history. As the 
international political economy has changed so has the role of regions. Moreover, 
different types of regions have played different roles. These different roles have been 
determined by changes within the state and within the international political economy. 
Other factors too have affected regions and their role such as history, geography, 
natural resources, location, proximity to other states, regional politics, security and 
ethnicity. The role of regions in the international political economy is not determined 
by one factor. It is the combination of the domestic and the international. Indeed, 
changes in both affect the role a region has, does and can play. The processes of 
globalisation, regionalisation, localisation and decentralisation have too contributed to 
the rise of regions as actors. In the case of the Far East its role has been determined by 
its geographical location, its strategic importance, its natural resource wealth, as well 
as its proximity and complementarity to North-East Asia.
4.7 Russian-Japanese Relations -  What Role for the Far East? -Future Scenarios
The Far East has always played a role in Russian-Japanese relations. The Far East is 
an example of the role a region can, does and could play in the international political 
economy. Its historical and contemporary roles have been detailed in this volume. 
However, what does the region’s future role hold? Many historical and contemporary 
roles for the Far East depend on the same criteria -  the domestic and the international.
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Future scenarios for a Far Eastern role depend initially on changes in the international 
political economy -  changes in the international political economy affects actors, how 
they interact, key issues and trends, the basis of domestic and foreign policy, partners 
for cooperation and conflict, alliances and so on. In Russian-Japanese relations this 
means changes in Russia and Japan are key. In Russia this means the success of 
transition, the nature of politics, legal frameworks, economic growth, the ability to 
exploit natures resources, stabilisation of socio-politics, macroeconomic control, 
infrastructure development, foreign investment attracting parameters, bureaucracy, 
crime and much more. In Japan this means managing domestic economic decline, the 
role of the territorial dispute, foreign policy, the separation of politics and economics, 
other actors in North-East Asia’s balance of power -  China and South Korea, Japan’s 
search for a new international role, the direction of Japan’s international relations (bias 
towards Asia or the West), and more.
At the domestic level, as well as existing criteria such as natural resources, 
geographical location and proximity to North-East Asia, hostile centre-periphery 
relations, the future prospects of Russia will be key in determining the Far East’s role. 
Indeed, it is assumed the region’s geographical location and its natural resources are 
key to its future. Based on these assumptions, the other key domestic criteria that will 
be key in determining the Far East’s role are the national socio-politico-economic 
situation, Russia’s position in the international political economy and trade policies, 
international commodity market prices, inter-regional cooperation, centre-periphery 
relations and Russia’s relations with North-East Asia. However, as Bradshaw states all 
of these factors will collectively depend on whether Russia’s economic situation 
proves to be stable, successful or dire.3 Indeed, the same can be said for Japan and for 
the international political economy. In determining the role of the Far East in Russian- 
Japanese relations, it is necessary to include all factors -  domestic and international, 
on all sides -  Russia, Japan and the international political economy.
3Bradshaw, Michael J., “The Russian Far East -  Prospects for the New Millennium” in Bradshaw, 
Michael J. (Ed.), The Russian Far East and Pacific Asia -  Unfulfilled Potential. Curzon Press, 
Richmond, Surrey, UK, 2001, p.281-284.
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4.8 Conclusions
The international political economy is the arena where the units of international 
relations operate. Their goals, aspirations, needs, attitudes, latitude of choice and 
actions are significantly influenced by the overall distribution of power. In order to 
explain what conditions make states behave as they do it is essential to describe what 
they typically do. Theoretical frameworks include an overview of the main schools of 
thought in international relations and their insights into the basis and causes for 
cooperation and conflict, which can be applied to the understanding of Russian- 
Japanese relations. Moreover, given that the entire nature of the international political 
economy has changed, part of this theoretical framework has been built around 
understanding new and changing phenomenon -  namely new actors, changing 
geography and new policy sources and processes. The new international political 
economy is the framework that has changed traditional notions of Russian-Japanese 
relations. As a result of the Soviet Union’s collapse, the position of regions, such as 
the Far East, has shifted on both the domestic and international stages. The Far East’s 
geography -  in terms of location with respect to the centre and the international 
political economy -  as well as its phenomenal resource wealth and harsh environment 
have politicised this once subdued, isolated and protected region. Having once been 
the focus of intense energies, the Far East has been left to fend for itself in the post- 
Soviet international political economy. Though part of the Russian state it is politically 
detached and veers eastwards with the view to developing ties with North-East Asia. 
This has raised questions of its role both within Russia and internationally.
The complementary nature of the Russian and Japanese economies, and the Far East’s 
position between these two actors, provides for an interesting case study of the roles of 
gateway, resource-rich and frontier regions in international relations that are 
themselves changing in nature, both at a state and systematic level. Theory, while 
providing the basis for analysing such phenomenon, tends to be built around historical 
evidence and trends. The history of the Far East’s political economy has seen a 
shifting role for the region. Though debates have centred around whether the region is 
an important gateway or just an outpost, there has never been any argument about its 
special status. From being the epicentre of North-East Asian geopolitics, it became the 
focus of the Russian state’s quest for economic growth. Politically, the region was the 
focus of the tsarist and Soviet developmental models. The Far East also represented a
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buffer zone between European Russia and Japan under the guise of the Far Eastern 
Republic, as well as a base for the projection of Soviet power within the region. When 
the Soviet Union collapsed, a new Russia, keen to find her feet and adjust to a 
changing international political economy, re-opened the debate over what role a new 
Far East should play. However, this was further complicated by changes at the 
domestic, regional and international levels.
The Far East was, historically, a crossroads between the major powers of North-East 
Asia, as well as a lure for wealth by Moscow. Before the Sovietisation of the Far East 
it was a frontier, a gateway and a buffer between Moscow and North-East Asia. The 
region was key to Russian-Japanese relations -  it was the location of economic 
cooperation, it was the conference centre for meetings between the two states, and it 
was the focus of political and territorial issues between the two powers. Today the Far 
East has shifted attention away from the territorial dispute between Russia and Japan. 
Along with other subnational regions, the Far East has changed the entire nature of 
Russian-Japanese relations. It has diluted the traditional structures of relations in this 
bilateral framework and it is building cleavages based around the many aspects of 
international relations. In many ways the Post-Soviet Far East is recreating its pre- 
Soviet role -  one of an actor in a changing international political economy.
Russian-Japanese relations have, like relations between other states, tended to be built 
around or dominated by one historical issue. In this case it is the territorial dispute. 
Like relations between other states Russian-Japanese relations have seen both periods 
of cooperation and conflict. However, there are two things that differentiate Russian- 
Japanese relations from relations typical of that between two states. Firstly, relations 
have always existed between these geographical areas. These geographical regions 
initially had no nationality (i.e. they were not affiliated either with the Russian or 
Japanese states), and then became part of states that unified all the territories adjacent 
to their motherland. These territories then became parts of expansionist empires -  the 
tsarist succeeded by the Soviet empire and the Japanese empire. Today relations still 
exist between these same geographical regions while the states they form part of are 
undergoing domestic transitions and trying to determine their international roles. The 
second differentiating factor is that the two states have seen both mutual economic 
gain and political ideology be the key determinants of relations. Officially these have
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not existed simultaneously. Unofficially they have. State level relations -  those 
between Moscow and Tokyo -  have used politics as the basis for bilateral relations. 
Non-state level relations -  those between sub-national regions -  have used mutual 
economic gain as the basis for bilateral relations. Consequently, conflicts of interest 
between the centre and the periphery have emerged both in regard to domestic and 
international relations and are, in Russia as elsewhere, a driving force of globalisation.
4.9 Russian-Japanese Relations -  What Role for the Far East?
In the introduction it was stated that this study would strive to make a contribution by 
attempting to fill in some of the gaps in the literature as well as by building on existing 
literature by:
> Firstly, the incorporation of theory into this study -  something innovative in studies 
about Russian-Japanese relations and the Far East;
>  Secondly, by attempting to determine the socio-politico-economic role of (resource- 
rich) regions in international relations by using the Far East as an example;
> Next, by attempting to understand post-Soviet Russian-Japanese relations and the Far 
East both independently and in the frameworks of Russian-Japanese relations and 
North-East Asia;
> And, finally, by using all of this research and its findings the key objective was to 
provide a contribution to the literature of international relations by investigating the 
role of regions in the changing international political economy.
This study has incorporated theoretical ideas relevant to this study. This theoretical 
application has been multi-disciplinary in its approach, something that is uncommon to 
such studies. Most theoretical applications tend to focus on one discipline. This thesis has 
included ideas from politics, international relations, economics, geography and Soviet 
studies. It is the first time theory has been applied to any studies on Russian-Japanese 
relations. Application of theory to the Far East is not new, but a multi-disciplinary 
approach is. Theory has been used to understand the relationship between Russia and 
Japan, and the Far East as an actor. It has been applied to assist in showing how the 
relationship has changed over time and, indeed, has been key to understanding how the 
entire framework of the international political economy has changed. It has also been key 
in explaining how and why new actors, such as regions like the Far East, have entered the 
international political economy.
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In determining the socio-politico-economic role of (resource-rich) regions in international 
relations by using the Far East as an example, this study has looked at regions. It has seen 
how the international political economy has changed and how regions have become 
actors in their own right. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union it has looked at 
decentralisation, centre-periphery relations, globalisation and post-Soviet transition and 
how they have all given rise to the role of regions in the international political economy. 
It has also further examined the role of regions that are peripheral (located on the edge of 
a state), those that are geographically proximate to other more developed states and those 
that are rich in resources. The research findings have detailed how regions, especially 
those that are resource-rich, have been able to establish roles for themselves independent 
of the political centre of the state of which they are part -  notably the Far East. Research 
into regions leveraging their geographical position and resources to improve their socio- 
politico-economic position is not new, what is new is:
>  The application of a multi-disciplinary approach;
> The recognition of the influence of history and of geography;
> The realisation of the harsh socio-politico-economic realities that impact regions 
both from within a state and as a result of the changing international political 
economy;
>  And, an emphasis that a region’s role can, does and has changed.
In attempting to understand post-Soviet Russian-Japanese relations and the Far East both 
independently and in the frameworks of Russian-Japanese relations and North-East Asia, 
this thesis fully examined pre-Soviet and Soviet relations between the two states. It 
combined relations of three separate periods and was able to analyse and draw a picture 
of how relations were built, grew and have developed. It looked at Russian-Japanese 
relations in terms of bipolarity and multipolarity (the later in the context of North-East 
Asia). It applied theory to Russian-Japanese relations and emphasised how theory related 
to the changing dynamics of the relationship, based on theories and ideas of international 
relations. More than that, fieldwork was carried out in the field with key individuals who 
were impacting and analysing Russian-Japanese relations at the national and subnational 
levels. Research findings rubbished the myth that Moscow and Tokyo dominated 
relations. It also looked at how subnational relations were impacting Russian-Japanese 
relations. The thesis’s contribution to the field of study of Russian-Japanese relations 
was:
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>  Understanding Russian-Japanese relations at the subnational and national levels;
>  Time-lining and analysing the birth, emergence and development of Russian- 
Japanese relations;
>  Taking into consideration the changing domestic and international frameworks and 
how they impact Russia and Japan, their foreign policy decision making and their 
mutual relations with each other directly and within the context of North-East Asia; 
and
> Interviewing key figures in Russian-Japanese relations both at the national and local 
levels.
In attempting to understand the Far East, detailed analysis of regions as actors was 
undertaken. Attempts to examine different types of regions based on their location, 
resources and historical roles were pursued. Theory was applied both to the ideas of 
regions as part of a state as well as to the idea of regions as actors in the international 
political economy. In terms of examining the history of the Far East, this was done from 
the Russian Empire’s expansion and incorporation of the region up and until the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. This was key in determining how the Far East had grown as an actor 
and the key influences upon its development -  politically (the centralised tsarist and 
Soviet empires, as well as relations with North-East Asia), economically (its phenomenal 
resource base), and socially (its interaction with North-East Asia, its location and its 
relations with Moscow). In contributing to understanding the Far East, this research has:
>  Undertaken original fieldwork and interacted with local, national and foreign parties;
>  Applied theory, history, geography and contemporary knowledge to the Far East;
>  It has understood that the Far East has always been an international actor, that its 
post-Soviet role is as much determined by Moscow as it is by interaction with 
surrounding states;
>  And, taken a multi-disciplinary approach to the study of the Far East whereas most 
studies tend to be either one of economic, political, historical or geographic.
With the view to combining primary and secondary research, and its dissemination, 
the key objective of this thesis was to make a contribution to the literature of 
international relations by investigating the role of regions in the international political 
economy. This study has investigated this role by applying theory to this study, by 
using a unique case study -  the Far East in Russian-Japanese relations, by undertaking
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a multi-disciplinary approach and by analysing pre-Soviet, Soviet and post-Soviet 
phenomenon that have impacted the frameworks of this study.
4.10 A New Role for the Far East -  Potential and Reality
As a final piece to this study, this last section, “A New Role for the Far East -  
Potential and Reality” will critically reassess the author’s argument in relation to the 
aims of the thesis and the nature of the Far East region, recognising that the:
>  Far East has not been a unitary actor and this has prevented it having a cohesive 
role in the areas researched;
> Documentary and interview material cited in the thesis only establishes the 
potential and not the actuality of an autonomous regional role; and
> Political developments under Putin since the end of the research timeframe have 
reversed most of the trends towards regional autonomy on which the author has 
based this study.
The Far East, in spite of attempts, has not been a unitary actor and this has prevented 
the region from having a cohesive role in the areas researched, namely in Russian- 
Japanese relations. What defines a region is that it has certain characteristics that give 
it a cohesiveness and distinctiveness setting it apart from other regions. Regions can be 
geographical, administrative, pplitical, economic, social, cultural and so on. In the case 
of the Far East the region is both geographical and administrative. But geography and 
administration do not imply unity. Indeed, in terms of the political, economic, social 
and cultural, there are similarities but political and economic differences have 
culminated in little unity in the Far East. Indeed, the Far East not being a unitary actor 
has been central to the region having a cohesive role in Russian-Japanese relations. 
What have emerged, instead, are generalisations about the role that the region did, can, 
does and could play. In reality different roles are played by each of the individual 
territories that make up the region. Each has differing relations with the centre, varying 
degrees of economic development, industrial production, infrastructure, natural 
resources and political problems, which are all affected by their territorial assignation. 
The Far Eastern resource endowment and, thus, its economic potential are not 
uniformly distributed across the region. Primor’e and Khabarovsk compete for the title 
of gateway territory. Khabarovsk City (the capital of Khabarovsk) was the key Far 
Eastern centre during the Soviet era while Vladivostok (the capital of Primor’e) was
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closed for forty-five years until 1992. But the territories have struggled to unify and 
capitalise on their shared interests, due to politics.
The lack of unity can be partially explained by the split of the territories into two 
broad groups -  the republics versus the oblasts, krais and various autonomous okrugs. 
The rivalry was focused on the question of the 1993 constitution. Early drafts gave the 
republics more privileges and a larger share of the power by virtue of having more 
seats in the upper chamber of parliament. The krais and oblasts objected because there 
were more of them in most cases they were more populous and wealthier. The 
difference between the two types of territories has been festering since 1991. It had led 
to a series of precipitant actions, many, but not all, of them with examples in the Far 
East -  the abortive movement for a republic (Enisei Republic in the summer of 1991), 
threats to declare republics (Tomsk and Irkutsk Oblasts), actual declarations of 
republics (Urals Republic, Amur Republic), postponed declarations of a republic 
(Eastern Siberia), declaration of intention to declare a republic (Primorskii Republic), 
discussion of a declaration of a republic (Kamchatka Republic), and even rejection of 
a republic (the Far Eastern Republic).
The organisation around which any independence or regional autonomy movement 
would have to be based in the Far East is the Association of Far Eastern and Trans- 
Baikal Territories. It was created in August 1990 by the Soviets in the territories of the 
Far East. Its purpose was to help the Soviets coordinate their activities and allow them 
to protect the interests of the region. Like other regional associations its original 
interest was, and remains, economic. It has worked independently and in cooperation 
with other regional associations to wring various economic concessions from Moscow. 
It has even drawn up a development plan for the Far East as a means of providing a 
road map for a better, brighter future. However, as with all things Russian it, too, has 
been politicised. When Sakhalin Governor Fedorov brought up the question of the 
disputed territories before the group there was little choice. He told the other 
representatives at a meeting that if Moscow could not defend Russia from national 
betrayal, then a Far Eastern Republic must save Russia and Moscow itself from a 
territorial repatriation of the disputed territories. The Association of Far Eastern and 
Trans-Baikal Territories was not willing to accept the proposal to create a Far Eastern 
Republic, but it did send an appeal on the disputed territories issue to Moscow.
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In terms of economics the Far East can be treated as a region in that it has common 
features -  an abundance of resources, the drive to leverage resources as a mean to 
make political gains from Moscow, and that economics to key to cooperation with 
North-East Asia. The most common feature of all the Far Eastern regions it that they 
all seek drastic means for their survival. But coordination of these territories into a 
unitary region in terms of policy certainly does not exist. From an economic point of 
view, there have emerged three broad sub-units in the Far East: the southern Far East 
that shares borders with China (Primor’e, Khabarovsk and Amur), the Okhotsk rim 
with fishing monoculture (Sakhalin and Kamchatka) and the northern Far East which 
relies on the extraction of diamonds and gold (Sakha and Magadan). The strategy for 
integration with North-East Asia is different for each Far Eastern territory. Given the 
deepening differentiation and conflicts of interest amongst these territories, it is 
difficult to imagine that an organisation similar to the Association of Far Eastern and 
Trans-Baikal Territories that comprises all the territories of the region will be created 
in the near future. Moreover, political conflicts in the Far East could become more 
complex and more severe, further driving away any unitary prospects, namely:
>  The continuing tug of war between Moscow and the territorial leaders for 
control over resources and the distribution of taxes;
>  Competition amongst various territories could intensify; both intra-territorially 
and in terms of centre-periphery relations;
>  Political struggles within territories could become further complicated with 
various factions seeking support from various political influences in Moscow 
and abroad;
>  A serious gap between economic necessity and political/psychological reaction 
to this economic intensity has developed amongst the populace, making the 
situation politically volatile and uncertain. When the survival of the region 
depends on integration into North-East Asia, and indeed such integration is 
proceeding with tremendous speed, it becomes clear that the most important 
agent to make important decisions is the local government. And yet, the local 
interest in local self governance has sharply declined; and
> Forced integration with North-East Asia has created political and psychological 
tensions.
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While this study has investigated the potential role regions can play in the 
international political economy as exemplified by the example of the Far East in 
Russian-Japanese relations, it exemplifies issues central to the plight of other regions 
while being unique. However, what all studies, including that undertaken by the author 
here, have done is not look deeply at the non-unitary elements of the region being 
investigated. This volume has made conclusions based on cooperation amongst the 
individual ten territories of the Far East. But the Far East is not and has not been a 
unitary actor and this has prevented it having a cohesive role in Russian-Japanese 
relations. As highlighted by the classifications made by Hanson, Bradshaw and 
Treyvish, and Lysenko and Matveev, each of the Far East’s territories has different 
roles to play. Indeed, each territory has more than one role it can play. This, in turn, is 
a further contributing factor to the non-unitary nature of the Far East as a region.
And, now to the second point of this final section -  the documentary and interview 
material cited in this thesis establishes only the potential and not the actuality of an 
autonomous role. This study strove to make a contribution to the field of international 
relations by attempting to fill in some of the gaps in the literature as well as by 
building on existing literature in four key ways: the incorporation of theory into 
studies about Russian-Japanese relations and the Far East; by attempting to determine 
the socio-politico-economic role of (resource-rich) regions in international relations by 
using the Far East as an example; to understand post-Soviet Russian-Japanese 
relations and the Far East as an example; to understand post-Soviet Russian-Japanese 
relations and the Far East both independently and in the frameworks of Russian- 
Japanese relations and North-East Asia; and by using all of this research and its 
findings the key objective is to provide a contribution to the literature of international 
relations by investigating the role of regions in the changing international political 
economy. Indeed, this research makes a contribution from the fact that the 
documentary and interview material cited is based on primary research conducted in 
different times, locations and with interviewees than that previously undertaken in this 
field of study.
As previously cited the primary research for this thesis involved gathering facts or 
evidence by going directly to the source itself -  fieldwork in Russia, Japan and the US. 
The research conducted for this volume involved collecting facts that could be
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objectively observed and measured. It made inferences about the unknown made on 
the basis o the known; not necessary statements of truth but hypotheses that may or 
may not be valid. But the documentary and interview material cited only determined 
the potential or prospective role of the Far East in Russian-Japanese relations. It only 
used the Far East as a case study for the role of regions in the international political 
economy and was not concrete actuality. It made inferences about the potential based 
on the primary research conducted and, thus, is not a detailed study of the actual role 
of the region whether it is autonomous or not. Conclusions drawn are based on the 
culmination of primary research findings as well as secondary materials. They use 
hypothetical studies and scenarios to reach conclusions that are based on best practice 
and not necessarily material ones. Indeed, they make conclusions based on a specific 
time period -  to 1998, which does not consider developments since. This leads to the 
third and final part of this last section: the political developments under Putin since the 
end of the research timeframe have reversed most of the trends towards regional 
autonomy on which the author has based this study.
Regarded as intelligent, tough and hardworking, Putin was chosen by El’stin to 
succeed Stepashin as Prime Minister in August 1999. Putin quickly became popular 
with many Russians for his September invasion of Chechnia in response to terrorism 
and the invasion of Dagestan by Chechen militants. After parties aligned with Putin 
won solid support in the December 1999 parliamentary elections, El’tsin resigned and 
Putin became Acting President. Putin quickly moved to reassert the central 
government’s authority over all territories and sought to exert control over elements of 
the independent media. He won enactment of liberal economic reforms and ratification 
of international arms agreements, while also renewing ties with former Soviet client 
states and maintaining Russia’s strong opposition to proposed US ballistic missile 
defences.
December 11, 2004 saw the war in Chechnia officially enter its second decade, three 
months after the terrorist attacks on School Number One in Beslan, Northern Ossettia. 
The incident brought to the fore the fact that after ten years of war in Chechnia, the 
situation in the Northern Caucasus had become desperate. Russian has to contend with 
the potential resurgence of ethno-political and inter-communal conflicts that marked 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, including the conflict between the Ossettian and
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Ingush communities around Beslan, and the further deterioration of the region’s 
economy, social conditions and political structures. Putin and other Kremlin officials 
saw all this as a product of the 1990s. For them, the 1990s were not years of emerging 
political pluralism, as they are generally viewed in the West, but a decade of chaos. 
From their perspective, regional leaders took El’tsin’s famous exhortation to take as 
much sovereignty as you can swallow as a signal to create their own fiefdoms. These 
leaders defied Moscow, produced a myriad of new regional regulations, and both 
reduced and diverted revenue flows away from the federal government into 
inappropriate hands. Electoral politics in the regions became irremediably corrupt as 
local mafias and business interests emerged as the primary backers of gubernatorial 
candidates and their campaigns. They were very much in charge, not local publics and 
not even Moscow.
From Putin’s point of view, decentralisation under El’tsin served to fragment the 
federation and encouraged the kind of moves toward regional separatism that 
Chechnia embodied in its worst form. In his opinion, the self-interest of corrupt local 
elites, in Chechnia and elsewhere, came to replace the purported principles of self- 
determination that had led to the creation of Russia’s federal system in the Soviet era. 
Putin and those around him became increasingly frustrated at the growth of regional 
problems and disparities and at their inability to exert control over key parts of the 
federation. As a result, the Kremlin became convinced that restoring Moscow’s firm 
grip over Russia’s regions was necessary to preserve national unity and public security 
from the twin threats of secessionism and terrorism. This conviction was bolstered by 
the tragedy of Beslan and the inability of local authorities to either prevent or respond 
to the attack.
In ending the direct election of regional governors, Putin has made it clear that his 
purpose is to ensure that governors will now answer to him -  the President. They will 
serve the Russian state not regional mafias. In sum, from Putin’s perspective, his 
centralising reforms are directed at rooting out the widespread corruption that 
facilitated the Beslan attack, at halting the manipulation of regional elections and 
politics that made regional leaders beholden to local interests rather than Moscow, and 
at making local leaders personally responsible to the President for the outcome of 
developments in their regions.
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Although Putin’s administrative changes may have their own internal logic, they seem, 
from the outside -  in specifically and deliberately removing local participation in 
decision-making through the electoral process -  destined to complicate Moscow’s 
ability to govern the country effectively in the future. This is not least because the 
changes raise the question of whether or not Russia can ultimately continue to be 
designated as a federal state, where powers are delimited between the centre and the 
territories. The short answer to this question seems to no it cannot. And is this is, 
indeed the case, then Russia’s demise as a federation will constrain Moscow’s efforts 
both to manage the affairs of the North Caucasus and to re-integrate Chechnia into the 
state as a distinct territory. The administrative changes also seem likely to increase 
political tension in republics like Tatarstan, where pro-independent movements in the 
early 1990s were defused by developing authority over certain aspects of economic, 
social and political life from Moscow to Kazan.
In essence, under Putin, Moscow is moving away from the conception of Russia as a 
multi-ethnic/multi-territorial state. Nationality issues -  which were a dominant feature 
of politics in the North Caucasus and Russia’s Volga region (including Tatarstan) 
under the Russian Empire as well as the Soviet Union -  are being concealed under the 
more neutral label of regional issues. National territories, like Tatarstan and the 
republics of the North Caucasus, are being demoted to regions. The autonomy of 
Tatarstan outlined in a February 1994 landmark treaty with Moscow has been 
diminished since Putin came into power in 2000. And Moscow has stopped 
concluding similar power-sharing treaties with other regions and begun to roll them 
back. The Russian Nationalities Ministry, which was essentially abolished as a 
ministerial structure in March 2004, was reinstated after Beslan as the Ministry of 
Regional Development. And during Moscow debates on the appointment of regional 
governors, further proposals were put forward to curtail the authority of regional 
assemblies, directly appoint mayors, and even to abolish autonomous republics and 
regions all together by returning to a modified form of the tsarist-era provinces.
The idea of federalism from the bottom-up, which was championed by Tatarstan and 
its President Shaimiyev, and which promoted political parity between the centre and 
the regions, has been rejected by Moscow. Putin has made it clear that federalism, if it 
is to exist at all, will be created from the top-down. It will not be based on mutual
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agreements between the centre and regions, but on what Moscow decides is 
appropriate to delegate to the regions.
This is particularly problematic as just after Beslan (in a September 6, 2004 meeting 
with Western analysts at his residence in Novo-Ogarevo) Putin promised more 
flexibility in dealing politically with Chechnia and North Caucasus, and more 
autonomy for Chechnia. But if the political framework for autonomy is removed, and 
Russia becomes a unitary state, is it possible to create and sustain Chechnia as a 
special easel Elites in Russia’s traditional autonomous republics, like Tatarstan and 
the republics of the North Caucasus, have consistently opposed the formation of a 
unitary state (not least because this would undercut their own power base). 
Furthermore, in moving to build a new political and administrative system in Russia 
entirely from the top down, Putin is also trying to create a new cadre of regional 
leaders by inserting people from outside -  essentially those from Moscow. In 
appointing presidential representatives and governors he has abandoned the task of 
developing and cultivating new leaders at the local level who can eventually win 
genuine popular support. Indeed Putin does not trust local elites who are not closely 
tied to Moscow (or to St. Petersburg). Too much local initiative and leadership, not 
too little, has been Russia’s problem in Putin’s mind.
The approach of imposing regional leaders from outside will also put a strain on 
Moscow’s own personnel resources. Putin’s vertical of power is not a conventional 
pyramid with a broad base of support. It is a narrow column extending down from the 
Kremlin. This is because, unlike the secretary-generals or presidents of the Soviet 
period, Putin does not have a party structure or a system of collective leadership to 
rely on. Since coming to power in 2000, Putin has improvised with an informal system 
that has drawn on a coterie of colleagues from his service in the KGB and in St. 
Petersburg’s municipal government. The new governance reforms will tax the limited 
pool of competent people at his disposal. Dmitrii Kozak’s appointment illustrates 
Putin’s dilemmas. Kozak is a close associate of Putin’s from his St. Petersburg days. 
He has already had a number of appointments in the Russian government apparatus 
and the Presidential Administration, and was formerly in charge of modernising the 
federal government bureaucracy.
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In essence, Putin has replaced power-sharing agreements with Russia’s regions and 
direct elections with a network of his own emissaries or viceroys, like Dmitrii Kozak. 
International precedents, as well as Russia’s own historical experience of the tsarist 
and Soviet period, indicates that this approach will do little to resolve Russia’s long­
term and deep-rooted problems in regions like North Caucasus. It can provide a 
temporary fix at best. Trusted aides like Kozak cannot be shifted around from position 
to position indefinitely as new challenges arise. As a consequence, governance reforms 
based on central appointments run the risk of creating a hollow, watered-down state, 
rather than a strong or effective one at either the federal or local level.
In essence, since Putin’s accession to power in 2000, he has done more to reverse most 
of the trends towards regional autonomy upon which this study has been based. His 
strong arm has seen a shift to centralise power back to Moscow by reducing the 
willingness to negotiate with territories as well as by ensuring central government is 
key to determining who the key players in local politics are. Putin has, thus, reduced 
the role of regions, such as the Far East, and their ability to be considered part of the 
international political economy.
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Figure A 1.3:
The Far East Between Russia and Japan
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Figure A 1.4:
The Disputed Islands Chain
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Figure A 1.5:
The Disputed Territories and the 1855 Shimoda Treaty
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Figure A 1.6:
The Disputed Territories and the 1875 St. Petersburg Treaty
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FigureA1.7:
The Disputed Territories and the 1905 Portsmouth Treaty
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Figure A1.8:
The Disputed Territories and the 1951 San Francisco Treaty
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Figure A1.10:
The Korean Peninsula/North-East Asia
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Appendix 2:
Territories and Treaties 
-  The Origins of Russian-Japanese Conflict
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Appendix 2: Territories and Treaties -  The Origins of Russian-Japanese Conflict
Between the Sea of Okhotsk and North Pacific there sit a tiny chain of islands the 
Russians call the Kurils and the Japanese the Northern Territories (see Figure A 1.4). 
Normally these ancient volcanic peaks would be of little interest to most, aside 
geologists and anthropologists. Along with Sakhalin Island they form Sakhalin Oblast 
-  a Far Eastern territory. Russian exploration of these territories began in the 1600s. 
By the 1700s, Japan was exploring and settling Sakhalin and the Kurils too, 
establishing factories and fishing communities. It was this co-exploration and 
settlement that gave rise to the Russian-Japanese territorial dispute. Russian-Japanese 
relations have long been explained to the territorial dispute. But this explanation is 
more rhetoric than reality, more symbolism than substance, more excuse than 
explanation.1 The issue dominates Russian-Japanese relations. The territorial dispute 
has been central to Russian and Soviet relations with Japan. The issue has rendered 
full amity all but impossible, preventing a post-WWII peace treaty.2 Japan believes 
normalising relations with Russia would benefit both sides, North-East Asia and more. 
She sees a positive correlation between the territorial dispute’s resolution and normal
'j
relations. Historically, both Russia/Soviet Union and Japan were concerned with 
ownership claims rather than the truth, law or justice.4 The principal effort of Soviet 
historians was to claim Sakhalin and the Kurils by rights of earliest settlement and 
assimilation. Regrettably, this obsessive search for ownership left little room for 
objectivity. Japanese historians have been just as successful in dismissing myths about
’Moodgal, Rahul N., “Russia/Japan -  Closer Links” in Oxford Analvtica Daily Bulletin. August 13, 
1997, pp.8-9; Katori, Yasue, “Japanese-Soviet Relations -  Past, Present and Future” in Japan Review of 
International Affairs. Vol.4, No.3, Fall/Winter, 1990, pp. 127-141; Kawato, Akio, “Beyond the Myth of 
Asian Values -  Is a Clash of Cultures Inevitable?” in Chuokoron. December 1995, pp. 1-11. The 
territorial dispute concerns three main islands (Kunashiri, Etorofu, Shikotan) and the Habomai group of 
three smaller islands, lying of the tip of Hokkaido. Japan accuses Russia (and previously the Soviet 
Union) of illegally occupying the islands since the end of WWII. Claims for (southern) Sakhalin have 
also been made, but these have, largely, ceased. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs -  Japan documents still 
highlight the disputed islands and southern Sakhalin in the same colour as Japan in maps showing 
Russia and Japan.)
2Matsumoto, Shun-ichi, Northern Territories and Russo-Japanese Relations. Northern Territories Policy 
Association, Tokyo, Japan, 1970, pp. 1-2.
3Izvestiia, April 21, 1992 and May 5, 1992; See Allison, Graham, Kimura, Hiroshi, and Sarkisov, 
Konstantin (Eds.), Beyond the Cold War to Trilateral Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region -  
Scenarios for New Relationships Between Japan. Russia and the US. Harvard University, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, US, 1992, Appendix F.
4Kamiya, Fuji, “The Northern Territories -  130 Years of Japanese Talks with Csarist Russia and the 
Soviet Union” in Zagoria, Donald S. (Ed.), Soviet Policy in East Asia. Yale University Press, New
Haven, Connecticut, US, 1982, pp.121-151.
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early assimilation.5 But it remains unclear when Japanese exploration of these 
territories exactly commenced.6
n
Japan claims the islands have never been under the jurisdiction of any other state. 
Supporting this contention, Japan cites two treaties with tsarist Russia -  the 1855 
Shimoda Treaty (see Figure A 1.5) and the 1875 St. Petersburg Treaty (see Figure 
A 1.6) -  as the initial point of her argument that the islands are part of Hokkaido. Japan 
also holds that the 1951 San Francisco Treaty (see Figure A1.8) provides no legal 
basis for Russian control of the territories. The contention is the interpretation of the 
San Francisco Treaty (see Figure A1.8). Under Article 2, section (c), Japan renounces 
all right, title and claim to the Kuril Islands, and to that portion o f Sakhalin and the 
islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence o f the 
Treaty o f Portsmouth o f September 5, 1905 (see Figure A 1.7). The peace treaty does 
not specify to whom these territories were relinquished; it also does not define what 
territories compose the Kuril Islands. What’s more the Soviet Union refused to sign
O
the treaty. The Portsmouth Treaty (see Figure A 1.7) marked Russia’s decline and 
Japan’s emergence. Article 2, section (c) can be interpreted as a symbolic 
manifestation of this double character.9 Russia’s claim to these islands is based on law 
and history. She states she landed and conquered the islands before Japan, and the 
island’s residents were Russian first.10 Indeed, wartime allied agreements and the San
Japanese Embassy, Sevemie Territory Yaponi, Japanese Embassy, Moscow, Russia, 1992, pp.3-11. 
Geographical features of the disputed islands suggest closer links with Hokkaido than the rest of the 
Kurils. According to botanists, flora found on Hokkaido and the disputed islands favours Japanese 
botany, while the rest of the Kurils are more Sub-Arctic -  closer to Russia’s geographical character.
7Ministry of Foreign Affairs -  Japan -Public Information Bureau, The Northern Islands -  Background 
of Territorial Problems in the Japanese-Soviet Negotiations. Ministry of Foreign Affairs -  Japan, 
Tokyo, Japan, 1955, p.7.
8Treaty ending the Russian-Japanese war. Germany, the US and Britain were instrumental in forcing 
reconciliations. Russia was compelled to recognise Korea’s independence and Japan’s paramount 
political, military and economic interests in Korea. Russia also agreed to place Manchuria under 
China’s sovereignty again and all foreign troops removed. Railways in South Manchuria, constructed by 
Russia, were ceded to Japan without payment. The disputed Liaotung Peninsula, containing ports 
Dalian and Arthur, and southern Sakhalin, became Japanese, as did Far Eastern fishing rights.
9Tsuyoshi, Hasegawa, “Rethinking the Russo-Japanese Territorial Dispute” in Japan Echo, Vol.22, 
No.4, Winter 1995, pp.4-11.
10Izvestiia, November 13, 1970: ‘...Russian explorers [learned] of the Kurils as early as 1632, when no 
one on the... islands... knew... Japan existed. When they were discovered by Russia, the Kurils and 
Sakhalin were inhabited by the Ainu and Siberian nationalities... Even much later, in 1726, Russian 
navigators [failed to see Japanese] on the Kurils. [It was impossible for] Japanese to be [on the islands], 
since the laws of that time, under the rule of the Tokugawa Shoguns, forbade... Japanese to leave their 
[homeland]... Japanese historians... wrote... Sakhalin, ...the Kurils... [and] even the islands of Ezo (now 
Hokkaido), were not regarded as possessions of Japan until the middle of the nineteenth century’.
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Francisco Treaty are also used to confirm Russian claims.11 Japan disputes Russia’s 
historical facts, arguing the issue is not initial discovery but whom effectively ruled. 
Russia rejects Japan's claims based on the Shimoda and St. Petersburg Treaties; the 
reason being Japan initiated war against Russia in 1904 so violating these treaties. 
Japan also invaded northern Sakhalin, the Far East and Siberia in the 1920s, violating 
the 1905 Treaty.
The Shimoda Treaty (see Figure A1.5) initiated exchanges between Russia and Japan,
establishing a boundary between Etorofu and Uruppu, but not for Sakhalin.12
Subsequently, there was mixed Russian and Japanese settlement of the island. The St.
Petersburg Treaty (see Figure A 1.6) established boundaries -  making the Kurils
Russian and Sakhalin Japanese. However, the treaty did not state the Kurils were a
1 ^chain of eighteen islands north of Uruppu and excluded today’s disputed islands. The 
Postdam Declaration confirmed the disputed islands were not Japanese.14 In August 
1945 the Soviet Union violated a neutrality agreement with Japan and entered into 
war. After seizing southern Sakhalin the Soviet military seized the disputed 
territories.15 They were incorporated into Soviet territory in 1946;16 Soviets replaced 
the island’s Japanese inhabitants.17 The subsequent San Francisco Peace Treaty (see 
Figure A 1.8) saw Japan renounce her rights to Sakhalin and the Kurils although the 
Kuril Islands she renounced excluded the disputed territories.
nKim, Young C., Japanese-Soviet Relations -  Interaction of Politics. Economics and National Security. 
The Washington Papers, Vol.2, The Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown 
University, Sage Publications, Beverley Hills, California, US, 1974, pp.29-47.
12See Stephan, John J., Ezo Under the Tokugawa Bakufu. 1798-1821 -  An Aspect of Japan’s Frontier 
History. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of London, London, UK, 1969.
13The Asahi Evening News. June 7, 1978.
14The Postdam Declaration (Scpain No.677): General Headquarter Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers (January 29, 1946) -  Memorandum for Imperial Japanese Government through Central Liaison 
Office, Tokyo. Subject -  Governmental and Administrative Separation of Certain Outlying Areas from 
Japan: 3. For the purpose of this directive, Japan is defined as her four main islands (Hokkaido, Honshu, 
Kyushu and Shikoku)... and excluding ...(c )  the Kuril (Chishima) Islands, the Habomai and Hapomaze 
Islands... (including Suisho, Yuri, Akiyuri, Shibotsu and Taraku...) and Shikotan.
15The Mainichi Daily News, September 26, 1979.
16On February 25, 1947, the Soviet Presidium amended Article No.22 of the constitution by detaching 
Sakhalin and the Kurils from Khabarovsk and making them into an independent unit -  Sakhalin Oblast.
17See Panov, Alexander N., Beyond Distrust to Trust -  Inside the Northern Territories Talks with Japan. 
Simul’ Press, Tokyo, Japan, 1992.
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In June 1955, the Soviet Union and Japan began negotiations for the termination of a 
state of war, the signing of a peace treaty and the restoration of diplomatic relations.18 
In September 1956, Japan’s Plenipotentiary Representative Matsumoto and Soviet 
First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Gromyko exchanged letters, agreeing to 
continue peace treaty negotiations, including the territorial issue, after the re­
establishment of diplomatic relations.19 On October 19, 1956, the Soviet Union and 
Japan signed the Joint Declaration -  determining post-war processes ending the state 
of war.20 The declaration clearly stated two islands (Habomai and Shikotan) would be 
returned to Japan, following the conclusion of a peace treaty {the two-plus-two 
solution). The 1960 renewal of the Japan-US Security Treaty saw the Soviet Union 
demand all foreign military be eliminated from Japan as a prerequisite to returning two 
of the islands. But the US military had been stationed in Japan prior to the declaration, 
and as the declaration had been ratified by both states and submitted to the UN, it was 
impossible to change its content. In October 1973 Prime Minister Tanaka went to 
Moscow to meet Brezhnev. The two leaders confirmed the territorial issue remained 
unresolved. Aware of this, the Soviet Union almost agreed to returning two of the 
disputed islands, hinting others could follow. However, after bellicose demands from 
Tanaka for a return of all islands, an angry Brezhnev retracted the offer. After the 
meeting, the Soviet Union refused to acknowledge the territorial issue’s existence.21
It was in this atmosphere Japanese Foreign Minister Sonoda visited the Soviet Union 
in January 1978 to conduct negotiations on a peace treaty. During these negotiations, 
Sonoda repeatedly stated that Japan's position regarding the signing of a peace treaty 
was expressly based on resolving the territorial issue in Japan's favour.22 But no
18Garthoff, Rayomnd L., “A Diplomatic History of the Dispute” in Goody, James E., Ivanov, Vladimir 
I., and Shimotamai, Nobuo (Eds.), “Northern Territories” and Beyond -  Russian. Japanese and 
American Perspectives, Praeger Publishers under the auspices of the US Institute of Peace, Westport, 
Connecticut, US, 1995, p. 17.
19Interestingly, at the request of Japanese Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, the US sent a memorandum 
confirming support for Japan (September 7, 1956); they stated the islands had always been Japanese.
20Frankland, Noble (Ed.), Documents on International Affairs. Oxford University Press, London, UK, 
1959, p.751. ‘...In this connection, the Soviet Union, desiring to meet the wishes of Japan and taking 
into consideration the interests of the Japanese nation, agrees to transfer to Japan the Habomai Islands 
and the Island of Shikotan, the actual transfer of these islands to Japan to take place after the conclusion 
of a Peace Treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union... ’
2‘Author’s interview with Muakami, Takashi, Professor of Economics, Slavic Research Centre, 
Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Hokkaido, Japan, October 20, 1997.
22Nakagawa, Torn, “Japan’s Northern Territories in International Politics” in Japan Review of 
International Affairs. Vol.2, N o.l, Spring/Summer 1988, pp.3-24.
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resolution was reached. Subsequent pre-1991 attempts to resolve the territorial 
disputes also resulted in stalemate.23 Indeed, to the end of the Pre-Putin period the 
issue remained unresolved.
23Hiroshi, Kimura, “Money for Moscow -  A Test Case for Japanese Diplomacy” in Japan Echo. Vol.20, 
No.3, Autumn 1993, pp.64-67; and Hiroshi, Kimura, "Reluctance About Aid to Russia" in Japan Echo. 
Vol.20, No.3, Autumn 1993, p55.
Appendix 3: 
Fieldwork Diary
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Figure A3.1: Fieldwork Diary
Interviewee Date Affiliation Type
Moscow
Anatoli Chubais Jul 11, 1995 Russian Government Official
Victor Pavliantenko Nov 15, 1996 Centre for Japanese Studies Academic
Kunio Okada Nov 16, 1996 Japan Association for Trade with Russia and Central-Eastern Europe (ROTOBO) Official
Iwao Ohashi Nov 17, 1996 Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO) Official
Victor Snegir Nov 18, 1996 British Embassy Official
Khabarovsk
Alexander Sheingauz Dec 11, 1996 Khabarovsk Economic Research Institute (KERI) Academic
Vladivostok
Elena Danish Nov 28, 1996 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) Official
Irina Boiko Nov 29, 1996 Far Eastern Centre for Economic Development (FECED) Academic
Alexander Abramov Nov 29, 1996 Far Eastern Centre for Economic Development (FECED) Academic
Gennadi Nesov Nov 30,1996 Primor’e Territory Government Committee for Shipping, Sea Ports, Communications 
and Transportation
Official
Vladimir Kojevnikov Dec 3, 1996 Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography of the Peoples of the Far East Academic
Ishihara Koji Dec 4, 1996 Consulate-General of Japan at Vladivostok Official
Evegeni Zharikov Dec 4, 1996 Pacific Economic Development and Cooperation Centre (PEDCC) Academic
Tatiiana Kapelush Dec 9, 1996 United States Department of Commerce Official
Vladimir Saprikin Dec 12, 1996 Municipality of Vladivostok City Official
Tokyo
Sim Yee Lau Jan 1, 1997 
Jan 16, 1997 
Oct 29, 1997
Sasakawa Peace Foundation Academic
Takeo Ishino Jan 8, 1997 Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO) Official
Hiromi Yusa Jan 8, 1997 
Jan 9, 1997
Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO) Official
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Tadayuki Hochi Jan 13, 1997 
Oct 29, 1997
Japan Association for Trade with Russia and Central-Eastern Europe (ROTOBO) Official
Kazuo Ogawa Jan 13, 1997 
Oct 29, 1997
Japan Association for Trade with Russia and Central-Eastern Europe (ROTOBO) Official
Shingo Yoshida Jan 13, 1997 
Oct 29, 1997
Japan Association for Trade with Russia and Central-Eastern Europe (ROTOBO) Official
Tadayuki Miyashita Jan 17, 1997 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Official
Mikoto Katagiri Jan 21, 1997 Mitsubishi Corporation Business
Igor Kazakov Jan 21, 1997 Trade Representation of the Russian Federation in Japan Official
Pavel Minakir Jan 22, 1997 Khabarovsk Economic Research Institute (KERI) Academic
Kensaku Kumabe Jan 23, 1997 Export-Import (EXIM) Bank of Japan Official
Ukeru Magosaki Jan 23, 1997 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Official
Akira Tateyama Oct 15, 1997 Japan Institute of International Relations (JIIR) Academic
Akira Maejima Oct 17, 1997 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Official
Motoya Nakamura Oct 17, 1997 Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO) Official
Takashi Shirasu Oct 29, 1997 Sasakawa Peace Foundation Academic
Sunsuke Nakagawara Oct 30, 1997 Mitsui and Company Business
Hisao Kanamori Oct 31, 1997 Japan Centre for Economic Research (JCER) Official
Osami Kanno Oct 31, 1997 Sakhalin Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (SODECO) Business
Koichi Ninomiya Oct 31, 1997 Mitsubishi Corporation Business
Kazuya Sato Oct 31, 1997 Sakhalin Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (SODECO) Business
Kunio Okada Nov 6, 1996 Japan Association for Trade with Russia and Central-Eastern Europe (ROTOBO) Official
Iwao Ohashi Nov 12, 1996 Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO) Official
Kyoto
Satoshi Mizobata Oct 24, 1997 Kyoto Institute of Economic Research (KIER) Academic
Niigata
Vladimir Ivanov Jan 22, 1997 
Oct 22, 1997 
Oct 28, 1997
Economic Research Institute for North-East Asia (ERINA) Academic
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Hisako Tsuji Oct 27, 1997 Economic Research Institute for North-East Asia (ERINA) Academic
Karla Smith Oct 28, 1997 Economic Research Institute for North-East Asia (ERINA) Academic
Sapporo
Hayashi Tadayuki Oct 20, 1997 Hokkaido University Academic
Shugo Minagawa Oct 20, 1997 Hokkaido University Academic
Takashi Murakami Oct 20, 1997 Hokkaido University Academic
Hawai’i
John Stephan Feb 2, 1997 University of Hawai’i at Manoa Academic
Patricia Polansky Feb 3, 1997 University of Hawai’i at Manoa Academic
Robert Valliant Feb 3, 1997 University of Hawai’i at Manoa Academic
James Dorian Feb 4, 1997 East-West Centre (EWC) Academic
Mark Valencia Feb 5, 1997 East-West Centre (EWC) Academic
John Tichotsky Feb 6, 1997 University of Hawai’i at Manoa Academic
Seattle
Jay Baird Feb 11,1997 Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESCO) Business
Kathryn Terry Feb 11, 1997 Foundation for Russian-American Cooperation Official
Elisa Miller Feb 12, 1997 Russian Far East (RFE) Update Academic
Craig ZumBrunnen Feb 12, 1997 University of Washington Academic
Judith Thornton Feb 12, 1997 University of Washington Academic
Arland Tussing Feb 13,1997 Arland R. Tussing and Associates (ARTA) Business
Alice Anderson Feb 13,1997 Sunmar Shipping Incorporated Business
New York
Nathan Shklyar Feb 19, 1997 Institute of East-West Studies (IEWS) Academic
Boston
Akio Kawato Jul 18, 1996 Consul-General of Japan Official
Notes: Positions refer to those at the time of interview and these may have since changed.
Listings are done on a date basis.
Where meetings were held more than once, the listings have been ordered based on the date of the first meeting.
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Figure A3.2: Interview Sample Categorisations
Interview Type
Interviewee Type Number of Interviews % of Interview Sample
Official 25 41.7%
Academic 27 45%
Business 8 13.3%
TOTAL 60 100.0%
Interview Geography
Interviewee Location Number of Interviews % of Interview Sample
Russia 15 25%
Japan 30 50%
US 15 25%
TOTAL 60 100.0%
Subnational/National Composition of Interviews
Subnational/Location Number of Interviews % of Interview Sample
Subnational 32 53.3%
National 28 46.7%
TOTAL 60 100.0%
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Appendix 4:
Major Events in Russian-Japanese Relations,
1992-1998
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Figure A4.1: Major Events in Russian-Japanese Relations, 1992-1998
Year Major Events Other Events
1992 September
Joint Compendium Document on History of Territorial Problems Between 
Russia and Japan released
September
El’tsin cancels visit to Japan
1993 October
El’tsin visits Japan
November
Japanese consuls in Vladivostok and Khabarovsk opened
1994 March
Foreign Minister Hata visit Russia 
September
Russian-Japanese Foreign Ministers meet at UN General Assembly 
November
First Deputy Prime Minister Soskovets visits Japan
February
First Trilateral Forum on North Pacific Security (Tokyo)
1995 March
Foreign Minister Kozyrev visits Japan 
August
Russian-Japanese Foreign Ministers meet in Brunei at ASEAN forum
March
First round of negotiations on a framework for fishing 
operations in waters around the Northern Territories 
April
State Duma Speaker Ribkin visits Japan
1996 March
Foreign Minister Ikdea visits Russia 
April
Russian-Japanese bilateral summit (Nuclear Safety Summit, Moscow) 
June
Russian and Japanese Foreign Ministers meeting (Lyons Summit)
July
Russian-Japanese Foreign Ministers meet in Indonesia at ASEAN forum 
September
Russian-Japanese Foreign Ministers meet at UN General Assembly
April
Defence Agency Director General Usui visits Russia 
June-July
Presidential election in Russia 
July
Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force visits Vladivostok
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November
Foreign Minister Primakov visits Japan
1997 January
Tokyo meeting on Russian-Japanese relations 
May
Foreign Minister Ikeda visits Russia 
June
First Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov visits Japan 
Russian-Japanese bilateral summit (Denver Summit)
Russian-Japanese Foreign Ministers meet at ceremony returning Hong
Kong to China
July
Russian-Japanese Foreign Ministers meet in Malaysia at ASEAN forum 
Prime Minister Hashimoto addresses Japan Association of Corporate 
Executives 
September
Russian-Japanese Foreign Ministers meet at UN General Assembly 
October
Russian-Japanese natural resource projects announced 
November
Russian-Japanese bilateral summit in Krasnoyarsk 
Foreign Minister Primakov visits Japan
May
Defence Minister Rodionov visits Japan 
June
Russian naval vessel visits Tokyo 
October
Federation Council Speaker Stroyev visits Japan 
November
Opening of Japanese consular office in Sakhalin 
December
Essential agreement reached in negotiations on framework 
for fishing operations in disputed territories waters
1998 February
Prime Minister Obuchi visits Russia 
April
Russian-Japanese bilateral summit in Kawana 
May
Russian-Japanese Foreign Ministers meet at G8, London 
Russian-Japanese bilateral summit, Birmingham
March
Prime Minister Chemomirdin replaced by Kiryenko 
May
Joint Staff Council Chairman Natsukawa visits Russia 
July
Joint exercise by the Japanese Self-Defence Forces and 
Russian military for search and rescue operations
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June
Russian-Japanese Foreign Ministers meet at G8, London 
July
Prime Minister Kirienko visits Japan
Russian-Japanese Foreign Ministers meet in Manila at ASEAN forum 
September
Senior Foreign Policy Advisor Hashimoto visits Russia 
Russian-Japanese Foreign Ministers meeting (UN General Assembly) 
October
Foreign Minister Koumura visits Russia 
November
Prime Minister Obuchi visits Russia
Sakhalin-Hokkaido Cooperation Agreement______________________
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August
Prime Minister Kirienko dismissed 
Russian financial markets collapse 
September
Primakov appointed Prime Minister 
December
Chief of Staff Kiashnin visits Japan
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> Proceedings of the International Conference, Ekonomika Dal’nego Vostoka v 
Ysloviiakh Reformy (From the Russian: The Far Eastern Economy Under 
Conditions of Reform), Khabarovsk, November 22-24, 1994, Russian Academy of 
Sciences Far Eastern Branch Economic Research Institute, Dalnoaka, Khabarovsk- 
Vladivostok, Russia, 1995
>  Proceedings of the Second Scientific Conference, Ekonomika Dal’nego Vostoka v 
Ysloviakh Reformy (From the Russian: The Far Eastern Economy Under 
Conditions of Reform), Khabarovsk, November 28-29, 1995, Russian Academy of 
Sciences Far Eastern Branch Economic Research Institute, Dalnoaka, Khabarovsk- 
Vladivostok, Russia, 1995
>  Proceedings of the Third International Scientific Conference, Ekonomika 
Mezhdunarodnie Sortridnichestva na Dal’nem Vostoke Rossii (From the Russian: 
Economic Development and International Cooperation in the Russian Far East), 
May 13-14, 1996, Khabarovsk, Russian Academy of Sciences Far Eastern Branch 
Economic Research Institute, Dalnaoka, Khabarovsk-Vladivostok, Russia, 1996
> Prokhorov, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, K Vaprosu o Sovietskoi-Kitaiskoi Granitse 
(From the Russian: Towards Questions on the Soviet-Chinese Border), 
Mezhdunarodhnie Otnasheniia, Moscow, Russia, 1975
> Promvshlennost Rossiskoi Federatsii 1992 (From the Russian: Industry of the 
Russian Federation 1992), Moscow, Russia, 1992
> Radischchev, A.N., Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii (From the Russian: Complete 
Collected Works), AN SSR, Moscow-St. Petersburg, Russia, Vol.3, 1952
> Rossiskii Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik 1994 g. (From the Russian: Russian 
Statistical Yearbook 1994), Moscow, Russia, 1994
> Respublika Sakha (Yakutiia) v Tsifrakh 1991 [From the Russian: The Republic of 
Sakha (Yakutiia) in Figures, 1991], Yakutsk, Sakha, Russia, 1992
> Respublika Sakha (Yakutiia) v Tsifrakh 1992 [From the Russian: The Republic of 
Sakha (Yakutiia) in Figures, 1992], Yakutsk, Sakha, Russia, 1993
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>  Riabov, Nikolai Ivanovich, and Shtein, Moisei Grigorevich, Ocherki Istorii 
Russkogo Dal’nego Vostoka, 17-19 vv, (From the Russian: Essays on the History 
of the Russian Far East, 17-19 Century), Dalgiz, Khabarovsk, Russia, 1939
>  Ryankkava, F.N. (Ed.), Evreiska Avtonomnaia Oblast’ (From the Russian: 
Yevreiska Autonomous Oblast), Informatsionna-Izdatel’skii Otdel Instituta 
Kompleksnogo Analiza Regionalnikh Problem DVO Rossiskoi Akadsemi Nauk, 
Moscow, Russia, 1992
>  Russia -  Political and Economic Analysis and Business Directory. Foreign 
Investment Promotion Centre (FIPC) under the Ministry of Economy of Russia, 
Chamber World Reports, Moscow, Russia, 1996
> Russko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia. 1689-1916 (From the Russian: Russian-Chinese 
Relations, 1689-1916), AN, Moscow, Russia, 1958
> Ribakovski, Leonid Leonidovich, Naselenie Dal’nego Vostoka za 150 let (From 
the Russian: Far Eastern Violence for 150 Years), Nauka, Moscow, Russia, 1990
> Safronov, F.G., Russkie na Severo-Vostoke Azi v XVII-Seredine XIX v (From the 
Russian: Russia in North-East Asia in the Seventeenth Century to the Middle of 
the Nineteenth Century), Nauka, Moscow, Russia, 1978
> Serebiiakov, V., Diachenko B., and Kongorova, C., Zoltaiia Oposnost (From the 
Russian: Yellow Dangers), Izdarelstva Varon, Vladivostok, Russia, 1996
> Sergeev, V.D., Stranitsi Istorii Kamchatki (From the Russian: Pages in the History 
of Kamchatka), Petropavlovsk-Kamchatski Dal’no Vostochnoe Knizhnoe 
Izdatel’svo, Kamchatka, Russia, 1992
> Sheingauz, Alexander S., Karakin, Vladimir P., and Tyukalov, Vladimir A., Forest 
Sector of the Russian Far East -  A Status Report. USAID-Sponsored Russian Far 
East Sustainable Natural Resource Management Project USAID EPT/RFE, 
Russian Academy of Sciences Far Eastern Branch Economic Research Institute, 
Khabarovsk-Vladivostok, Russia, 1996
> Sibir’ i Dalnii Vostok v Tsifrakh 1992 (From the Russian: Siberia and the Far East 
in Numbers, 1992), Moscow, Russia, 1992
> Solovyov, Sergei, Ekolagiia i Ekonomika v Kamchatke (From the Russian: 
Ecology and Economics in Kamchatka), Friends of the Earth-Japan, Vladivostok, 
Russia, 1995
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>  Sotsiarno-Ekonomicheskoe Polazhenie Khabarovskogo Kraia za Yanvar-Dekabr
1992 goda (From the Russian: Social-Economic Indicators of Khabarovsk Krai 
From January to December 1992), Goskomstat Rossy Moscow, 1993
> Statisticheskii Bulleten No.l -  Nekatorie Pokazateli Ekonomiki Rossiskoi 
Federatsi v 1992 godu (From the Russian: Statistical Bulletin No.l -  Certain 
Economic Indicators of the Russian Federation), Moscow, Russia, 1992
> Struchenko, I.G., and Dimitrenko, A.V., Vladivostok (From the Russian) Russian 
Academy of Sciences Far Eastern Branch Economic Research Institute, 
Vladivostok, Russia, 1993
>  Tikhomirov, Mikhail Nikolaevich, Sbomik Statei po Istori Dal’nego Vostoka 
(From the Russian: The Anthology State in the History of the Far East), AN, 
Moscow, Russia, 1958
>  Tokarev, Sergei Aleksandrovich, Ocherk Istorii Yakutskogo Naroda (From the 
Russian: An Essay on the History of the Yakutsk People), Gosizdat, Moscow, 
Russia, 1940
>  Trotsky, Leon, The Third International After Lenin -  The Draft Programme of the 
Communist International -  A Criticism of Fundamentals. Moscow, Russia, 1928
>  Turkin, Vladimir, Moskva-Pekin -  Stikhi (From the Russian: Moscow-Beijing -  
Poetry), Primizdat, Vladivostok, Russia, 1951
>  Vinakorava, M.M., Galavatenko, A.U., and Klakova, G.V., Vneshnaiia Politika 
Rossii na Dal’nem Vostoke -  Konsta XIX-Nachala XXgg. (From the Russian: 
Russian Foreign Policy in the Far East -  End of the Nineteenth Century-Beginning 
of the Twentieth Century), Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia, 1993
>  Vinogradov, A., DaTnikh Kraiakh (From the Russian: Eastern Krais), I.N. 
Kushnerev, Moscow, Russia, 1901
> Vladivostok City Administration, Vladivostok -  135 Years. Ussuri Books, 
Vladivostok, Russia, 1995
> ------- Vladivostok -  An Atlas (From the Russian) Ussuri Books, Vladivostok,
Russia, 1995
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RUSSIAN WRITTEN SOURCES -  JOURNALS AND NEWSPAPERS
> Acta Slavica Yaponika (From the Russian: The Glorious Acts of Japan)
> Argumenty i Fakti (From the Russian: The Arguments and The Facts)
>  Bulleten Dragotsennie Metalli i Dragotsennie Kamni (From the Russian: Bulletin 
of Precious Metals and Precious Stones)
> Business in Russia
> Coudert Brothers -  Attorneys at Law (Moscow Office) Archives (English and 
Russian)
> Dalnii Vostok (From the Russian: The Far East)
>  The Economic Life of the Russian Far East (EL-RFE)
>  Ekonomicheskaia Gazeta (From the Russian: The Economic Newspaper)
> Ekonomika i Zhizn’ (From the Russian: Economics and Life)
> Far Eastern Affairs
>  The Foreign Investment Promotion Centre (FIPC) under the Ministry of Economy 
of the Russian Federation (http://www.fipc.ru)
> Goskomstat Rossii (From the Russian: The Russian State Committee for 
Statistics)
> Interfax
> International Affairs
> International Affairs (Russia)
> Itar-Tass Foreign News Update
> Izvestiia (From the Russian: It is Known)
>  Izvestiia Sibirskogo Akademi Nauk SSSR (From the Russian: USSR Academy of 
Sciences, -  Siberian Branch)
>  Kommersant (From the Russian: The Merchant)
> Komsomolskaia Pravda (From the Russian: Cosmopolitan Truth)
> Konrif (From the Russian: Conrif)
> Krasnaia Zveda (From the Russian: The Red Star)
>  Living Here
> The Moscow Times
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> The Moscow Tribune
>  Moskovskie Novosti (From the Russian: The Moscow News)
>  News and Views from the Soviet Union
>  Nezavisimaia Gazeta (From the Russian: The Independent)
>  Novy Mir (From the Russian: New World)
>  Official Customs Statistics
>  Oktiabr’ (From the Russian: October)
>  Pravda (From the Russian: The Truth)
>  Priamurskie Vedomosti (From the Russian: Priamur Official Bulletin)
>  Problemy Dal’nego Vostoka (From the Russian: Problems of the Far East)
>  Rossiskaia Gazetta (From the Russian: The Russian Newspaper)
>  Rossiskie Vesti (From the Russian: The Russian Lead)
>  Revoloutsiia i Natsionalnosti (From the Russian: Revolution and Nationalism)
>  Revoloutsionnyi Vostok (From the Russian: The Revolutionary East)
>  Rossiskaia Gazetta
> Rossiskie Vesti
>  Russia Today (http://www.russiatoday.com)
>  Russian Information Agency (RIA)-Novosti (http://www.ria-novosti.com) 
(Russian and English)
> Severnaia Azia (From the Russian: Northern Asia)
>  Tas s/Itar-Tass
>  Tikhookeanskaia Zvezda (From the Russian: The Pacific Ocean Star)
> USSR Facts and Figures/Russia and Eurasia Facts and Figures
>  Vladivostok (From the Russian: Vladivostok)
>  Vladivostok News
> Vladivostok Today
>  Voprosi Ekonomiki
> World Economy and International Relations
> Yakutskie Vedomosti (From the Russian: Yakutsk Official Bulletin)
>  Yaponiia (From the Russian: Japan)
>  Zhizn’ Natsional’nostei (From the Russian: The Nationalistic Life)
>  Znakomtes Yaponiia (From the Russian: Introducing Japan)
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> Zvezda (From the Russian: The Star)
RUSSIAN INTERVIEW SOURCES3
Moscow
> Chubais, Anatoli, First Deputy Chairman of the Russian Government, Moscow, 
Russia, July 11, 19954
>  Ohashi, Iwao, Chief Representative, Moscow Liaison Office, Japan External 
Trade Organisation (JETRO), Moscow, Russia, November 17, 1996
>  Okada, Kunio, Institute for Russian and East European Studies (IREES), Japan 
Association for Trade with Russia and Central-Eastern Europe (ROTOBO), 
Moscow, Russia, November 16, 1998
> Pavlyantenko, Victor, Head, Centre for Japanese Studies, Russian Academy of 
Sciences Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Moscow, Russia, November 15, 1996
> Snegir, Victor, Commercial Officer, British Embassy, Moscow, Russia, November
18,1996
Khabarovsk
> Sheingauz, Alexander, Vice-Director, Russian Academy of Sciences Far Eastern 
Branch Economic Research Institute, Khabarovsk, Russia, December 11, 1996
Vladivostok
> Abramov, Alexander, Far Eastern Centre for Economic Development, 
Vladivostok, Russia, November 29, 1996
> Boiko, Irina, General Director, Far Eastern Centre for Economic Development, 
Vladivostok, Russia, November 29, 1996
>  Danysh, Elena, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s (EBRD’s) 
Regional Representative, Vladivostok, Russia, November 28, 1996
>  Kapelush, Tatyana, Commercial Assistant, United States Department of 
Commerce, Vladivostok, Russia, December 9, 1996
interviews refer to both formal interviews and general discussions. Positions of interviewees refer to
those at the time of interview and may have since changed.
4This refers to questions asked of the interviewee during the discussion that followed a lecture he had
given at The Moscow Institute of Social and Political Studies, Moscow, Russia.
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>  Kojevnikov, Vladimir, Head of the International Relations Laboratory, Institute of 
History, Archaeology and Ethnography of the Peoples of the Far East, 
Vladivostok, Russia, December 3, 1996
>  Koji, Ishihara, Attache, Consulate-General of Japan at Vladivostok, Vladivostok, 
Russia, December 4, 1996
>  Nesov, Gennady, Chairman, Primorye Territory Government Committee for 
Shipping, Sea Ports, Communications and Transportation, Vladivostok, Russia, 
November 30, 1996
> Saprikin, Vladimir, Chairman, International Relations Committee, Municipality of 
Vladivostok City, Vladivostok, Russia, December 12, 1996
>  Zharikov, Evgeny, Senior Researcher, Pacific Economic Development and 
Cooperation Centre, Russian Academy of Sciences Economic Research Institute, 
Vladivostok, Russia, December 4, 1996
RUSSIAN HUMAN, INSTITUTIONAL AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES5
Khabarovsk
> Buldakova, Valentina -  Head, International Department, Russian Academy of 
Sciences Far Eastern Branch Economic Research Institute
>  Fukalova, Marina -  Interpreter, International Department, Russian Academy of 
Sciences Far Eastern Branch Economic Research Institute
Vladivostok
> Filimonova, Elena -  Director, Department of International Programmes, Far 
Eastern State University
> Kalinicky, Marina -  Assistant, Department of International Programmes, Far 
Eastern State University
> Kuscheva, Natasha -  Senior Inspector, Department of International Programmes, 
Far Eastern State University
>  Podsushny, Valery -  Head, Information Analysis, Department of International 
Programmes, Far Eastern State University
Positions of the human resources refer to those at the time of interview and may have since changed.
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> Syedain, Hashi -  Editor-in-Chief, Vladivostok News
>  Japan Centre in Vladivostok
JAPANESE W RITTEN SOURCES -  TEXTS
> Defence Agency -  Japan, Defence of Japan, Defence Agency -  Japan, Tokyo, 
Japan, 1993
>   Defence of Japan, Defence Agency -  Japan, Tokyo, Japan, 1994
> Economic Research Institute for North-East Asia (ERINA), Japan and Russia in 
North-East Asia -  Building a Framework for Cooperation in the 21st Century, 
Report of the Workshop in Tainai, Niigata, July 29-30, 1997, Economic Research 
Institute for North-East Asia, Niigata, Japan, 1997
> Japan Centre for Economic Research (JCER), Long-Term Forecast for the Global 
Economy -  East Asia on the Road to Sustained Growth -In a Global Economy 
Japan is Loosing its Relative Position, Long-Term Forecast Team, Japan Centre 
for Economic Research, Tokyo, Japan, March 1996
> --------  Russian-Japanese Trade. Japan Centre for Economic Research, Tokyo,
Japan, 1997
> Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO), JETRO White Paper on Foreign 
Direct Investment 1996 -  Increasing Foreign Investment in APEC and Japan's 
Response. Japan External Trade Organisation, Tokyo, Japan, 1996
>  Japan-Russia Trade in 1995 (Summary in English). Japan External Trade
Organisation, Tokyo, Japan, 1996
>  White Paper on International Trade -  Japan 1996 Trade Statistics. Japan
External Trade Organisation, Tokyo, Japan, 1996
>  White Paper on International Trade -  Japan 1996 Trade Statistics. Japan
External Trade Organisation, Tokyo, Japan, 1997
>  JETRO Business Facts and Figures -  Nippon 1997. Japan External Trade
Organisation, Tokyo, Japan, 1997
> The Japan Times, Japanese Viewpoints. The Japan Times, Tokyo, Japan, 1995
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>  Matsumoto, Shun-ichi, Northern Territories and Russo-Japanese Relations, 
Northern Territories Policy Association, Tokyo, Japan, 1970
>  Minsitry of Foreign Affairs -  Japan, The Northern Territories -  Background of 
Territorial Problems in the Japanese-Soviet Negotiations, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs -  Japan, Public Information Bureau, Tokyo, Japan, 1955
>   The Position of the Japanese Government on the Northern Territorial Issue,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs -  Japan, Tokyo, Japan, 1965
>   Japan's Northern Territories. Ministry of Foreign Affairs -  Japan, Tokyo,
Japan, 1987
>   Japan's Basic Policy on Relations with the Russian Federation, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs -  Japan, Tokyo, Japan, April 13, 1993
>  Japan's Assistance to the Russian Federation. Ministry of Foreign Affairs -
Japan, Tokyo, Japan, October 1993
>  Takeeskaiia Deklaratsiia o Rossiska-Yaponskikh Otnosheniia (From the
Russian: Tokyo Declaration on Russian-Japanese Relations), Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs -  Japan, Tokyo, Japan, October 1993 (Russian)
>  Yaponiia i Rossiia -  v Interesak Padlinnogo Vzhaimapanimaniia (From the
Russian: Japan and Russia -  In Interesting Original Mutual Understanding), 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs -  Japan, Tokyo, Japan, 1996 (Russian)
>  --------  Yaponski Tsentr -  Deiatelnost Yaponskikh Tsenterov v Novikh
Nezhavisimikh Gosoodarstvakh (From the Russian: The Japan Centre -  Activities 
of the Japan Centres in the Newly Independent States), Ministry of Foreign Affairs
-Japan , March 1997 (Russian)
> Ministry of Foreign Affairs -  Japan -Newly Independent States Division, Outline 
of Japan's Assistance for Russia, Ministry of Japan -  Newly Independent States 
Division, Tokyo, Japan, 1996
>  Ministry of Foreign Affairs -  Japan -Public Information Bureau, The Northern 
Islands -  Background of Territorial Problems in the Japanese-Soviet Negotiations, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs -  Japan, Tokyo, Japan
>  Ministry of Foreign Affairs -  Japan -Secretariat of the Cooperation Committee, 
Japan's Assistance to the Newly Independent States. Ministry of Foreign Affairs -  
Japan -Secretariat of the Cooperation Committee, Tokyo, Japan, 1997
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> Japan's Assistance for the Newly Independent States -  Fact Sheet, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs -  Japan -Secretariat of the Cooperation Committee, April 1996
>  --------Japan's Assistant Programmes for Russia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs -
Japan -Secretariat of the Cooperation Committee, Tokyo, Japan, May 1997
> Panov, Alexander N., Beyond Distrust to Trust -  Inside the Northern Territories 
Talks with Japan, Simul’ Press, Tokyo, Japan, 1992
>  Panov, Viktor Ananevich, Amerikanskve Podlozhnye Dokumentv, Yosif Korot, 
Vladivostok, Russia, 1918
>  Research Institute for Peace and Security, Asian Security. 1994-95, Research 
Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo, Japan, 1994
>  --------Asian Security. 1995-96. Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo,
Japan, 1995
>  Takahashi, Hiroshi, Kuribayashi, Sumio, and Jeong, Kap-Young (Eds.), Trade and 
Industrial Development in Northeast Asia. Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Tokyo, 
Japan, 1995
>  Vladimirov, Aleksandr Borisovich, Condition. Problems and Prospects of 
Development of Russian Economy at a New Stage of Reforms. Department of 
Research Cooperation, Economic Research Institute, Economic Planning Agency, 
Tokyo, Japan, 1991
JAPANESE W RITTEN SOURCES -  JOURNALS AND NEWSPAPERS
> The Asahi Evening News (English)
>  Chuokoron (English)
>  Economic Research Institute of North-East Asia (ERINA) Report (English and 
Russian)
> Japan Echo (English)
>  Japan Quarterly (English)
> Japan Review of International Affairs (English)
>  The Japan Times (English)
>  The Japan Times Weekly (English)
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> The Japan Times Weekly International (English)
>  Japanese Diplomatic Blue Books
> Journal of Japanese Studies
> Journal of Japanese Trade and Industry (English)
> Konrif (English)
>  The Kyungwon Economics and Management Review (English)
>  The Mainichi Daily News (English)
>  Nippon -  Business Facts and Figures (English)
>  SOTOBO’s Joint Japan-US Symposium on the Russian Economy/ROTOBO’s 
Joint Japan-US Symposium on the Russian Economy (English)
JAPANESE INTERVIEW SOURCES6
Tokyo
> Hochi, Tadayuki, Research Development Department, Institute for Russian and 
East European Studies (IREES), Japan Association for Trade with Russia and 
Central-Eastern Europe (ROTOBO), Tokyo, Japan, January 13, 1997 and October 
29, 1997
> Ishino, Takeo, Senior Researcher, Overseas Research Department, Japan External 
Trade Organisation (JETRO), Tokyo, Japan, January 8, 1997
> Kanamori, Hisao, Adviser, Japan Centre for Economic Research (JCER), Tokyo, 
Japan, January 21, 1997 and October 16, 1997
> Kanno, Osami, Senior Managing Director, Sakhalin Oil and Gas Development 
Company Limited (SODECO), Tokyo, Japan, October 31, 1997
> Katagiri, Mikoto, Assistant General Manager, Development and Coordination 
Department, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Middle East Team, 
Mitsubishi Corporation, Tokyo, Japan, January 21, 1997
> Kazakov, Igor, Deputy Trade Representative, Trade Representation of the Russian 
Federation in Japan, Tokyo, Japan, January 21, 1997
interviews refer to both formal interviews and general discussions. Positions of interviewees refer to 
those at the time of interview and may have since changed.
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>  Kumabe, Kensaku, Assistant Director General, Loan Department 2 (Europe, 
Middle East and Africa), Export-Import Bank of Japan, Tokyo, Japan, January 23, 
1997
>  Lau, Sim Yee, Programme Officer, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Tokyo, Japan, 
January 1, 1997, January 16, 1997 and October 29, 1997
>  Maejima, Akira, Division for Assistance to the Newly Independent States, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, October 17, 1997
>  Magosaki, Ukeru, Hokkaido’s Ambassador to Tokyo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Tokyo, Japan, January 23, 1997
>  Minakir, Pavel, Director, Russian Academy of Sciences Far Eastern Branch 
Economic Research Institute (Khabarovsk, Russia), Tokyo, Japan, January 22, 
1997
> Miyashita, Tadayuki, Newly Independent States (NIS) Division, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, January 17, 1997
>  Nakagawara, Sunsuke, Manager, Overseas Coordination and Administration 
Department, Corporate Planning Division, Mitsui and Company Limited, Tokyo, 
Japan, October 30, 1997
>  Nakamura, Motoya, Russia and Eastern Europe Section, Overseas Research 
Department, Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO), Tokyo, Japan, October
17,1997
> Ninomiya, Koichi, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Middle East 
Team, Development and Coordination Department, Mitsubishi Corporation, 
Tokyo, Japan, October 31, 1997
> Ogawa, Kazuo, Director General, Institute for Russian and East European Studies 
(IREES), Japan Association for Trade with Russia and Central-Eastern Europe 
(ROTOBO), Tokyo, Japan, January 13, 1997 and October 29, 1997
>  Ohashi, Iwao, Chief Representative, Moscow Liaison Office, Japan External 
Trade Organisation (JETRO), Moscow, Russia, November 12, 1996
> Okado, Kunio, Institute for Russian and Eastern European Studies (IREES), Japan 
Association for Trade with Russia and Central-Eastern Europe (ROTOBO), 
Tokyo, Japan, November 6, 1996
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> Sato, Kazuya, General Manager, Administration Department, Sakhalin Oil and 
Gas Development Company Limited (SODECO), Tokyo, Japan, October 31, 1997
>  Shirasu, Takashi, Chief Programme Officer, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Tokyo, 
Japan, October 29, 1997
>  Tateyama, Akira, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Russian Studies, The Japan 
Institute for International Affairs (JIIA), Tokyo, Japan, October 15, 1997
>  Yoshida, Shingo, Institute for Russian and East European Studies (IREES), Japan 
Association for Trade with Russia and Central-Eastern Europe (ROTOBO), 
Tokyo, Japan, January 13, 1997 and October 29, 1997
>  Yusa, Hiromi, Russia and Eastern Europe Section, Overseas Research 
Department, Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO), Tokyo, Japan, January 
8, 1997 and January 9, 1997
Kyoto
> Mizobata, Satoshi, Associate Professor of Comparative Economics, Kyoto 
Institute of Economic Research (KIER), Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan, October 
24, 1997
Niigata
> Ivanov, Vladimir Ivanov, Senior Researcher, Economic Research Institute for 
North-East Asia (ERINA), Niigata, Japan, January 22, 1997, October 22, 1997 and 
October 28, 1997
>  Smith, Karla, Research Division, Economic Research Institute for North-East Asia 
(ERINA), Niigata, Japan, October 28, 1997
> Tsuji, Hisako, Senior Researcher, Research Division, Economic Research Institute 
for North-East Asia (ERINA), Niigata, Japan, October 27, 1997
Sapporo
> Hayashi, Tadayuki, Director, Slavic Research Centre, Hokkaido University, 
Sapporo, Hokkaido, Japan, October 20, 1997
> Minagawa, Shugo, Professor in Comparative Politics, Slavic Research Centre, 
Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Hokkaido, Japan, October 20, 1997
> Murakami, Takashi, Professor of Economics, Slavic Research Centre, Hokkaido 
University, Sapporo, Hokkaido, Japan, October 20, 1997
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JAPANESE HUMAN, INSTITUTIONAL AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES7
Tokyo
> Julia Gould
> Kinji Ishiguchi
> The Japan Foundation
>  The Japan Institute for Social and Economic Affairs
>  Japan Times Newspaper
> The National Diet Library
>  The Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund
>  The Russia-Japan Library
>  The Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and Industry
>  The Tokyo Trade Centre
> The United Nations University
Sapporo
> Srinivasan, Ancha -  Senior Researcher, Regional Science Institute
7Positions of the human resources refer to those at the time of interview and may have since changed.
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